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ABSTRACT
This thesis empirically examines the contribution of financial institutions to systemic
risk by looking at their interactions with market-based finance. The financial crisis of
2007-09 catalysed the transformation of the financial system with the introduction of
the post-crisis regulations, which were aimed at mitigating systemic risk by addressing
vulnerabilities that manifested in the crisis. This resulted in the increased resilience of the
banking sector, which was at the centre of the financial crisis, as well as the proliferation
of market-based finance as an alternative source of funding for corporations. Yet, as the
recent market turmoil due to Covid-19 has showcased, this has created new vulnerabilities
which necessitate the continuous assessment of the evolving financial system.
The thesis is based on three essays. The first essay examines the effects of the mandatory
collateralisation of over-the-counter derivatives contracts on counterparty, liquidity and
systemic risks of the largest dealer banks and central counterparties (CCPs). Using a
stress test network model calibrated to the banks’ balance sheet data, we document risk-
shifting effects in the form of risk transformation from counterparty to liquidity risk and a
reduction of systemic risk at the expense of increased propensity for contagion from the
CCP to its members. In addition, we find that the expansion of central clearing reduces
systemic risk, in accordance with regulatory predictions.
The second essay examines the effects of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on the under-
lying securities’ liquidity, returns and volatility via information links which are formed
when investors use information from one asset to price the other. Using a proprietary
dataset of Irish ETF holdings from the Central Bank of Ireland, we find that ETFs form
close information links with the underlying equities but weak ones with the underly-
ing corporate debt securities because of the higher accessibility of the former, leading to
stronger co-movements of liquidity, returns and volatility with the equities compared
to the corporate debt securities. The results indicate that ETFs can affect the underlying
markets in different ways depending on their accessibility, contributing to the ongoing
vi
debate on the role of ETFs in propagating shocks and systemic risk.
Finally, the third essay examines the resilience of banks to liquidity shocks originating
from money market funds (MMFs) using a stress test network model calibrated to the
full US MMF holdings data, following the introduction of post-crisis regulations in both
sectors. My findings suggest that while the banks can withstand a withdrawal of short-
term funding from MMFs due to their high liquidity reserves, the MMFs can incur severe
fire sales losses in the face of large redemption shocks and in the absence of a regulatory
authority acting as buyer of last resort of commercial paper, despite the regulations
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The financial crisis of 2007-09 revealed many of the vulnerabilities of the financial
system and shortcomings of the existing regulatory framework at the time. The banking
sector coexisted alongside a shadow banking sector that provided credit intermediation
through a long chain of intermediaries without appropriate regulatory oversight. These
intermediaries engaged in maturity and liquidity transformation by obtaining short-term
funding and investing in less liquid longer-term assets using leverage, and transferred
counterparty risk to other investors. By not being subject to bank regulations, shadow
banks such as broker-dealers were not eligible for emergency borrowing from the central
banks’ discount window and they facilitated the housing market boom by securitising
mortgage loans (often of low credit quality) and selling them to other investors. Impor-
tantly, the two sectors were closely interconnected as many shadow banking entities were
owned by banks to reduce the latter’s regulatory capital requirements while maintaining
exposure to the activities of the former (Acharya et al., 2013), and as such they benefited
from the sponsor banks’ implicit support due to reputational reasons. At the same time,
entities such as money market funds (MMFs) provided funding to the banking sector by
investing in short-term debt such as commercial paper.
When the crisis hit, the banking sector was undercapitalised as a result of these unregu-
lated activities and had no minimum liquidity requirements, leading to a global recession
1
when it was unable to continue extending credit to the real economy after facing losses
and a dry-up of funding (Cornett et al. (2011), Acharya and Mora (2015)). The shadow
banking sector was also a key transmitter of stress. Market participants engaged in bilat-
eral over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives trades that were often under- or uncollateralised,
creating a complex web of exposures and fostering systemic risk. MMFs investing in short-
term corporate debt experienced runs due to their structural vulnerabilities incentivising
investors to withdraw their funds before others, reducing lending and exacerbating the
funding problems of the financial sector while forcing sponsor banks to absorb the losses
according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IMF, 2010).
These events led to a rethinking of the regulatory framework that governs banks and
other financial institutions, and the emergence of macroprudential regulation that aims
to reduce systemic risk. Reforms were focused on strengthening the banks’ capital and
liquidity reserves via the introduction of Basel III as well as the resilience of shadow
banking entities such as MMFs, and on redesigning the functioning of financial markets
such as OTC derivatives via the mandatory clearing through central counterparties (CCPs)
and the collateralisation of non-centrally cleared trades as mandated by the Group of
Twenty (G20) (G20, 2009).
Today, most of these reforms have been fully implemented or are being finalised. The
finalised Basel III framework (also called Basel IV or Basel 3.1) is due to be implemented
by 2023, making banks more resilient during times of stress by increasing their capital
buffers and reducing their reliance on short-term wholesale funding. Derivatives reforms
have made the majority of interest rate and credit OTC derivatives trades to be centrally
cleared through CCPs, improving transparency and reducing exposures, while collateral
exchange in non-centrally cleared trades has been mandatory since 2016 for the largest
market participants, reducing counterparty risk. MMFs investing in corporate debt are
subject to more stringent liquidity requirements and mark-to-market their share prices to
reduce the incentive for investors to run on the fund.
The market reforms have helped transform the fragile shadow banking sector into
resilient market-based finance (MBF). The MBF sector, comprising mostly pension funds,
insurance companies and other investment funds such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs),
2
accounted for 49.5% of the global financial system in 2019, up from 42% in 2008, and plays
an increasingly important role in providing financing to the real economy according to
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (FSB, 2020a). This has been broadly seen as a positive
outcome for the resilience of the financial system as it diversifies risk away from banks and
provides an alternative source of funding if banks are unable to perform their core lending
activities according to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) (FCA, 2016). Importantly,
market-based finance has replaced many shadow banking activities and is a more resilient
source of financing. This is because it increases transparency by reducing the chain of
intermediaries and system-wide leverage, does not rely on implicit sponsor support during
times of stress, and has a more robust funding structure via long-term debt and equity
rather than exclusively short-term wholesale financing (Adrian, 2017). Overall, the short-
term wholesale-funded credit extension through various leveraged entities of shadow
banking has been replaced by the simpler and more transparent capital allocation in
financial markets through investment funds of market-based finance.
Nonetheless, the events of the market turmoil in March 2020 due to Covid-19 have
shed light on the vulnerabilities prevalent in the MBF sector and its reliance on market
liquidity. As economies were being shut down to stem the spread of the virus, financial
markets experienced increased volatility due to the economic uncertainty, which led to
large margin calls that forced leveraged institutions such as hedge funds to unwind their
derivatives positions to raise cash to pay their obligations.1 MMFs investing in corporate
debt suffered large outflows once again as investors preferred to hoard cash and faced fire
sales losses as the market liquidity of commercial paper evaporated, and other investment
funds also faced large redemptions due to a flight-to-quality (FSB, 2020b). This dash-
for-cash had a severe effect on government bonds, which are traditionally considered
safe assets, as most participants preferred to sell what they perceived to be their most
1There was significant heterogeneity in initial margin increases across different CCPs which mainly
depended on the asset classes they cleared as well as their margin methodologies. For example, while
LCH Limited reported a relatively modest increase of 17% or $29.7 billion in total initial margin held for
interest rates derivatives, CME Group reported an increase of 75% or $81.6 billion for its futures and options
including equities derivatives in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the previous one according to the
Futures Industry Association (FIA) (FIA, 2020). In addition, variation margin calls were even larger in the
bilateral segment of the OTC derivatives market compared to the centrally cleared one according to the Bank
of England (BoE) (BoE, 2020b).
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liquid securities to raise cash. As a result, the dealer banks’ capacity to absorb these sales
was quickly overwhelmed, and government bond yields spiked. Only the highest-rated
corporates were able to maintain access to market-based financing while most lower-rated
ones resorted to drawing their credit lines from banks (Acharya and Steffen, 2020), which
highlighted the fragility of the MBF sector as a source of funding in times of stress.
In order to restore stability to the financial system and ease the stress in government
bond markets to facilitate the transmission of monetary policy, central banks introduced
a wide range of measures. These included asset purchases, liquidity facilities and a
temporary relaxation of certain regulatory measures such as the leverage ratio that were
considered to be constraining dealers from intermediating in the financial markets. While
this was effective in easing the strains in the financial system, this episode has highlighted
the importance of examining the new vulnerabilities that have arisen after the financial
crisis in order to effectively mitigate them.
1.2 Objectives and contributions
This thesis aims to provide insights into the role of different financial institutions in
amplifying or mitigating systemic risk, and evaluate the impact of post-crisis regulations
designed to curb this form of risk. A summary of each essay in this thesis is provided in
this section, outlining their main results and contribution to the existing literature as well
as to the current policy debate.
1.2.1 OTC derivatives markets clearing
The first essay examines the effects of the mandatory collateralisation of OTC deriva-
tives contracts on counterparty, liquidity and systemic risks of the largest dealer banks
and CCPs. This market reform, called non-central clearing, was introduced in 2016 in
order to further reduce counterparty and systemic risks in the derivatives transactions
that are not centrally cleared through CCPs according to the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
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(BCBS-IOSCO, 2015). However, the clearing process that involves rigid margining and
marking-to-market has been criticised for being procyclical, creating sharp increases in
liquidity demand during periods of shortage in liquidity supply (Pirrong, 2014), which can
have systemic implications as became evident during the dash-for-cash episode in March
2020 which was partly driven by margin calls (FSB, 2020b). Since non-central clearing
greatly increases the demand for liquidity (Duffie et al., 2015), it is thus imperative to assess
the effects of this regulation on the different forms of risk faced by the market participants.
In this way we contribute to the academic literature that has mainly focused on the effects
of central clearing on the different forms of risk (Duffie and Zhu (2011), Loon and Zhong
(2014), Duffie et al. (2015)).
In order to answer our question, we develop a stress test network model of the largest
bank dealers in the OTC derivatives markets and a representative CCP that clears a fraction
of the total market activity, while the rest is bilaterally traded between the banks. The
model thus incorporates both central and non-central clearing of OTC derivatives to
examine the interplay between the two. This is important because the increased liquidity
risk associated with the collateralisation of bilateral exposures increases the probability of
bank defaults during market stress periods, and may result in higher losses for the CCP
and the surviving banks as the CCP’s loss mutualisation mechanisms are triggered (Pirrong
(2014), Domanski et al. (2015), King et al. (2020)). Considering the repercussions of non-
central clearing and the CCP loss mutualisation processes in isolation thus underestimates
the risks imposed to the financial system. To this end, we model the operations of the
CCP according to the current regulations (in terms of collateral collection and how they
mutualise losses in case of a bank’s default). This is a novel contribution to the literature,
because we take into account all the different channels through which CCPs can transmit
stress to their members and expand previous models of CCP contagion (Heath et al.,
2016). Our framework thus captures the CCP-bank nexus that has come to the forefront
of regulatory attention in the recent Covid-19 crisis, and our work aims to highlight the
systemic implications of the CCP’s mechanisms during a crisis (Huang and Takáts, 2020).
We calibrate the model to the banks’ balance sheet data and we find that non-central
clearing reduces counterparty and systemic risks, at the expense of higher liquidity risk.
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Hence, the introduction of non-central clearing creates a significant risk-shifting effect via
the transformation of counterparty to liquidity risk as derivatives exposures are mitigated
via the exchange of liquid assets. In addition, we find that the CCP can face higher
losses under non-central clearing, which increases its propensity to become a source of
contagion for its members when its pre-funded resources are depleted. This is because
non-central clearing increases the probability that the market participants will default on
their obligations due to liquidity risk, hence increasing the losses for the CCP.2
Overall, our findings indicate that the post-crisis reforms in the OTC derivatives
markets have been successful in reducing counterparty and systemic risks. However, it
is important to understand that this comes at the expense of higher liquidity risk, which
participants may not always be able to protect against as evidenced in the recent market
turbulence. This is a topic that is high in the current regulatory agenda on the lessons
learned from the March 2020 market turmoil (FSB, 2020b), and our results contribute to
this debate.
1.2.2 ETFs and capital markets
The second essay examines the effects that ETFs have on the underlying assets’ liquidity,
prices and volatility. ETFs have experienced tremendous growth following the financial
crisis, with global assets under management rising almost tenfold from $774 billion in
2008 to over $7 trillion in 2020 (ETFGI, 2020). Their popularity is attributed to the fact that
they offer investors an inexpensive way to gain exposure to a wide variety of asset classes,
combined with intraday liquidity by allowing their shares to be continuously traded on
exchanges.
The growth of ETFs has sparked a debate across industry practitioners, academics, and
policy makers on whether ETFs contribute to smooth market functioning, especially during
times of stress. The academic literature has found that ETFs increase comovements of prices
and liquidity of the underlying equities (Da and Shive (2015), Agarwal et al. (2017)) and
2We focus on the case of a systemic crisis where banks have to rely on their own funds to cover losses. In
such cases, illiquidity can lead to insolvency if banks have to sell assets at fire sales prices, depressing their
capital (Cont and Schaanning, 2016).
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increase their volatility (Ben-David et al., 2018), but the effects on corporate debt securities
are weaker due to the illiquid nature of the securities (Pan and Zeng (2017), Bhattacharya
and O’Hara (2018), Agapova and Volkov (2018)). In addition, in the recent market turmoil
of March 2020, ETFs appear to have acted as price discovery mechanisms, especially for
illiquid underlying securities such as corporate bonds, as investors traded the more liquid
ETF shares instead (BoE (2020b), Aramonte and Avalos (2020)). Yet, in previous instances
such as the flash crash of 2010, it has been argued that ETFs propagated liquidity shocks
to the underlying equities according to the report by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (CFTC-SEC,
2010). Hence, the debate has not been resolved and understanding the mechanism through
which ETFs affect the underlying securities is crucial as they increasingly dominate the
markets in which they invest.
To shed light on this mechanism, we use a unique proprietary dataset of the Central
Bank of Ireland containing all Irish ETFs and their holdings to look at the effects of Irish
ETFs on the liquidity, prices and volatility of their underlying equities and corporate debt
securities. Ireland is the main hub of ETFs in the euro area, with Irish ETFs managing e424
billion in assets as of September 2018, around two-thirds of the euro area total.
The rich dataset allows us to run panel regressions at the underlying security level
on a daily frequency in order to assess the effects of ETFs while controlling for a host of
other factors and including security and time fixed effects. We run the regressions for each
underlying asset class separately, to understand the differential impacts of ETFs on them.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. First, ETFs propagate liquidity
shocks to the underlying equities but not to the underlying corporate debt securities,
meaning that when ETFs become illiquid, they can also negatively affect the liquidity of
equities but have no effect on the liquidity of corporate debt securities. Second, when
demand shocks hit the ETF share prices, they can also strongly affect the prices of equities
but only have a weak effect on the prices of corporate debt securities. Third, higher ETF
ownership of equities increases their volatility, but higher ETF ownership of corporate
debt securities decreases their volatility.
To understand why such differential effects occur across the two underlying asset
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classes, we rely on the theoretical framework that looks at links between assets that
are formed via information channels. Information links are formed when investors use
information from one asset to price the other (Cespa and Foucault, 2014), and we argue
that ETFs form such information links with the underlying securities. However, the
strength of the information link depends on the accessibility of the underlying assets. If
the underlying securities are easy-to-trade with small transaction costs, such as exchange-
traded equities, this facilitates the incorporation of information from the linked asset,
and incentivises market participants to actively trade the underlying assets in order to
exploit arbitrage opportunities with ETF shares which increases the transmission of shocks
between markets. However, if the underlying securities are hard-to-trade with significant
search and transaction costs, such as over-the-counter-traded corporate debt securities,
this limits the ability of arbitrageurs to exploit arbitrage opportunities and results in a
weak information link with the ETFs, limiting the transmission of shocks.
The proposed mechanism of information links and our empirical findings are consistent
with how ETFs have behaved in previous periods of stress as well as previous findings
in the academic literature (Ben-David et al. (2018), Agapova and Volkov (2018)), and by
looking at both underlying asset classes together we are able to propose an explanation
for these differential effects. According to CFTC-SEC (2010), when SPY, the largest US
ETF tracking the S&P 500 index, became illiquid and suffered price declines in the flash
crash of 2010, the market makers in the underlying equities increased their quoted bid-ask
spreads or stopped intermediating entirely as they became uncertain about the value of the
securities, at least as reflected in the ETF share price. In other words, the strong information
link broke down during stress, which propagated the liquidity shock from the ETF to
the underlying equities. More recently, in March 2020, many corporate bond ETFs were
trading at large discounts to their underlying securities as the latter became completely
illiquid and their prices remained stale while investors traded ETF shares instead. The
demand shocks hitting the ETF share prices were not being transmitted to the underlying
corporate debt securities because of their inaccessibility, which is a manifestation of the
weak information link that exists between the two markets as the information present in
the ETF shares was not being incorporated into the underlying securities.
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The essay contributes to the debate on whether ETFs facilitate smooth market func-
tioning by arguing that it depends on the accessibility of the underlying markets, which
determines the strength of the information link that is formed between the two. This is im-
portant from a policy perspective as it sheds light on the mechanism through which ETFs
can propagate shocks to the underlying securities through various channels, including
their liquidity, prices and volatility. As ETFs continue to grow, their systemic importance
will increase, so it is crucial to obtain a holistic view of how they can propagate shocks,
and our paper contributes to this goal.
1.2.3 MMFs and money markets
The third essay examines the resilience of banks to liquidity shocks originating from
MMFs. Following the events of the financial crisis, where MMFs investing in corporate debt
experienced large runs which had a negative impact on the funding of the banks and as an
extension on the provision of credit to the real economy (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010),
Acharya and Mora (2015)), the post-crisis regulatory framework of Basel III mandated that
banks need to hold enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to withstand a funding shock
for a stress period of 30 days through their liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). However, LCR is
inherently microprudential in nature as it does not take into account the interconnectedness
that exists between financial sectors (Bonner et al., 2018). As such, the question of whether
it helps in mitigating systemic liquidity risk, a macroprudential concern, remains open
and is the focus of this essay.
This essay focuses on a specific aspect of systemic liquidity risk, the direct intercon-
nectedness that exists between banks and MMFs, which facilitate the short-term liquidity
needs of financial institutions by investing in commercial paper, certificates of deposit
and repurchase agreements (repos). While regulations were introduced to reduce MMFs’
fragility following the financial crisis, they again experienced runs during the recent
Covid-19 crisis due to investors’ flight-to-quality and search for cash. Without regulatory
intervention, the run could have triggered widespread contagion, propagating systemic
liquidity risk (Cunliffe (2020), BoE (2020a)). The fragility of MMFs during the financial
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crisis has been well-documented in the academic literature (Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013),
Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), Strahan and Tanyeri (2015), Schmidt et al. (2016)), but
there is scant empirical work looking at the post-crisis period following the introduction
of MMF regulations and this essay fills this gap.
To answer my research question, I develop a network model of MMFs and banks and
assess whether redemptions incurred by the former can significantly impair the available
liquidity of the latter. The redemptions can be modelled either exogenously (liquidity
risk) or endogenously as a result of losses due to a bank default (i.e. a Lehman scenario -
counterparty risk). To satisfy the redemptions, the MMFs stop reinvesting the proceeds
from maturing securities which creates a funding shortfall for the banks. The banks then
attempt to cover this shortfall in the overnight interbank market, which can create upward
pressure on interbank rates, propagating liquidity stress. In extreme cases where MMFs
have insufficient cash to satisfy redemptions, they resort to asset sales. Due to the absence
of an active secondary market of money market securities, they ask the issuing banks to
buy back the assets, and the latter can impose haircuts if they have insufficient liquidity
or are unwilling to provide it, creating fire sales losses for MMFs and a new round of
redemptions. Importantly, the model incorporates the post-crisis US MMF regulations
designed to strengthen their resilience and mitigate first-mover advantages to accurately
capture the dynamics that can unfold during stress.
The model is calibrated to the security-level US prime MMF holdings data as of De-
cember 2017 which provide a detailed picture of the network of exposures between MMFs
and the largest issuer banks of money market securities. My main finding is that LCR is
effective at protecting the banking sector against systemic liquidity risk arising from the
interconnectedness with the MMF sector, as the banks are able to retain their regulatory
LCR requirement of 100% even in the presence of very large MMF redemption shocks not
observed historically. The liquidity buffers held by both banks and MMFs have increased
their resilience, although when banks are unwilling to accommodate asset sales the re-
sulting fire sales can create significant losses for the MMFs. This is consistent with what
was observed in the recent market turmoil, and my results highlight the fragility of MMFs
during times of stress due to the illiquidity of their holdings which necessitates the review
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of the relevant regulatory framework, an important topic in the current regulatory agenda
(FSB, 2020b).
1.3 Conclusion and policy implications
To summarise, the findings of this thesis provide several policy implications. On OTC
derivatives markets, we find that CCPs reduce systemic risk as predicted by regulators, but
they can also increase stress in the financial system if their own resources are depleted or if
they increase margins procyclically. Hence, the regulatory stress testing methodologies
(e.g. the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) EU-wide CCP stress test)
should also incorporate CCPs’ actions during stress and how they affect their members to
gain a more holistic understanding of the dynamics that can crystallise. This would allow
them to capture feedback effects between banks and CCPs (e.g. through the activation of
the CCPs’ loss mutualisation mechanisms), as well as the broader impact of these effects
on banks’ credit provision to the real economy (Huang and Takáts, 2020). Furthermore, we
find that derivatives clearing reduces counterparty risk at the expense of higher liquidity
risk, which can have systemic implications if market participants engage in fire sales to
generate cash to pay their margin obligations (as hedge funds did in March 2020 (FSB,
2020b)), or if they hoard liquidity as a precautionary measure (as banks did (Huang and
Takáts, 2020)). To the extent that banks prefer to hold liquid assets, this can also have
a detrimental effect on loan origination, which can negatively affect the real economy
(Cornett et al., 2011). Hence, it is important that the regulatory authorities examine the
margining practices in centrally and non-centrally cleared markets to ensure that they do
not amplify funding strains during times of stress and disrupt the provision of credit to
the real economy as a result.
On ETFs, we find that they have a differential impact on the liquidity, prices and
volatility of equities and corporate debt securities, and we posit that this occurs because
of their different levels of accessibility. Hence, in order to understand whether ETFs can
propagate shocks to the underlying securities, policymakers should monitor markets with
which ETFs form strong information links that can break down during stress, as happened
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with the equity market in the flash crash of 2010. In this way, potential stress mitigation
mechanisms that could be adopted include security-level circuit breakers that would pause
trading in these securities if their prices moved sharply due to a liquidity crash (CFTC-SEC,
2010).
On MMFs and systemic liquidity risk, my findings suggest that the post-crisis reforms
have made the banks more capable to withstand liquidity shocks, but the MMFs are still
susceptible to fire sales losses if the market liquidity of commercial paper evaporates, even
after taking into account their higher liquidity buffers as a result of the reforms. Hence,
policymakers should consider whether the market structure of commercial paper needs
to be reformed to encourage an active secondary market and increase its liquidity, as
is currently the case with other money market securities such as certificates of deposit.
Indeed, my findings showcase that while MMFs’ losses are not significantly negatively
correlated with their liquidity holdings, they are very highly positively correlated with
banks’ reluctance to buy back assets as measured by the haircuts they impose on such sales.
As a result, from a policy perspective it would be more beneficial to ensure the continuous
existence of market liquidity rather than increase MMFs’ liquidity buffers further in order
to improve their resilience.
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Chapter 2
Systemic Stress Testing under Central
and Non-Central Clearing1
Abstract
The revised OTC derivatives regulatory framework mandated the collateralisation of
non-centrally cleared contracts. We develop a stress-testing network model of the largest
market participants to assess the effects of this reform on bank-level and systemic risks. We
compare defaults due to counterparty and liquidity risks and systemic losses in the regime
with and without non-central clearing. We find risk-shifting effects from counterparty to
liquidity risk and reduction of systemic risk at the expense of increased contagion from
central counterparties. The expansion of central clearing is found to reduce systemic risk,
supporting regulatory initiatives.
1This essay is based on the working paper titled “Systemic Stress Testing under Central and Non-Central
Clearing” co-authored with Barbara Casu (The Business School (formerly Cass)) and Elena Kalotychou
(Cyprus University of Technology).
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2.1 Introduction
The lack of market transparency associated with over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
contracts and the widespread losses during the financial crisis prompted the response
of the regulators who initiated a reform programme aimed at containing counterparty
and systemic risks in the financial system. The G20 leaders mandated the clearing of all
standardised OTC derivatives contracts through central counterparties by the end of 2012
and the introduction of higher capital requirements for bilateral contracts cleared between
counterparties (G20, 2009).2 The clearing mandates were later strengthened by collateral
requirements for bilateral trades (G20, 2011). Non-central clearing, formally introduced
in 2016, imposed the mandatory collateralisation of bilaterally traded OTC derivatives
through the exchange of margins between counterparties.3
The OTC derivatives market reforms have two main goals. First, promoting central
clearing by creating cost incentives (lower capital and collateral requirements compared to
bilateral clearing) with a view to reduce systemic risk by allowing for greater netting of
exposures through CCPs. Second, curbing counterparty risk through the establishment of
a rigorous and transparent margining mechanism extended to embrace bilateral trades.
As the reforms have reshaped the OTC derivatives markets, understanding their
implications is crucial for numerous reasons. First, as a result of the new clearing mandate
CCPs have become the dominant counterparties in several derivatives markets.4 Second,
rather than reducing risk the new clearing regulations may result in redistributing risk
away from derivatives positions to other creditors of distressed firms, potentially of
2Central clearing involves trading contracts through a clearing house, aka central counterparty (CCP),
which interposes itself between counterparties by becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every
buyer. As the bilateral trade ceases to exist the CCP concentrates counterparty risk in exchange for collateral
in the form of initial margin (IM) and contributions to a default fund (DF) which is used to mutualise
losses across clearing members (CMs). CCP protection is further established by daily marking-to-market
all positions and transferring cash-flows from losing counterparties to winning ones upon adverse price
movements through the collection of variation margin (VM).
3The G20 mandate was enforced via the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the European Market Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR) in the EU.
4The fraction of centrally cleared credit default swap (CDS) contracts increased from 10% to 55% in terms
of gross notional from 2010 to 2018 according to Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data. Central
clearing is predominant in the OTC interest rate derivatives market with CCPs managing 75% of total
positions globally as of December 2018 (BIS, 2019) and is gaining ground in other derivative asset classes
(BIS, 2017).
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systemic importance. The redistribution of risk could turn out to be destabilising for the
financial system. Third, the clearing process that involves rigid margining and marking-
to-market has been criticised for being procyclical, creating sharp increases in liquidity
demand during periods of shortage in liquidity supply, thereby exacerbating systemic
risk (Pirrong, 2014). This was evidenced in March 2020 when market turbulence led to a
dash-for-cash following margin calls, negatively affecting traditionally safe markets such
as US government bonds and aggravating redemptions from money market funds (BoE
(2020b), FSB (2020b)).
In this paper, we assess the impact of the introduction of the mandatory collateralisation
of bilaterally traded derivatives, which we refer to as non-central clearing. While non-
central clearing of OTC derivatives is expected to reduce counterparty risk and spillover
effects, it may do so at the expense of the liquidity of market participants (BCBS-IOSCO,
2015). Motivated by the documented concerns that liquidity risk may be a much more
significant source of stress than counterparty risk in cleared OTC derivatives markets
(Cont, 2017), our work focuses on disentangling and quantifying the effects of non-central
clearing on these two forms of risk for both the largest dealer banks as well as the CCP.
Acknowledging new forms of stress that can crystallise in the new regulatory environment
is key for preempting potential adverse effects of the new mandate.
The concept of risk transformation, first coined by Cont (2017), posits that clearing
does not eliminate counterparty risk but transforms it into liquidity risk as exposures are
mitigated via the exchange of margins (IM and VM) in the form of liquid assets. Hence,
the introduction of non-central clearing may create a risk-shifting effect, reducing poten-
tial losses from exposures and the risk of insolvency, but increasing disproportionately
the liquidity encumberment of market participants, rendering them more vulnerable to
liquidity shocks that can occur in times of market stress. We test the risk transformation
hypothesis by using the introduction of non-central clearing as the vehicle for providing
counterparty risk protection through the mandatory bilateral exchange of liquid assets.
In addition, improved understanding of the channels through which losses arise in
cleared OTC derivatives markets, particularly in the aftermath of a major regulatory
intervention, allows for a more accurate appraisal of the risks involved and the role of
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the CCP as a potential source of contagion for its members. The increased liquidity risk
associated with the collateralisation of bilateral exposures increases the probability of CM
defaults during market stress periods and may result in higher losses for the CCP and
the surviving CMs as the CCP’s loss mutualisation mechanisms are triggered (Pirrong
(2014), Domanski et al. (2015), King et al. (2020)). Thus, considering the repercussions of
non-central clearing and the CCP loss mutualisation processes in isolation underestimates
the risks imposed to the financial system. Our framework captures the CCP-bank nexus
that has come to the forefront of regulatory attention in the recent Covid-19 crisis, and our
work aims to highlight the systemic implications of the CCP’s mechanisms during a crisis
(Huang and Takáts, 2020).
We extend the literature which has mainly focused on central clearing, by evaluating the
effects of non-central clearing of OTC derivatives on counterparty, liquidity and systemic
risks and their interaction. Our contribution is twofold. First, on the methodological
front we contribute to existing empirical work on CCP modelling and, in particular,
the modelling of the loss allocation mechanisms of the clearing house. Building on
the methodology of Heath et al. (2016) we construct a network model of the largest
dealer banks in the OTC derivatives markets and a fictitious CCP taking into account
the various mechanisms through which the CCP allocates uncollateralised losses to the
CMs. The model dynamics unfold in two rounds. In the first round, an exogenous market
shock creates VM exchanges in the system and potential defaults due to a) liquidity risk
arising from insufficient liquid resources to meet VM obligations, and b) counterparty risk
attributed to large equity losses following missed VM gains from defaulted counterparties.
The second round captures the way the CCP mutualises the losses due to missed VM gains
across the surviving participants through further default fund contributions (over and
above those originally collected) and haircuts on their VM gains. This process can pose
both liquidity and counterparty risks to CMs. To our knowledge, this paper is the first
to comprehensively model the CCP’s loss mutualisation mechanisms to reflect the new
regulatory framework. Therefore, it provides the necessary framework to assess whether
the feedback effect between the banks and the CCP is amplified with the introduction of
non-central clearing during times of stress.
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Second, we contribute to three strands of empirical literature on derivatives clearing.
On counterparty risk, Duffie and Zhu (2011) argue through a theoretical model that central
clearing may not always reduce counterparty risk as fragmenting central clearing services
by assigning separate CCPs to each derivative asset class increases exposures. However,
Loon and Zhong (2014) find empirically that the introduction of central clearing in the CDS
market reduced counterparty risk. Our analysis complements the prior work by assessing
whether non-central clearing further reduces counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives
markets. On liquidity risk, Duffie et al. (2015) show that the introduction of non-central
clearing greatly increases the demand for collateral due to the limited netting benefits of
bilateral trading, while the expansion of central clearing reduces it due to multilateral
netting. We add to this line of research by analysing the implications of the increased
collateral demand due to the introduction of non-central clearing for financial stability.
On systemic risk, Heath et al. (2016) examine the effect of increased central clearing on
the topology and stability of the financial network and find that CCPs act as a source of
stability in the system even in the presence of large market shocks. Paddrik et al. (2020)
develop a network model of the cleared CDS market and calibrate it to trade repository
data to assess contagion effects under a stress scenario. They document significant losses
and defaults of market participants, even though the CCP avoids default by using its
pre-funded resources. On this front, our paper provides evidence in regards with the
CCP’s propensity for contagion following the introduction of non-central clearing. We
pursue this by considering a range of stress scenarios which could potentially exhaust
the CCP’s pre-funded resources, and quantifying the amount of stress imposed on its
members.5
In order to test our hypothesis on the effectiveness of non-central clearing, we calibrate
our model using annual report data on the positions of the largest participating banks in
5The theoretical branch of the literature concerns the optimal central counterparty design. Biais et al.
(2012) examine the implications of full vs. partial protection offered by CCPs in the presence of aggregate
risk. Acharya and Bisin (2014) consider the counterparty risk externality generated by the opaqueness of the
OTC markets and the CCP’s ability to eliminate it. Glasserman et al. (2016) argue for the need for CMs to
disclose information about their positions across multiple CCPs in order for the latter to impose accurate
margins. Amini et al. (2015) propose a CCP design based on fees and default fund policies that reduces
systemic risk and improves aggregate surplus. Menkveld (2016) shows that a certain degree of crowding in
trades is socially optimal because it increases overall investment.
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the global OTC derivatives markets and compare the systemic losses before and after the
introduction of non-central clearing. We measure systemic risk as the total equity losses that
occur in the system due to OTC derivatives trading during stress conditions.6 Importantly,
these losses pertain both to market-induced shocks (first-round) and feedback effects
(second-round). Our model belongs to the class of macroprudential stress testing models
which have been developed following the financial crisis to capture the interdependencies
between financial institutions that facilitated the propagation of shocks during the crisis.
Our main finding is that the introduction of non-central clearing substantially reduces
counterparty and systemic risks under all market conditions. However, the reduction
of counterparty and systemic risks comes at the expense of higher liquidity risk which
becomes substantial during extreme market stress due to large VM obligations. Non-central
clearing severely impairs the CMs’ ability to pay those obligations in periods of stress
due to higher liquidity encumberment, which triggers a significantly higher number of
liquidity-driven defaults, although the protection offered by non-central clearing reduces
the resulting losses in bilateral trading. As a result of the higher number of defaults,
the CCP suffers bigger losses and in turn becomes a significant source of contagion in
extremely adverse market conditions, distributing higher losses to the surviving members
in the second round. Nonetheless, we find that the reduction of (first-round) losses due to
the collateral in bilateral trades in the regime with non-central clearing more than offsets
the increase of (second-round) losses due to the greater fragility of the CCP , which results
in a reduction of overall systemic losses.
Second, our results provide empirical support for the risk transformation argument.
We show through simulations that in extreme market conditions the number of liquidity-
triggered defaults increases by 60 percent whereas the counterparty-triggered defaults
decrease by 50 percent. Hence, the introduction of non-central clearing creates a significant
risk-shifting effect via the transformation of counterparty to liquidity risk. In addition, we
6In our context, systemic risk propagates among banks through bilateral transactions similarly to Rochet
and Tirole (1996) although there exist several other channels of contagion including fire sales (Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2008), Cont and Schaanning (2016)), liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009),
herding behaviour (Acharya (2009), Farhi and Tirole (2012)) and runs (Pedersen (2009), Diamond and Dybvig
(1983)). Models introduced to measure individual contributions to systemic risk in terms of market equity
losses include Systemic Expected Shortfall (Acharya et al., 2017) and CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier,
2016).
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find that liquidity risk is a much more severe source of stress than counterparty risk in
cleared markets as it accounts for the vast majority of defaults.
Third, we test the expectation of regulatory authorities that the requirement of non-
central clearing may promote financial stability by incentivising market participants to
switch to central clearing due to lower collateral costs (BCBS-IOSCO, 2015). By simulating
various proportions of central clearing in the market, we find evidence in favour of the
expansion of central clearing because increased multilateral netting reduces exposures
and first-round losses following market shocks. The large reduction of first-round losses
reduces overall systemic risk even though the second-round losses increase as the CCP
becomes more dominant and its propensity for contagion increases. Furthermore, since the
expansion of central clearing reduces bilateral trading, the effects of non-central clearing
are found to be insignificant when the CCP is the counterparty to most transactions. This
showcases that non-central clearing can indeed provide incentives to market participants
to migrate to central clearing in order to mitigate the effects of higher collateral costs in
bilateral trading.
Against the backdrop of major regulatory overhauls whose impact is expected to be
economically significant given the size of the OTC derivatives markets, our results have
important policy implications. First, the introduction of non-central clearing appears
beneficial for financial stability but at the cost of higher liquidity risk and related defaults
during extreme market stress, which has adverse consequences for the stability of the CCP
and the surviving market participants. In the presence of large shocks, the liquidity crunch
can have systemically destabilising effects if market participants engage in fire sales (as
hedge funds did in March 2020 (FSB, 2020b)), or if they hoard liquidity as a precautionary
measure (as banks did (Huang and Takáts, 2020)). Hence, the regulatory authorities should
examine the margining practices in centrally and non-centrally cleared markets to ensure
that they do not amplify funding strains during times of stress. Second, to the extent that
non-central clearing prompts counterparties to migrate their bilateral positions to centrally
cleared ones, the resulting expansion of the CCP can reduce systemic risk. However, our
findings suggest that CCPs can also increase stress in the financial system if their own
resources are depleted or if they increase margins procyclically. Hence, the regulatory
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stress testing methodologies should also incorporate CCPs’ actions during stress and how
they affect their members to gain a more holistic understanding of the dynamics that can
crystallise (Domanski et al. (2015), Huang and Takáts (2020)).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the
key regulations regarding the clearing of OTC derivatives, section 2.3 describes the model,
section 2.4 presents the data used in our study and section 2.5 presents the empirical results.
Section 2.6 discusses the results of sensitivity analysis and finally section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Clearing regulations
In this section we briefly overview the clearing regulations in centrally and non-
centrally cleared transactions that we use in our model to derive our results. The IM
collected as collateral at contract initiation is intended to cover at least 99% of exposures
movements under normal market conditions over the margin period of risk - the time
required for positions to be closed out following a default - as stated in the principles
developed by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (CPSS-IOSCO, 2012). Regulators
have set the holding period at five days for centrally cleared positions and ten days for
bilateral transactions that are non-centrally cleared via the mandatory exchange of IM
between counterparties (BCBS-IOSCO, 2015).
Since the positions are marked-to-market daily, the maximum exposure the participants
have at any point in time is the daily price variation and is managed by the VM exchange
between counterparties. VM represents the change in value since the last marking-to-
market so that at the end of each day the value of the cleared contract is zero if the VM is
transferred successfully (no exposure). This prohibits large exposures from accumulating
during the life of the contract, thus reducing counterparty risk. In non-centrally cleared
trades, the exchange of VM was made mandatory for all market participants in March 2017,
although it also existed in various forms before the crisis (Gregory (2014), International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) ISDA (2014b)). It is important to note that in
centrally cleared trades VM must typically be paid in cash while IM can be in the form of
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high-quality liquid assets (HQLA). In non-centrally cleared trades, both IM and VM can
be settled using HQLA (BCBS-IOSCO, 2015).
Regarding centrally cleared trades, in accordance with international standards (CPSS-
IOSCO, 2012), the CCP requires CMs to contribute to the default fund as an additional
line of defence on a pro-rata IM basis. The DF is used to mutualise uncollateralised losses
(i.e. in excess of IM) in the case of a CM default among the surviving members. The
DF of systemically important CCPs is calibrated to Cover-2, i.e. expected to cover the
uncollateralised losses arising from the simultaneous default of the two largest CMs in
terms of exposures under extreme but plausible market conditions. These conditions are
typically modelled using stress tests that assess the CMs’ gains and losses during historical
or simulated stress conditions. Even though these stress tests are designed to capture the
effects of market turbulence on the centrally cleared portfolios, if they were to materialise
they would also affect the CMs’ bilateral positions which could amplify their losses and
make them more likely to default. Furthermore, the CCP also commits part of its capital to
absorb losses. This “skin-in-the-game” is typically used after the defaulting CM’s IM and
DF contributions and before other CMs’ DF contributions in order to incentivise the CCP
to maintain sound risk management practices. However, this capital is typically small so as
not to endanger the solvency of the CCP and compromise its main objective of protecting
surviving CMs.
Upon depletion of the pre-funded resources additional losses are managed through
the CCP recovery mechanism contained in the default management process (DMP) which
includes the Powers of Assessment and variation margin gains haircuts (VMGH) to the
winning counterparties. Under the Powers of Assessment, the CCP may request from
surviving CMs to provide additional resources limited to a certain multiple of their original
DF contributions in order to repay its obligations. This transforms the CCP into a possible
source of contagion by demanding liquidity in times of extreme market stress when
multiple CMs are likely to be constrained (Pirrong, 2014). If the Powers of Assessment
prove inadequate to cover the losses borne by the CCP, the residual losses are allocated
on a pro-rata basis to the winning counterparties by applying a VMGH. This has been
proposed as an effective loss allocation mechanism at the end of the risk waterfall by
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simulating the effects of general insolvency.
While under normal conditions the CCP is market-neutral since for every buyer there
is a seller, when a default occurs it becomes the owner of the centrally cleared portfolio
of the defaulted CM. This exposes the CCP to market risk which would make it liable to
unlimited future VM payments to winning counterparties and hence require unlimited
resources. As a result, the successful utilisation of its resources and the recovery tools
is conditional on returning to a matched book. This is achieved via an auction of the
defaulting portfolio where the surviving CMs act as bidders (ISDA, 2015). While the CMs
have the right to bid negatively, i.e. request compensation from the CCP in order to claim
ownership of the defaulting portfolio, the CCP incentivises sensible bidding behaviour by
allocating uncollateralised losses according to the ranking of the bids. Hence, CMs who
do not bid at all will be asked to replenish funds via the Powers of Assessment first in
full and then sequentially for other CMs according to bid competitiveness. It follows that
the winner of the auction will have its resources claimed last if necessary and hence the
probability of it having to replenish the DF with additional resources will be minimal. For
a more detailed description of the mechanisms of the DMP see ISDA (2015).
2.3 Model
Our modelling framework evolves over a period of three days, t = {0, 1, 2}, in order to
capture the key dynamics of clearing following a stress event. The time frame is aligned
with the clearing operations that occur at a daily frequency and the daily marking-to-
market of positions. Table 2.1 summarises the model dynamics.
At time t = 0 we construct the bilateral OTC derivative exposures network based
on the available aggregate data as well as a fictitious CCP that clears a fraction of total
derivatives activity. While the CMs stand for real banks, the CCP is not real for a number
of reasons.
First, analysing the rare and extreme event of a CCP failure is beyond the scope of
this study.7 Second, modeling of the breakdown of total exposures of CMs to real CCPs
7Historically there have been only four CCP defaults, the most severe one being related to the Hong Kong
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Table 2.1: Model dynamics
Time Round Description
t = 0 Baseline Initial configuration
t = 1 First day effects Shock on derivative asset triggers VM; po-
tential VM defaults due to liquidity risk
cause defaults due to counterparty risk
t = 2 Second day effects CCP triggers DMP if applicable; un-
funded losses are allocated to CMs
is challenging due to data limitations as we do not observe the fraction of exposures
centrally cleared by various real CCPs. Nonetheless, given our focus on CMs equity losses,
a fictitious CCP that acts as a market representative does not pose any drawback to the
analysis so long as its operation complies with the prevalent regulations.
We start the analysis by calculating the IM collected by the CCP and calibrating its
DF to Cover-2. These calculations are simplified in the sense that we only consider the
cost of protection against market risk while in reality CCPs also charge for other risks,
e.g. highly concentrated positions in the market.8 Following this calculation, we consider
two different configurations, one in which the CMs also post IM between themselves in
bilateral trades (non-central clearing) and one in which they don’t. This allows us to assess
the effects of non-central clearing on our model results. In both cases the CCP remains
active and clears the same fraction of derivatives activity, collecting the same amount of
collateral. We treat the asset class as a representative risky asset that the CMs trade with
each other.
The clear-cut distinction between the two configurations enables the straightforward
evaluation of the effects of collateralising bilateral trades. It is important to note that
this distinction is stylised since some bilateral trades exchanged collateral even before
the introduction of non-central clearing, although they tended to be undercollateralised
Futures Exchange in 1987 (Berndsen, 2020). For a description and empirical analysis of CCP failures see
Bignon and Vuillemey (2018) and Cox (2015).
8The exact level of detail in calculating margins is not relevant in terms of assessing the incremental
impact of non-central clearing provided it remains invariant in the two regimes. In subsection 2.6.1 we
discuss the model results when the CCP collects double the resources it does in the baseline configuration in
order to assess the effect on overall systemic risk. Our results on the effects of the introduction of non-central
clearing are robust.
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(Gregory, 2014). In addition, we do not endogenise the change of market activity in
response to the implementation of non-central clearing in our model, i.e. we assume that
the positions remain the same before and after introducing non-central clearing. Ghamami
and Glasserman (2017) and Bellia et al. (2017) find several cases in which bilateral trading
remains more capital and collateral efficient even after the introduction of non-central
clearing than a full migration to central clearing, while Cenedese et al. (2020) discuss the
incentive of market participants to make contracts non-standardised to circumvent the
clearing mandates. As such, the extent of change in the market activity as a result of the
new regulation remains ambiguous.9 Nonetheless, comparing the two configurations in
this way allows us to capture the transformation of counterparty to liquidity risk and
its systemic implications through the introduction of non-central clearing in a simplified
framework that incorporates the key drivers behind these risks.
At time t = 1 we commence the stress test by applying exogenous shocks of various
magnitudes on the asset which create VM losses and gains in the system. We assume that
VM is exchanged in bilateral transactions even without non-central clearing because as
stated in section 2.2 the majority of contracts already had such arrangements in place before
the introduction of the new regulations. In our context, the additional collateral demand is
due to the exchange of IM in bilateral transactions which puts additional liquidity strain
on the CMs.
We allow the CMs to react to the shock by attempting to close their positions and regain
liquidity through the return of IM in order to fulfil their VM obligations. This behaviour
follows from Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) who model budget-constrained dealers in
a similar way. Hence, after the shock we perform an optimisation in which the CMs trade
the asset with each other subject to their budget constraints. The larger the shock, the less
likely it is that everyone will be able to achieve their goal, which leads to more defaults.
We assume that the CMs pay their IM and VM obligations using their HQLA (which
include cash reserves) as discussed in the previous section and, in the baseline scenario,
that they are under liquidity stress if their liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) drops to less than
100%. LCR is a regulatory ratio introduced in Basel III that requires banks to have enough
9In subsection 2.5.2 we consider the case where a higher fraction of trades are cleared through the CCP to
assess the potential effects of a migration to central clearing.
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HQLA to repay their obligations under a severe 30-day stress scenario where funding
sources are withdrawn. This ratio under normal market conditions must be at least 100%,
i.e. banks must have HQLA equal or greater than the projected obligations during the
stress period, although during actual stress the banks are expected to use their HQLA
reserves. The banks typically hold HQLA reserves in excess of their projected obligations
and we assume that they have those excess reserves available for derivatives obligations,
with the rest used for other operations. Hence, CMs whose VM obligations breach their
LCR minimum requirements are assumed to default due to liquidity risk.10 We treat the
non-cash portion of HQLA as infinitely liquid and readily convertible to cash without the
risk of fire sales, given that VM obligations for centrally cleared trades are settled in cash.11
CMs whose counterparties default on their VM obligations suffer equity losses through
profit and loss. We assume that CMs default due to counterparty risk if their capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) drops to less than 8% as a result of these losses. CAR is a regulatory
ratio of minimum capital requirements that banks must always satisfy, introduced in Basel
III.
At time t = 2 the CCP assigns uncollateralised losses it suffers, if any, to the surviving
CMs. It first performs an auction of the defaulting portfolio in order to return to a
matched book. It then uses the available IM and DF resources to cover losses. If these pre-
funded resources are insufficient, it calls on its Powers of Assessment by asking surviving
CMs to replenish the DF according to their bidding behaviour, posing a liquidity risk to
them. As such, our model quantifies the domino effects that may originate from the loss
allocation mechanisms of the CCP that have been theoretically documented. Domanski
et al. (2015) argue that the unexpected liquidity demands originating from the CCP’s
recovery mechanisms may stress the CMs and in extreme cases cause a default cascade.
We estimate the potential number of defaults in such cases due to liquidity stress.
In the most extreme cases when the Powers of Assessment prove inadequate, the CCP
proceeds to VMGH, which translates into additional equity losses for the CMs that expect
10We discuss the model results assuming a minimum LCR of 70% in subsection 2.6.2.
11In unreported results, we have run the model assuming that banks have a fraction of HQLA available
to pay their derivatives obligations based on the reported ratio of projected derivatives outflows to total
outflows. The pool of available HQLA is smaller compared to our baseline methodology leading to more
banks being under liquidity stress, but the results are qualitatively similar.
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VM receipts from the CCP, posing a counterparty risk to them. Since this occurs only
in the most extreme market conditions when the CMs are stressed as well, our model
captures the wrong-way risk that has been reported by Pirrong (2014). In such cases the
activation of the CCP’s recovery mechanisms is likely to put additional pressure on the
system exactly when it is at its most vulnerable. We quantify the systemic losses that may
crystallise under such conditions due to VMGH.
The completion of the DMP typically occurs within five working days (ISDA, 2015) but
for simplicity we assume it takes place on a single day, t = 2. While this may overestimate
the amount of stress the CCP can realistically impose on the CMs on a single day, by not
considering multiple days we are also neglecting the potential amplification of losses if
asset price movements create further VM obligations for the CCP.
Our aggregate measure of systemic risk is the total equity losses of CMs on days 1
and 2 which we use to assess the effectiveness of non-central clearing. We proceed with a
detailed discussion of each step.
2.3.1 Initial Configuration (t = 0)
Consider a population of n banks belonging in the set of network nodes N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The presence or absence of a connection between any two banks through derivative expo-
sures is determined by the adjacency matrix I. This is a n× n matrix that takes values of 1
if there is an edge between banks i and j (Iij = 1) and 0 otherwise. The main diagonal of
the matrix is zero since the banks do not have exposures to themselves (Iii = 0 ∀ i ∈ N).
The network is directed since a bank may have an exposure to a counterparty but the
reverse need not be true.
We assume a core-periphery network structure which has been identified in OTC
derivatives markets among others by Craig and Von Peter (2014) and Markose (2012).
To configure the network, we use the connectivity priors assumed in a study by the
Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD) to construct the adjacency
matrix (MAGD, 2013). Specifically, we assume that the core (large) banks trade with
each other with 100% probability, they trade with the periphery (small) banks with 50%
probability and the latter trade with each other with 25% probability and generate random
26
numbers from the Bernoulli distribution in accordance with these priors.12 In total, we
generate 100 adjacency matrices and repeat the stress testing exercise for each random
network, providing results as averages of the 100 simulations.
Next, we construct the n× n bilateral exposures matrix X0. We define the OTC deriva-
tives obligation owed by bank i to bank j as X0ij. Thus, the sum of columns for row i
represents the observable total gross liabilities (L0i ) of bank i while the sum of rows for
column i represents the observable total gross assets (A0i ) as given by the balance sheet
data. We infer the bilateral gross exposures X0ij by minimising the errors in the row and















X0ij = 0 if Iij = 0
0 ≤ X0ij ≤ min(A0j , L0i )
The goal of optimisation (2.1) is to estimate the bilateral exposures matrix by providing
column and row sums as close as possible to the available bank data of liabilities and
assets respectively. If the adjacency matrix has an element with a value of zero then the
corresponding exposure is also zero and the upper bound is the minimum of the total
assets for the specific column and the total liabilities for the specific row. By construction,
the optimisation equates total assets and total liabilities, ∑i ∑j X0ji = ∑i ∑j X
0
ij, hence the
solution of the objective function is equal to the difference between the total assets and
total liabilities of the data. This implies that the system is assumed to form a complete
economy.
Following Heath et al. (2016), the bilateral gross notional positions are estimated by
multiplying the values in each row of the exposures matrix X0 by the ratio of gross notional
liabilities to gross market value of liabilities. The gross notional positions matrix is denoted
G0. Finally, the net notional positions matrix is simply calculated as N0 = G0 − (G0)T, i.e.
12Our results are robust to denser and sparser network configurations.
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the difference between the gross notional positions matrix and its transpose. The matrix
N0 is skew symmetric such that N0ij = −N0ji.
We introduce the CCP by augmenting the matrix N0 with an additional row and
column to create the new matrix W0. Let s ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of centrally cleared




ip ∀ i ∈ N and j = n + 1.
In addition, W0ij = −W0ji ∀ j ∈ N and i = n + 1. The matrix W
0 remains skew symmetric.
We can now calculate the IM using the matrix W0. As stated in section 2.2, the minimum
requirement for the calculation of the IM is to cover at least 99% of exposures movements,
which is typically estimated with a value-at-risk (VaR) model. We adopt a Monte Carlo
approach in order to be able to update the IM at t = 2. Specifically, we model the asset as a
representative interest rate swap with price dynamics following an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process:
dPt = −kPtdt + σtdZt (2.2)
where k is the speed of mean reversion, σt is the time-varying volatility and Zt is a one-
dimensional Brownian Motion under the real-world probability measure. We assume that
the long-run mean value of the contract is zero which implies a “fair” contract. The value
of k is irrelevant so we set it arbitrarily at 1. However, the volatility parameter is crucial in
setting the IM. We discuss the calibration of this parameter in section 2.4.
We simulate 1000 paths and calculate the margin as the maximum between the lower
1% and upper 99% percentiles of the price differences dPt as done in practice by CCPs in
order to protect themselves from both upswings and downswings. Denote this value as
m0:
m0 = max(|p1(dPt)|, |p99(dPt)|) (2.3)
where pa denotes the percentile at the a% level. For simplicity, we assume that all CMs
set the same margin m0 for their trades in the presence of non-central clearing. The IM for
each position is then calculated as:
IM0ij = m0|W0ij|
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In accordance with the regulations outlined in section 2.2, centrally cleared OTC
derivatives positions are assumed to have a holding period of five days, i.e. the CCP
would be able to unwind the positions within five days. As such, the IM is scaled by the
square root of five for centrally cleared positions:
IM0ij = m0
√
5|W0ij| ∀ i ∈ N and j = n + 1 (2.4)
Similarly, non-centrally cleared positions are assumed to have a holding period of ten
days due to their increased liquidity risk and smaller netting efficiencies. As such:
IM0ij = m0
√
10|W0ij| ∀ i, j ∈ N (2.5)
Note that the IM is posted in bilateral transactions only when non-central clearing is
enabled. In the alternative configuration without non-central clearing we have:
IM0ij = 0 ∀ i, j ∈ N (2.6)




ij as the total IM requirements for each CM i at time 0. We
subtract the total IM requirements from the CMs’ liquid assets under the two different
configurations in order to calculate their unencumbered resources. Naturally, since IM0i is
higher under non-central clearing, the CMs are more encumbered in this configuration
which is the key driver behind our results.
Finally, we calculate the CCP’s DF. As stated in section 2.2, the international regulations
require systemically important CCPs to be able to withstand the simultaneous default of
their two largest CMs under extreme but plausible market conditions. We calculate the
uncollateralised losses as follows:
SCi = z
√
5|W0ij| − IM0ij ∀ i ∈ N and j = n + 1 (2.7)
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where z captures 99.9% of movements:13
z = max(|p0.1(dPt)|, |p99.9(dPt)|) (2.8)
We rank SCi from largest to smallest and sum the first two entries in order to calculate
the DF:
DF = SCi(1) + SCi(2) (2.9)
Each CM contributes to the DF on a pro-rata basis according to their IM contribution.




DF ∀ i ∈ N and j = n + 1 (2.10)
This completes the initial system configuration. All positions are assumed to be marked-
to-market, i.e. there are no outstanding VM payments as of time 0.
2.3.2 First day effects (t = 1)
We begin the stress testing exercise by shocking the asset in order to create mark-to-
market gains and losses (VM). We measure the shocks in terms of standard deviations
of price changes σ0. In total we apply four shocks which are measured as multiples of
σ0, 2.33σ0, 3σ0, 10σ0 and 20σ0.14 The first two are “mild” shocks and are not expected to
stress the system significantly since the IM posted is larger than the VM generated. The
latter two are severe shocks with 20σ0 signifying an extreme market event. We discuss the
calibration of these shocks and their interpretation in section 2.4.
13Note that this is a conservative approach to size the DF because by using the absolute value of net
notional positions in (2.7) we consider the maximum losses that each CM may incur either due to a positive
or a negative shock. Alternatively, two separate shocks could be applied to all CMs as different stress
scenarios, one positive and one negative, and the DF would be sized as the maximum between the sums of
the two largest losses among those scenarios which would result in a slightly smaller DF. This would not
have a significant impact on our results given the fact that the normality assumption does not oversize the
DF irrespectively of the methodology used.
14We also apply negative shocks of corresponding magnitudes. The results are qualitatively and quantita-
tively similar.
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Let ∆P denote the change in the asset’s price as a result of the shock. The VM obligation




A positive W0ij signifies i being short and j being long. Hence, a positive (negative) ∆P
creates a VM obligation (gain) for i and VM gain (obligation) for j if W0ij is positive and




ij the total VM requirements for each CM i at time
1. The CMs can pay their VM obligations using their available HQLA AL0i (net of the IM
requirements calculated at t = 0).
While the study of Heath et al. (2016) assumed static CMs, we allow for portfolio
rebalancing by solving an optimisation problem to take into account the fact that the
contracts are cleared end-of-day hence some CMs may manage to close out their positions
and avoid default.
Denote the updated assets and liabilities of each CM i as A1i and L
1
i . Each CM attempts
to close out its positions by minimising the difference between its assets and liabilities. A
zero net position would require zero IM (IM1i = 0) and the CM would be able to regain






|A1i − L1i | (2.12)
subject to:
LCR1i =
AL0i − (IM1i − IM0i )−VML1i
stressi
≥ 100%









where stressi are the CM’s projected net outflows in a stress period for the LCR calculation,
R indicates return and E0i is the CM’s total equity.
The first condition is the budget constraint stating that the sum of the perceived net
IM receipt or payment and the VM obligation must not make the CM’s LCR drop to less
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i and is calculated by
updating the matrix X0 and repeating the calculations shown in subsection 2.3.1. We only
consider IM gains here because the IM posted remains in the ownership of the CM that
posted it. In contrast, VM gains are subject to counterparty risk because it is not certain
that they will be delivered by the counterparty. As such, the CMs do not take them into
account in their budget constraint, i.e. they do not rely on uncertain VM gains to pay their
own obligations.
The second condition states that the CMs expect a small return R on their equity E0i by
holding slightly unbalanced portfolios. This reflects their views on the market and we set
R to 1 basis point (bp) which signifies the expected daily return. This is included in order
to prohibit the CMs from taking unrealistically large net positions which is not reflected in
the data. Since the principal operation of the banks in this setup is market making, they
tend to hold balanced inventories in order to avoid excessive directional risk. However,
CMs that violate their budget constraint still try to achieve zero net positions.
Each CM performs the optimisation by assuming that its counterparties will accept
these changes. This implies that the markets are liquid enough to execute these trades. In
essence, the IM amounts calculated in (2.12) are the ones they perceive they can achieve,
not the realised ones. Defaults occur when we take into account all CMs’ optimal values to
form the updated exposures matrix and some CMs are unable to deleverage enough to
satisfy their constraints. This is much more likely to happen under extreme stress since the
VM requirements are larger.
We solve the optimisation for all CMs simultaneously by minimising the sum of the
individual objective functions subject to the vectors of budget and return constraints in






Since this is a complete economy, the total values of assets and liabilities in the system
















Once this is achieved, we create the updated bilateral exposures matrix X1 as before
using the solutions of (2.12) as the target column and row sums in optimisation (2.1). We
calculate the updated matrices G1, N1 and W1 using X1 and calculate the realised IM
obligations from W1.
A CM defaults due to liquidity risk if it breaches its LCR requirements. Hence, in order
to avoid default the following condition must be satisfied:
LCR1i =
AL0i − (IM1i − IM0i )−VML1i
stressi
≥ 100% ∀ i ∈ N (2.14)
Equation (2.14) captures liquidity risk and is central to our analysis. Since the CMs’
available liquidity AL0i is net of the IM posted, it follows that it is lower under non-central
clearing due to the increased IM requirements in the bilateral transactions. This then
translates into higher liquidity risk under this configuration as there are fewer resources to
pay the VM obligations VML1i .
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A secondary default occurs if a CM that satisfies condition (2.14) does not receive a
VM gain due to counterparty default that translates into an equity loss and results in a
breach of its CAR minimum requirement of 8%. Denote H the subset of CMs defaulting
due to their inability to satisfy (2.14). Hence, an additional condition for liquid CMs not
belonging in this subset to avoid default is:
CAR1i =
E0i −∑h max(VM1hi − IM0hi, 0)
RWAi
≥ 8% ∀ i ∈ N\H and h ∈ H (2.15)
where RWAi is the CM’s risk weighted assets used for the calculation of CAR.
Equation (2.15) captures counterparty risk. If non-central clearing is disabled then
IM0hi = 0 and the CMs translate the whole missed VM receipt as an equity loss. In the
alternative configuration, the IM protects the CMs to an extent which is the reasoning
15For completeness we also considered market risk, i.e. the revaluation of positions as a source of risk.
However, it has a negligible effect on our results and is not relevant to our analysis, hence we do not report
it.
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behind the introduction of non-central clearing. Denote D the subset of all CMs that
default at t = 1 by failing to satisfy any of conditions (2.14) and (2.15). We assume that
CMs that default due to counterparty risk, i.e. due to violation of (2.15) repay their VM
obligations since they have sufficient liquid resources to do so.
The liquid resources available to surviving CMs at the end of t = 1 are:
AL1i = AL
0
i − (IM1i − IM0i )− (VML1i −VMG1i ) ∀ i ∈ N\D (2.16)
where VMG1i denotes the realised VM gains for CM i.





max(VM1hi − IM0hi, 0) ∀ i ∈ N\D and h ∈ H (2.17)
We measure systemic risk (SR1) as the total equity loss in the system:
SR1 = ∑
i
(E1i − E0i ) ∀ i ∈ N (2.18)
In contrast to the CMs, the CCP does not translate uncollateralised losses into equity
losses but it manages them in accordance with its DMP which is modelled next.
While technically this is a zero-sum game as a CM’s devaluation of its assets corre-
sponds to an equal reduction of the defaulted counterparty’s liabilities, it is important to
consider those losses as part of the overall social welfare. Systemic risk poses an externality
because failing banks may require ex-post bailouts and equity losses lead to undercapitali-
sation of the financial system with adverse consequences for the real economy (Acharya
et al. (2017), Brunnermeier and Cheridito (2019)).
2.3.3 Second day effects (t = 2)
At t = 2 the CCP manages the defaulting portfolios and uncollateralised losses it
sustains at t = 1, if any. If there are no defaults on the first day, there are no further losses
in the system and the stress testing exercise stops there.
We assume that on the second day the CCP performs a margin update, i.e. it updates its
IM requirements upwards to take into account the increased volatility of the market. This
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effect is known as margin procyclicality and is a standard practice of CCPs which may have
negative consequences for systemic stability given that margins act as destabilising factors
in illiquid markets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). If the shock is large enough to be
considered a tail scenario by the VaR model, the IM increases exerting further liquidity
pressure on CMs. Margin procyclicality is a major concern for regulators who plan to
incorporate it into stress testing methodologies considering the increasing importance
of CCPs in derivatives markets (BoE, 2015). Empirically, some papers have documented
that CCPs quickly raise margins following a shock but are slower in lowering them after
volatility declines (Abruzzo and Park, 2016), while others have found limited evidence for
procyclicality (Lewandowska and Glaser, 2017). However, the market turmoil of March
2020 has renewed interest in margin procyclicality among policymakers (FSB, 2020b).
Following the default of at least one CM, the CCP becomes the owner of its centrally
cleared portfolio. Its first act is to offload the portfolio from its books in order to become
market neutral again and avoid potential future VM obligations to the counterparties. As
explained in section 2.2, the main tool at the CCP’s disposal in order to achieve this is the
auction.
The clearing rules specify the set-up of the auction (see e.g. section 9 ICEU (2017) and
Ferrara et al. (2017)). It is a first-price sealed bid auction where all CMs are obligated
to participate. The CMs have the right to bid negatively, i.e. request resources from the
CCP in order to obtain the defaulting portfolio (for example because it consists of net
short positions and the CMs request the premium or due to its excessive riskiness). As
mentioned before, the CCP incentivises CMs to bid sensibly by allocating uncollateralised
losses according to the bidding behaviour. This implies the existence of a loss function
in the payoff of the bidders in contrast to the standard auction setting where losers walk
away with nothing.
We adopt the standard auction setting where the bidders are risk-neutral (Milgrom
and Weber, 1982). For simplicity, the CCP is assumed to combine all defaulting portfolios







(X1jd − X1dj)s ∀ d ∈ D and j ∈ N (2.19)
which is the sum of the total assets minus total liabilities of centrally cleared positions as
captured by the clearing fraction s of defaulted CMs belonging in the subset D.
Since the CCP marks-to-market the portfolio, its price is known to be PV. However,
the incorporation of the defaulting portfolio into each CM’s existing one creates unique
new IM gains or losses which differentiate each bidder’s valuation. Each surviving CM’s
IM posted to the CCP at the end of t = 1 was:
IM1ij = m0
√
5|W1ij| ∀ i ∈ N\D and j = n + 1
Let WD = ∑d W1dj ∀ d ∈ D and j = n + 1 denote the net notional of the defaulting
portfolio. The net IM gain or loss from incorporating the defaulting portfolio into each
CM’s existing one is calculated as:
IM2ij − IM1ij = m1
√
5|W1ij + WD| −m0
√
5|W1ij| ∀ i ∈ N\D and j = n + 1 (2.20)
where m1 is the updated VaR estimated as in (2.3) but including the change in the asset
price ∆P due to the shock into the Monte Carlo paths to capture margin procyclicality.
The fair private value of each CM for the defaulting portfolio is thus given as:
ui = PV − (IM2ij − IM1ij) ∀ i ∈ N\D and j = n + 1 (2.21)
Note that PV is constant and known to all CMs since the CCP marks-to-market the
portfolio which makes this auction a private value auction. A positive (negative) PV
implies an asset (liability) for the CM, hence it posts (requests) compensation to (from)
the CCP to acquire the portfolio. A positive (negative) net IM (IM2ij − IM1ij) is a future
payment (receipt) to (from) the CCP hence the CM requests (posts) this amount from (to)
the CCP.
As in the standard auction setting, we assume that the CMs’ valuations ui are indepen-
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dent and drawn from a known to all distribution F with density f and support [u, u]. We
assume a uniform distribution with support u = −0.1 and u = 0.1 in $ trillion.16
Each CM places a bid bi = b(ui). In a standard setting the payoff πi would be:
πi =
ui − bi if bi > maxj 6=i bj0 otherwise
That is, the winner places the highest bid and profits the difference between his valua-
tion and his bid while losers walk away with nothing, i.e. zero payoff.
However, in this case the CCP punishes losers by requesting contributions via the
Powers of Assessment according to the ranking of the bids. The contributions are capped
to a multiple of the original DF contribution, typically two. CMs cannot calculate the loss
function ex-ante (except for the maximum exposure due to the cap) for several reasons.
First, it requires the ordering of the bids to be known which is obviously not possible
before the auction is complete. Second, the bids are sealed so only the CCP knows the
ranking ex-post. Third, the CMs are not aware of the total losses faced by the CCP, nor
the individual contributions to the DF from all the CMs. Hence, we depart from the
usual notion of risk estimation to model CMs that face Knightian uncertainty, i.e. an
unmeasurable risk.
Under such a setting, agents are said to be Knightian uncertainty averse and maximise
expected utility given the least favourable state of nature. In other words, they maximise
expected utility under the worst-case scenario according to the maximin expected payoff
representation introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). However, the worst-case
scenario is known to everyone: it is the one where the losses are so large that the CMs pay
the capped amount which is equal to twice their original DF contribution irrespectively
of the bidding order. That is, the losses are not fully covered by the addition of twice the
original DF to the available resources.
In Appendix A.1 we prove that in this case the loss function becomes irrelevant and
the auction boils down to the standard independent private value (IPV) case where the
16The uniform distribution is the standard assumption in the auction theory literature. Selecting broader
bounds results in lower overall bids while tighter bounds increase them. Alternative bounds do not have a
significant effect on our results.
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if u < ui ≤ u
−∞ if ui = u
(2.22)
where M is the number of bidders, i.e. the number of surviving CMs. A CM whose
valuation coincides with the lower bound of the distribution u would be a certain loser
and ask an infinite amount of compensation from the CCP. Our bounds are broad enough
to never observe this case.
Since the CMs have a finite amount of liquid resources available, they bid in accordance
to their budget constraint (Che and Gale, 1998):
b∗(ui) = min(b(ui), AL1i ) (2.23)
Once all bids (2.23) have been placed, the CCP assigns the portfolio to the highest
bidder. If the highest bid is negative, the CCP is assumed to always be able to pay the
winner.17
Next, if the CCP faces uncollateralised losses that exceed the defaulted CMs’ IM and
DF contributions as well as a small equity tranche of $100 million, it calls on its Powers
of Assessment. Each surviving CM is obligated to contribute up to twice its original DF
amount starting from the lowest bidder and ascending until the losses have been covered
or every CM has pledged the capped amount and the losses are still not fully covered.
The CMs use their remaining liquid assets to pay the additional funds. If any CM does
not have enough liquid resources, i.e. it breaches its LCR requirements, it defaults due to




≥ 100% ∀ i ∈ N\D (2.24)
where PAi is the amount asked by the CCP under the Powers of Assessment.
In the most extreme case when there are still unfunded losses after the Powers of
17In reality, it may occur that the CCP does not have enough resources of its own to pay the bid in which
case it has to rely on its DF and then its Powers of Assessment to replenish it. This adds an additional layer
of complexity and also introduces the possibility of CCP default hence we eschew it.
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Assessment, the CCP assigns these residual losses via VMGH to the winning counterparties.
This haircut is applied pro-rata and is directly translated into an equity loss for the CMs
since the CCP does not post IM to them. Any CM whose updated CAR drops below 8%





≥ 8% ∀ i ∈ N\D and j = n + 1 (2.25)
where VM2ji is the VM loss due to VMGH.
We measure systemic risk for t = 2 (SR2) as:
SR2 = ∑
i
(E2i − E1i ) ∀ i ∈ N\D (2.26)
The total equity loss (SRT) in the system is:
SRT = SR1 + SR2 (2.27)
which gives the total measure of systemic risk.
Any CMs that default at t = 2 would require the repetition of the auction process,
although there are no uncollateralised losses in this case. We do not perform this step as it
does not add substantial information to our analysis.
2.3.4 Model implications
The model has several implications for the redistribution of risks across the CCP and
the CMs following the introduction of non-central clearing. First, the model predicts
that the liquidity risk of the CMs will increase because they have fewer unencumbered
liquid assets to pay their VM obligations, as captured by equation (2.14). Second, it is also
expected that their counterparty risk will decrease as the presence of the IM in the bilateral
transactions will protect them from losses due to counterparty default, as seen in equation
(2.15). Third, holding the CCP’s resources constant, non-central clearing can increase
the CCP’s losses if more CMs default on their obligations due to liquidity risk. Hence,
the effect on systemic risk is ambiguous as the collateralisation of bilateral transactions
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can reduce losses due to default but can lead to higher losses for the CCP which will be
subsequently mutualised across the surviving CMs.
We finish this section by highlighting certain model simplifications and abstractions
from real life. First, due to data limitations we do not include non-banks or non-financial
institutions (end-users). These entities are more likely to lie in the periphery of the
network although their significant presence in the OTC interest rate derivatives market is
recognised (ISDA, 2014a). However, non-banks tend to be more susceptible to liquidity
shocks (Paddrik et al., 2020), which would only reinforce our results on the prevalence
of liquidity risk in cleared derivatives markets. Second, the available aggregate data do
not allow for the correct identification of connections. While we simulate 100 random
networks in order to average out the results, there remains the possibility of considerable
model error. Nonetheless, we base our network formation on existing literature which is
based on actual data of bilateral exposures. Third, we do not account for banks’ additional
sources to raise liquidity such as the repo market. Equally however, systemic events
are characterised by multiple market failures as was evident in the recent financial crisis
and their orderly operation cannot be guaranteed (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). While
macroprudential stress test models add general equilibrium dimensions to improve on
their microprudential counterparts, there is a limit to the degree of generalisation that is
possible without losing tractability (Demekas, 2015). Stress testing models remain partial
equilibrium exercises but they can be extended in order to balance the trade-off between
reality and model tractability.
2.4 Data
We test the model implications by running simulations using data on 39 banks that
act as CMs. The selection of these banks is based on a study by the Macroeconomic
Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD), also adopted by Heath et al. (2016), which uses
proprietary data and simulates a core-periphery structure of the OTC derivatives network
that comprises the 16 largest global derivatives dealers forming the densely connected core
and a number of smaller banks representing individual jurisdictions forming the sparsely
connected periphery (MAGD, 2013). The list of banks is provided in Table A.1 in Appendix
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A.2.
We obtain the following data for the banks from their 2018 annual reports: total interest
rate derivatives gross assets and liabilities, gross notional, liquid assets as measured by
their HQLA required under Basel III regulation and used among others for derivatives
activities, as well as their total equity (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital). The annual reports include
data for five major derivatives asset classes, those being equity, currency, commodity, credit
and interest rate. For simplicity, in this study we focus on one asset class and we choose
the interest rate one since it dominates all other classes in terms of notional and exposures.
In this way we capture more than 85% of the total OTC derivatives markets activity in
terms of gross notional which stood at $544 trillion at the end of 2018 (BIS, 2019). We set
the central clearing fraction s equal to 75% in line with current estimates for interest rate
derivatives (BIS, 2019), with the rest 25% of trading activity being bilaterally traded.
A summary of the data is given in Table 2.2. Figures are in $ trillion. The majority of
trading activity is concentrated in the Core-16 banks, accounting for approximately 80%
of total assets, liabilities and notional, with the rest 20% shared among the Periphery-23
banks. Approximately 50% of total liquid assets are in the core and the rest 50% in the
periphery, while 57% of total equity belongs to the Core-16 banks and 43% in the Periphery-
23 banks. The derivatives data represent the aggregates for each bank which we use to
infer the unobservable bilateral connections as explained in the previous section. Using
this data to calibrate our model, the CCP collects $224.3 billion in IM and $13.1 billion
for its default fund, approximately twice as much as the resources collected by LCH, the
leading CCP for interest rate swaps.18 When non-central clearing is enabled, CMs post
$449 billion in IM between themselves. The fact that the CMs post almost twice as much
IM in the bilateral transactions (covering 25% of total notional) compared to the centrally
cleared ones (covering 75% of total notional) highlights the netting benefits arising from
the dominance of CCPs.
Regarding the volatility parameter σ0, since we don’t have any prior knowledge of
its value we refer to the study of MAGD (2013) which estimates the daily volatility of
18According to the 2017 EU-wide CCP stress test published by the European Securities and Markets
Authority, LCH had approximately EUR 110 billion in IM and EUR 7 billion in its default fund (ESMA, 2018).
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Table 2.2: Data summary ($ trillion)
Total Core-16 Periphery-23
Gross assets 2.78 2.22 0.56
Gross liabilities 2.66 2.07 0.59
Gross notional 465.40 386.32 79.08
Liquid assets 8.76 4.44 4.32
Equity 3.19 1.81 1.38
Source: Annual reports and own calculations
the interest rate derivatives class using proprietary data equal to 0.068%.19 We use this
parameter value to calculate the market shocks which we interpret as parallel movements
of the swap curve used to price interest rate swaps, the dominant contract of interest rate
derivatives.
To give context to the magnitude of the shocks we apply to the system, a 2.33σ0 ≈ 15.8
bps movement is approximately one-third the shock to the USD Libor swap rate on the day
Lehman Brothers defaulted, which was 45 bps according to a report by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC, 2019). A 3σ0 ≈ 20.4 bps movement is equivalent to
approximately one-half the Lehman shock, a 10σ0 ≈ 60.8 bps movement is 1.5 times the
Lehman shock, while a 20σ0 ≈ 136 bps movement is 3 times the Lehman shock. Hence, a
10σ0 shock can be described as “extreme but plausible” while a 20σ0 is probably beyond
what CCPs would consider plausible. The reason we apply such a shock is because we
can simulate an extreme scenario where the CCP’s pre-funded resources are depleted,
which has happened in rare cases historically. Given that our CCP is a global market
representative, the shock required to exhaust its resources is also very large. With smaller
and more realistic CCPs the corresponding shock would be smaller.
19While a different value of σ0 would change our absolute results, we are more interested in the relative
results, i.e. comparing before and after the introduction of non-central clearing, and we expect those to be




We report the baseline model results for each of the two rounds (days 1 and 2) in Table
2.3. The table presents mean values across the 100 simulated networks for the defaults
due to liquidity and counterparty risk as well as the overall systemic and CCP losses. The
results derived from the simulations are compared between the two configurations, with
and without non-central clearing (NCC), for shocks of various magnitudes. We calculate
the % change of effects achieved through NCC and assess the statistical significance
through a two-sample t-test.20 The results are also graphically presented in bar graphs in
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 for ease of exposition.
20We also apply the Welch’s t-test to control for unequal variances between the two samples. The results
remain the same.
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Figure 2.1: Baseline configuration results (first day)






























































































































Figure 2.2: Baseline configuration results (second day)
Table 2.3: Baseline configuration results
This table reports the baseline results of the analysis. The CCP is assumed to clear 75% of all derivatives transactions,
and the banks default due to liquidity risk if their LCR drops to less than 100% and due to counterparty risk if
their CAR drops to less than 8%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Day 1 results
Shock With NCC Without NCC % Change
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.51 0.07 628.57∗∗∗
3σ0 0.63 0.13 384.62∗∗∗
10σ0 4.56 2.79 63.44∗∗∗
20σ0 11.53 8.48 35.97∗∗∗
Systemic losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.06 −100.00∗
3σ0 0.00 0.33 −100.00∗∗
10σ0 16.91 54.41 −68.93∗∗∗
20σ0 189.59 254.59 −25.53∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.02 −100.00
20σ0 0.13 0.67 −80.60∗∗∗
CCP uncollateralised losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 33.20 25.40 30.69∗∗∗
20σ0 221.12 194.79 13.52∗∗∗
Panel B: Day 2 results
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.15 0.04 275.00∗∗∗
20σ0 0.36 0.33 9.09
Systemic losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 4.38 1.04 319.79∗∗∗
20σ0 125.58 105.02 19.58∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 1.65 1.48 11.49
Panel C: Days 1&2 results
Systemic losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.06 −100.00∗
3σ0 0.00 0.33 −100.00∗∗
10σ0 21.29 55.46 −61.62∗∗∗
20σ0 315.16 359.61 −12.36∗∗∗
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2.5.1.1 First day defaults and losses (t = 1)
The results from day 1 for shocks ranging from 2.33 to 20 standard deviations are
reported in Panel A of Table 2.3. Defaults due to liquidity risk occur due to the violation of
condition (2.14), that is, if the net IM and the VM obligations make the banks breach their
LCR requirement. The introduction of NCC significantly increases the liquidity-driven
default frequency for all market shocks due to the higher liquidity encumberment of the
banks, with the increase being most pronounced for mild shocks (628.57% at 2.33σ0) and
least pronounced during extreme market stress (35.97% at 20σ0). This is because when
large market shocks occur many banks cannot repay their VM obligations even in the
absence of the liquidity encumberment caused by the introduction of NCC. In absolute
terms, the number of defaults is substantial, reaching an average of 11.53 under NCC and
8.48 without in the most extreme case. The results indicate that NCC leads to a significant
increase in liquidity risk which affects a large number of banks.
The day 1 systemic equity losses defined in (2.18) caused by the defaults due to liquidity
risk are discussed next. For mild shocks NCC eliminates all systemic losses due to the
added protection offered by the IM in the bilateral transactions. As the shock magnitude
increases, the crystallised losses become larger as expected, and NCC decreases the overall
losses. The loss reduction is both statistically and economically significant. Specifically,
NCC caps the overall systemic losses at $189.59 billion or 5.94% of the total equity of all
banks. Without NCC the losses are as high as $254.59 billion or 7.97% of total equity, an
increase of 25.53% or $65 billion. Even though the number of defaults due to liquidity
risk is higher under NCC in extreme market conditions, leading to higher raw losses
before taking into account the collateral, the IM posted in bilateral transactions protects the
surviving participants. Our findings provide support for the role of NCC as a mechanism
for obtaining economically significant savings in systemic losses attributed to extreme
market shocks in the OTC derivatives markets.
Even though NCC significantly reduces systemic losses, the reduction of defaults due
to counterparty risk as a result of these losses is more limited. This is because defaults due
to counterparty risk are zero or near zero with or without NCC in all but the most extreme
market shock case. The banks have sufficient capital to withstand the losses that occur,
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and while under a 20σ0 scenario there is a statistically significant reduction of defaults of
80.60%, the actual number of defaults is very small, 0.13 under NCC and 0.67 without.
This finding corroborates Cont (2017) who argues that liquidity risk is the main source
of stress in cleared markets. It also shows that the small benefits of introducing NCC in
terms of decreasing counterparty risk are overshadowed by the accompanying increase of
liquidity risk which adds to the evidence for the effect of risk transformation.
The CCP sustains zero uncollateralised losses under mild stress since its resources
remain constant under both configurations and are sufficient to cover losses due to default.
However, due to the dominance of the CCP in our model which clears 75% of total trading
activity, the uncollateralised losses in the most extreme scenario are very large, standing at
$221.12 billion under NCC and $194.79 billion without. NCC increases the losses sustained
by the CCP by 13.52% in the most extreme case because of the higher number of defaults
due to liquidity risk. Nonetheless, since some of those losses are owed to other defaulted
counterparties, we assume that the CCP is only liable to repay surviving CMs. As such, the
magnitude of losses presented in Table 2.3 overestimates the true level of stress imposed
on the CCP.
While NCC appears effective at reducing counterparty and systemic risks when consid-
ering the first-round results, the increased liquidity risk in the most extreme shock scenario
leads to a higher number of total defaults, so the CCP sustains larger losses in this case.
This has important implications for financial stability because these losses are transmitted
back to the surviving CMs in accordance with the DMP as reported in the ensuing analysis.
2.5.1.2 Second day defaults and losses (t = 2)
On the second day, the CCP distributes any losses in excess of the defaulted CMs’
posted IM and DF contributions and a small tranche of its own equity to the surviving
CMs. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 2.3.
Defaults due to liquidity risk (i.e. due to insufficient liquid assets to meet the Powers
of Assessment (2.24)) and counterparty risk (i.e. due to equity losses caused by VMGH
(2.25)) only occur under severe stress when the CCP’s pre-funded resources are depleted
and the recovery tools are activated. The defaults due to liquidity risk remain small with
and without NCC, reaching 0.36 and 0.33 on average respectively, due to the cap on the
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amount of resources that the CCP can ask for. As such, we do not find that the CCP poses
a substantial liquidity risk to its members, alleviating concerns about the repercussions of
the stress imposed on CMs due to the Powers of Assessment (Domanski et al., 2015).
The equity losses sustained by CMs due to VMGH defined in (2.26) reach $125.58
billion under NCC or 4.18% of remaining total equity from day 1 and $105.02 billion
without or 3.57% of remaining equity in the most extreme market scenario. Interestingly,
the introduction of NCC seems to amplify the CCP’s potential for contagion in the most
extreme market conditions, increasing average losses by $20.56 billion or, equivalently, by
19.58%. The increased liquidity risk leads to more initial defaults and more uncollateralised
losses for the CCP, which transmits them back to the surviving CMs leading to higher
secondary losses. As such, the CCP’s propensity to act as a source of contagion in the
most extreme cases is amplified with the introduction of NCC. Nonetheless, the increase
in losses transmitted by the CCP is not enough to significantly increase the number of
defaults occurring due to counterparty risk, implying that the CMs are able to withstand
the additional losses distributed by the CCP under NCC. The number of defaults due to
counterparty risk is virtually zero for all shocks except the most extreme one, where they
average 1.65 under NCC and 1.48 without, statistically the same.
2.5.1.3 Overall systemic losses
We report the overall systemic losses that occur over the two days of the clearing
process derived using (2.27) in Panel C of Table 2.3.
NCC significantly reduces overall systemic losses under all market conditions. Under
NCC, losses remain zero for small to moderate shocks, rising to $21.29 billion or 0.67% of
total initial equity for a 10σ0 shock and $315.16 billion for the most extreme 20σ0 shock or
9.87% of total initial equity. Without NCC, losses occur in all cases, rising to $55.46 billion
or 1.74% of total initial equity for a 10σ0 shock and $359.61 billion or 11.26% of total initial
equity for a 20σ0 shock. The findings suggest that the introduction of NCC reduces losses
by 61.62% and 12.36%, respectively for shock sizes of 10σ0 and 20σ0, which amounts to
economically significant savings of $34.17 billion and $44.45 billion or 1.07% and 1.39% of
total initial equity respectively.
We can thus deduce that the introduction of NCC promotes financial stability in terms
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of reducing total equity losses. The exchange of IM in bilateral transactions mitigates
the losses arising from counterparty risk at the expense of an increase of liquidity risk.
However, this increase has implications for the stability of the CCP since it faces larger
losses in adverse market conditions and as a result the knock-on effects are also more
severe. We further analyse the implications of the expansion of central clearing for systemic
risk in the next subsection.
2.5.2 Central clearing and systemic risk
In this subsection we examine the impact of the expansion of central clearing on
systemic risk. Post-crisis regulations have heavily promoted the expansion of CCPs as a
result of them being regarded as bulwarks that provide stability to the financial system,
and the introduction of non-central clearing is an additional step towards that goal by
incentivising market participants to switch to central clearing in order to benefit from
lower margin costs (BCBS-IOSCO, 2015).
We repeat the stress testing exercise twice by setting the clearing fraction s equal
to 0.5 and 0.95, i.e. we assume that 50% and 95% of positions are centrally cleared
compared to 75% in the earlier configuration. That is, we consider a scenario with reduced
central clearing and another one with increased central clearing compared to the earlier
configuration. For each repetition a new set of 100 random adjacency matrices is generated.
The results are presented in Table 2.4 as well as graphically in Figures 2.3 - 2.6.
On day 1, liquidity risk remains the main source of stress but the corresponding number
of defaults decreases with the expansion of the CCP because the increasing netting benefits
lower the exposures and the amount of collateral required so the CMs have lower liquidity
encumberment. When the CCP clears 50% of transactions, the number of liquidity-driven
defaults is 17.91 and 11.28 with and without NCC respectively, compared to 6.20 and 5.83
when 95% of transactions are centrally cleared. In addition, because of the decreasing
role of non-central clearing, which affects only 5% of transactions in the increased central
clearing configuration, the % increase in the number of defaults is lower when the CCP is
dominant.
The decrease in the number of defaults due to liquidity risk leads to a sizeable decrease
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in systemic losses on day 1. With decreased central clearing, the losses in the most
extreme market scenario under NCC are $528.76 billion or 16.55% of total equity while
with increased central clearing they are $23.55 billion or 0.74% of total equity, reduced by
95.54%. Without NCC the corresponding losses are $664.06 billion or 20.79% of total equity
and $36.30 billion or 1.14% of total equity, reduced by 94.53%. These results illustrate the
very significant reduction of exposures and counterparty risk due to market shocks that
can be achieved with the proliferation of CCPs. NCC reduces these losses even further
which corroborates our baseline results from subsection 2.5.1.
Defaults due to counterparty risk are completely eliminated with a clearing fraction
of 95% as fewer CMs default on their VM obligations due to liquidity risk, leading to
smaller systemic losses and hence zero defaults due to counterparty risk, with or without
NCC. Under reduced central clearing, the number of defaults due to counterparty risk is
reduced with NCC but similarly with the baseline results they are low, 1.44 and 2.89 with
and without NCC respectively. This shows that even with very large equity losses of up to
20% of total capital most banks do not breach their capital adequacy ratios.
On the other hand, the expansion of central clearing also increases the systemic impor-
tance of the CCP and its propensity for contagion under severe stress. The uncollateralised
losses faced by the CCP in the most extreme market scenario with 50% of positions cen-
trally cleared are $166.70 billion under NCC and $147.16 billion without, compared to
$201.30 billion and $193.62 billion respectively with 95% of positions centrally cleared.
Interestingly, even though the number of CMs that default on their VM obligations due to
liquidity stress decreases, the losses incurred by the CCP increase as it expands its oper-
ations. This highlights the fact that in a configuration where the CCP is most dominant,
the exposures that manifest when shocks occur are so large that only a small number
of defaults is sufficient to generate losses comparable to those in a configuration with a
smaller CCP.
The number of defaults due to liquidity risk on day 2 is further reduced with the
expansion of central clearing to 0.10 and 0.12 with and without NCC respectively since the
CMs are less liquidity encumbered which allows them to meet their Powers of Assessment
obligations.
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Figure 2.3: Alternative central clearing configurations results - Reduced central clearing (first day)




























































































































Figure 2.4: Alternative central clearing configurations results - Reduced central clearing (second day)




























































Round 1 number of defaults due to counterparty risk
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%





















































Figure 2.5: Alternative central clearing configurations results - Increased central clearing (first day)
























































































































Figure 2.6: Alternative central clearing configurations results - Increased central clearing (second day)
Table 2.4: Alternative central clearing configurations results
This table reports results assuming that the CCP clears 50% and 95% of all derivatives transactions in the Reduced central clearing and
Increased central clearing configurations respectively. The banks default due to liquidity risk if their LCR drops to less than 100% and
due to counterparty risk if their CAR drops to less than 8%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Day 1 results
Reduced central clearing Increased central clearing
Shock With NCC Without
NCC
% Change With NCC Without
NCC
% Change
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 1.29 0.03 4200.00∗∗∗ 0.22 0.13 69.23∗
3σ0 1.65 0.10 1550.00∗∗∗ 0.37 0.21 76.19∗∗
10σ0 9.39 4.29 118.88∗∗∗ 2.00 1.81 10.50
20σ0 17.91 11.28 58.78∗∗∗ 6.20 5.83 6.35∗
Systemic losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 −100.00∗∗
3σ0 0.00 1.28 −100.00∗∗ 0.00 0.05 −100.00∗∗∗
10σ0 62.53 156.60 −60.07∗∗∗ 1.67 7.05 −76.33∗∗∗
20σ0 528.76 664.06 −20.38∗∗∗ 23.55 36.30 −35.13∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.34 −100.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 1.44 2.89 −50.17∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
CCP uncol. losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 34.88 22.67 53.86∗∗∗ 24.47 23.16 5.69
20σ0 166.70 147.16 13.28∗∗∗ 201.30 193.62 3.97
Panel B: Day 2 results
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.21 0.03 600.00∗∗∗ 0.07 0.06 16.67
20σ0 0.64 0.42 52.38∗∗∗ 0.10 0.12 −16.67
Systemic losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 9.85 2.43 305.50∗∗∗ 0.65 0.59 10.30
20σ0 41.69 43.76 −4.73 137.29 133.13 3.13
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.04 −100.00∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 0.24 0.37 −35.14 0.82 0.96 −14.58
Panel C: Days 1&2 results
Systemic losses ($ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 −100.00∗∗
3σ0 0.00 1.28 −100.00∗∗ 0.00 0.05 −100.00∗∗∗
10σ0 72.39 159.03 −54.48∗∗∗ 2.32 7.64 −69.61∗∗∗
20σ0 570.45 707.82 −19.41∗∗∗ 160.84 169.44 −5.07
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The CCP’s expansion leads to substantially higher systemic losses on day 2 in the
most extreme market scenario, from $41.69 billion or 1.56% of remaining capital under
NCC and $43.76 billion or 1.73% of remaining capital without NCC with reduced central
clearing, to $137.29 billion or 4.33% of remaining capital under NCC and $133.13 billion or
4.22% of remaining capital without NCC with increased central clearing, an increase of 3.3
times and 3 times respectively. Hence, once the CCP exhausts its pre-funded resources it
becomes a source of contagion and the losses it distributes are amplified with its increased
presence in the market.
The defaults due to counterparty risk increase with the expansion of central clearing
because the CCP distributes larger uncollateralised losses to the surviving CMs via VMGH.
However, these defaults remain low as banks are well-capitalised, at 0.24 and 0.37 with
and without NCC respectively when the CCP clears 50% of all transactions, to 0.82 and
0.96 when the CCP clears 95% of all transactions.
Finally, the total systemic losses for days 1 and 2 decrease with the expansion of central
clearing under all market scenarios due to the beneficial effect of multilateral netting in
reducing exposures. In the most extreme market scenario, the losses decrease by 71.80%
with NCC as central clearing expands, from $570.45 billion or 17.86% of total equity with
reduced central clearing to $160.84 billion or 5.04% of total equity with increased central
clearing. Without NCC, total systemic losses decrease by 76.06% from $707.82 billion or
22.16% of total equity with reduced central clearing to $169.44 billion or 5.31% of total
equity with increased central clearing.
The results indicate that the expansion of central clearing is beneficial for financial
stability as it substantially reduces total systemic losses, driven by the reduction of first-
round losses originating from market shocks due to increasing netting benefits. However,
this reduction is accompanied by an increase of second-round losses due to the feedback
effect, such that the CCP can distribute losses that are much higher than those due to the
market shock when it is dominant in the market. Hence, even though the net reduction is
positive (decrease of first-round losses more than offsets increase of second-round ones),
the fact that the CCP has the potential to become the main source of stress in the system
requires a careful appraisal of its pre-funded resources in the new regulatory environment
to ensure it does not contribute to financial instability.
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Examining the effect of NCC as the CCP expands, we observe that its effects (both
positive and negative) become subdued when it affects only 5% of market activity. In terms
of total systemic losses, we observe that the only insignificant difference in means occurs in
the increased central clearing configuration under extreme stress. In general, NCC is most
effective at reducing systemic losses when central clearing is limited as observed by the
reduction of losses between the two configurations for various levels of central clearing.
This is intuitive given that bilateral transactions capture a larger fraction of market activity
when central clearing is limited.
2.6 Sensitivity analysis
2.6.1 Increased CCP resources
In this subsection we discuss the model results when the CCP increases its pre-funded
resources, the IM and the DF, by 100% compared to the baseline configuration. Such an
increase would better protect the CCP, reducing the losses it distributes in the second
round, at the cost of higher liquidity encumberment of CMs and higher losses in the first
round. We can thus use the model to assess which effect dominates and what is the net
effect on overall systemic risk.21 The results are reported in Table A.2 and in Figures A.1
and A.2 in Appendix A.2.
On day 1, the number of defaults due to liquidity risk is slightly higher compared to the
baseline configuration under all market conditions due to the higher liquidity encumber-
ment, reaching 12.87 and 9.79 with and without NCC respectively during extreme stress
compared to 11.53 and 8.48 in the baseline configuration. The resulting systemic losses also
increase, reaching $205.86 billion or 6.45% of total equity under NCC compared to $189.59
billion or 5.94% of total equity in the baseline configuration, and $273.46 billion or 8.56% of
total equity without NCC compared to $254.59 billion or 7.97% of total equity in the base-
line configuration. The number of defaults due to counterparty risk increases marginally
due to the increased systemic losses, reaching 0.17 under NCC and 0.80 without, compared
21This analysis is partial in the sense that it does not capture the change in CMs’ incentive to centrally
clear if CCP margin costs double. As such, systemic risk could increase if they migrate transactions outside
of CCPs.
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to 0.13 and 0.67 respectively in the baseline configuration. The CCP suffers uncollateralised
losses only in the most extreme market scenario due to its increased resources, reaching
$141.36 billion under NCC and $127.24 billion without, significantly reduced compared to
the baseline configuration losses of $221.12 billion and $194.79 billion respectively.
On day 2, the number of defaults due to liquidity risk increases slightly, up to 0.74 under
NCC and 0.55 without in the most extreme market scenario, compared to 0.36 and 0.33
with and without NCC respectively in the baseline configuration. This is because the CCP
has a larger DF so it asks for more resources to replenish it from the CMs. The systemic
losses are greatly reduced, at $54.96 billion or 1.84% of remaining equity under NCC
compared to $125.58 billion or 4.18% of remaining equity in the baseline configuration,
and $44.29 billion or 1.52% of remaining equity without NCC compared to $105.02 billion
or 3.57% of remaining equity in the baseline configuration. As a result, the defaults due to
counterparty risk also decrease, at 0.65 under NCC and 0.80 without compared to 1.65 and
1.48 respectively in the baseline configuration.
Finally, the total systemic losses decrease under severe stress conditions, reaching
$260.82 billion or 8.17% of total equity under NCC compared to $315.16 billion or 9.87%
of total equity in the baseline configuration, and $317.74 billion or 9.95% of total equity
without NCC compared to $359.61 billion or 11.26% of total equity in the baseline config-
uration. In other words, a more robust CCP decreases overall systemic risk because the
increase in first-round losses due to the higher liquidity risk of CMs is more than offset by
the decrease in second-round losses allocated by the CCP due to its larger resources.
2.6.2 Alternative LCR threshold
In this subsection we discuss the model results assuming that the banks default due to
liquidity risk if their LCR drops below 70% instead of 100% as in the baseline configuration.
In general, the reported effects are reduced if the banks have more available liquidity
to pay their VM obligations, although the actual resources that they can utilise for their
derivatives activities are likely to be only a fraction of their total HQLA. The results are
reported in Table A.3 and in Figures A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A.2.
The number of defaults due to liquidity risk on day 1 is substantially reduced since
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banks have more HQLA available, reaching 2.98 in extreme stress under NCC and 1.92
without, higher under NCC by 55.21%, compared to 11.53 and 8.48 respectively in the
baseline configuration, higher under NCC by 35.97%. This leads to systemic losses of up
to $52.34 billion under NCC and $65.83 billion without, or 1.64% and 2.06% of total equity
respectively, reduced by 20.50% under NCC. These compare to the baseline results of
$189.59 billion or 5.94% of the total equity under NCC and $254.59 billion or 7.97% of total
equity without, reduced by 25.53% under NCC. As a result, the number of defaults due
to counterparty risk is also lower, reaching 0.03 under NCC and 0.19 without in extreme
stress, decreased by 84.21% under NCC, compared to 0.13 and 0.67 respectively in the
baseline configuration, decreased by 80.60% under NCC. The CCP’s uncollateralised losses
reach $58.55 billion under NCC and $50.25 billion without, increased by 16.52% with the
introduction of NCC, compared to $221.12 billion and $194.79 billion respectively in the
baseline configuration, increased by 13.52% with NCC. Hence, even though the magnitude
of day 1 defaults and losses decreases when we lower the minimum LCR bound, the
relative difference between the two configurations with and without NCC remains similar,
which provides support to our baseline results regarding the effects of NCC.
On day 2, the number of defaults due to liquidity risk again decreases, reaching only
0.01 under extreme stress with and without NCC compared to 0.36 and 0.33 in the baseline
configuration. The systemic losses are also lower, at $23.53 billion under NCC or 0.75% of
remaining equity, and $16.61 billion without or 0.53% of remaining equity, higher under
NCC by 41.64%. These compare to the baseline results of $125.58 billion under NCC or
4.18% of remaining total equity and $105.02 billion without or 3.57% of remaining equity,
increased by 19.58% under NCC. The resulting defaults due to counterparty risk reach
0.09 under NCC and 0.19 without, compared to 1.65 and 1.48 in the baseline configuration.
Finally, the total systemic losses reach $75.87 billion or 2.38% of total equity under NCC
and $82.44 billion or 2.58% of total equity without, decreased by $6.6 billion or 7.98% under
NCC. This decrease is not statistically significant, in contrast to the decrease of 12.36% in
total systemic losses in the baseline configuration from $359.61 billion without NCC to
$315.16 billion following its introduction. This is because the decrease of day 1 losses of
$13.49 billion is more comparable to the increase of day 2 losses of $6.92 billion, compared
to the baseline configuration decrease of day 1 losses of $65 billion and increase of day 2
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losses of $20.56 billion. In other words, when the banks utilise more resources to pay their
VM obligations the beneficial effect of NCC at reducing first-round losses is almost entirely
offset by the increase of second-round losses due to the CCP’s operations, so the net effect
on total systemic losses is less pronounced. This result further highlights the importance
of containing the potential of the CCP to act as a source of contagion during extreme stress,
as it can potentially negate the reduction of systemic losses originating from the market
shock with the introduction of NCC.
2.6.3 Static market participants
In this subsection we discuss results from a static variant of the model. Under this
configuration the CMs are not allowed to rebalance their portfolios following the shock
on the first day but they passively accept the resulting losses as they crystallise. This
mimics the methodology of Heath et al. (2016) and serves as a useful benchmark in order
to compare with our baseline configuration’s results. We report the results in Table A.4
and in Figures A.5 and A.6 in Appendix A.2.
Overall, we observe that the number of defaults on day 1 tends to be higher for mild
shocks but slightly lower for severe shocks under the static configuration compared to the
baseline one. This is because in the presence of small shocks and few distressed market
participants, healthy CMs are able to accommodate the needs of the former so they are
able to avoid default. However, once extreme shocks occur everyone runs for the exit due
to large VM obligations and the system becomes more fragile (Pedersen, 2009).
In the most extreme market scenario, the first-round losses in the static setup are $198.15
billion or 6.20% of total equity under NCC and $249.63 billion or 7.82% of total equity
without, compared to $189.59 billion or 5.94% of total equity and $254.59 billion or 7.97%
of total equity respectively in the baseline configuration. While the number of defaults due
to liquidity risk is higher in the baseline configuration, the systemic losses are comparable.
This is because in the baseline configuration there is a higher number of defaults of small
(periphery) banks and lower number of defaults of core (large) banks. Intuitively, larger
banks would be more resilient to liquidity shocks than smaller ones and be able to more
quickly adapt to changing market conditions.
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Due to the similar systemic losses, the number of defaults due to counterparty risk
remains virtually the same, at 0.13 and 0.66 with and without NCC respectively, compared
to 0.13 and 0.67 in the baseline configuration. The CCP also sustains similar losses, $220.49
billion with NCC and $192.94 billion without compared to $221.12 billion and $194.79
billion in the baseline configuration respectively, leading to similar second-round losses.
These are capped at $120.98 billion or 4.04% of remaining equity under NCC and $104.31
billion or 3.54% of remaining equity without, compared to $125.58 billion or 4.18% of
remaining equity and $105.02 billion or 3.57% of remaining equity respectively in the
baseline configuration.
Finally, the total systemic losses in the most extreme market scenario under the static
setup are $319.13 billion or 9.99% of total equity under NCC and $353.94 billion or 11.08% of
total equity without, compared to $315.16 billion or 9.87% of total equity and $359.61 billion
or 11.26% of total equity respectively under the baseline configuration. While the results in
terms of total systemic risk are similar between the baseline and static configurations, which
provides robustness to our main findings, the change in the composition of defaulting
banks highlights the fragility of the system during times of stress.
2.6.4 CCP interoperability
In the final subsection we discuss results from an alternative model configuration which
showcases how our framework can be used to assess a variety of different policies. In
particular, we consider the case of two competing CCPs which may or may not be linked
to each other through interoperability arrangements. Such arrangements allow for a buyer
and a seller to clear their trade through different CCPs, which makes the CCPs clearing
members of each other.
The main benefit arising from interoperability is the reduction of exposures in a frag-
mented clearing market since positions can be netted across CCPs, thus lowering the
margin costs of market participants. On the other hand, interoperability arrangements
can potentially increase systemic risk because they create exposures between CCPs so a
CM default in one CCP can lead to spillover losses to CMs of the other CCP. Furthermore,
CCPs do not have control over the amount of exposure that can build up between them as
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it depends on the CMs’ trades.
To date, CCP interoperability has been mainly applied in vanilla securities rather than
derivatives CCPs due to the inherently higher complexity of managing risks of derivatives
contracts with long maturities, which has hampered its widespread adoption (McPartland
and Lewis, 2016). Theoretical research has found that CCP interoperability can lead to
significant reduction of exposures in fragmented clearing markets, but at the same time
it can also increase systemic risk due to undercollateralisation of cross-CCP exposures
(Mägerle and Nellen, 2015). In our paper, we attempt to quantify the trade-off between
decreased exposures and increased CCPs’ propensity for contagion. While our results are
stylised and do not take into account all the complexities that would arise from derivatives
CCP interoperability arrangements, we contribute by providing empirical estimates of the
trade-off to assess which effect dominates.
As mentioned before, we consider two competing CCPs. In the case where there are
no interoperability arrangements, we assume that the first CCP manages the majority
of the trades of the Core-16 banks, while the second CCP caters for the trades of the
Periphery-23 banks between themselves and with the Core-16 banks. In other words, with
no interoperability the Core-16 banks are CMs of both CCPs, while the Periphery-23 banks
are CMs of the second CCP only. As a result, in this configuration collateral requirements
are not efficient since the Core-16 banks’ exposures are fragmented across two CCPs,
leading to higher IM requirements. Specifically, the first CCP collects $156.2 billion in
IM while the second CCP collects $123.2 billion, so the total IM collected is $279.4 billion.
This is 25% higher than the IM posted in the baseline configuration of $224.3 billion, a
significant increase.
When interoperability arrangements exist, the Core-16 banks do not need to be CMs
of the second CCP in order to accommodate the Periphery-23 banks’ trades. Hence,
in this case the Core-16 banks are CMs of the first CCP only while the Periphery-23
banks are CMs of the second CCP as before. However, the CCPs now have an exposure
between themselves equal to the value of the trades between the Core-16 and Periphery-23
banks. This configuration lowers the IM requirements to the same level as in the baseline
configuration because of the netting benefits, with the first CCP collecting $172.9 billion in
IM and the second one collecting $51.4 billion for a total of $224.3 billion.
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Apart from these changes the model works as before, although in the case of interoper-
ability if a CM of one CCP indirectly connected to the CM of the other defaults and creates
losses for the CCP that are not covered by its pre-funded resources, these losses can be
transmitted to the other CCP and mutualised across its CMs. We assume that non-central
clearing is present in both configurations in order to focus on the effects of interoperability
and not confound our results. The results are presented in Table A.5 and in Figures A.7 -
A.9 in Appendix A.2.
On day 1, defaults due to liquidity risk remain significantly lower under interoperability
compared to without in all cases, reaching 11.63 and 13.17 on average respectively in
the most extreme market scenario. This is because as explained before the presence of
interoperability lowers the system-wide IM requirements and hence the CMs’ liquidity
encumberment. This translates into lower day 1 systemic losses, reaching $189.78 billion or
5.94% of initial equity under interoperability and $220.51 billion or 6.90% of initial equity
without, reduced by 13.93%. The resulting defaults due to counterparty risk are thus also
lower under interoperability compared to without, at 0.11 and 0.16 respectively, although
there is no statistical difference between them.
The first CCP suffers slightly lower uncollateralised losses under interoperability com-
pared to without as a result of the lower number of defaults due to liquidity risk, reaching
$183.98 billion and $185.88 billion respectively under extreme market stress, statistically
the same. However, the second CCP’s losses under interoperability are significantly lower
compared to without, reaching $31.37 billion and $93.01 billion respectively, a reduction of
66.28%. This is because without interoperability it includes all 39 banks as CMs while with
interoperability only the Periphery-23 banks are its CMs. As a result, its exposures are
greatly reduced under interoperability as the Core-16 banks do not need to act as its CMs
to accommodate the Periphery-23 banks’ trades, leading to lower losses in times of stress.
On day 2, defaults due to liquidity risk are slightly higher under interoperability
compared to without, at 0.43 and 0.28 respectively. The systemic losses reach $101.59
billion or 3.38% of remaining equity under interoperability and $122.99 billion or 4.14%
of remaining equity without, reduced by 17.40%. This is because even though under
interoperability there is transmission of losses across CCPs, they only reach $250 million
after taking into account the collateral which are more than offset by the significant
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reduction of the second CCP’s uncollateralised losses and their subsequent mutualisation
across its CMs. As a result, the number of defaults due to counterparty risk due to VMGH
decreases by 24.41% with the introduction of interoperability from 1.68 to 1.27. Finally, the
total systemic losses always remain lower under interoperability compared to without,
reaching $291.37 billion or 9.12% of total equity and $343.49 billion or 10.75% of total equity
respectively, reduced by 15.17%.
Our results indicate that interoperability arrangements can in fact reduce liquidity,
counterparty and systemic risks. As long as their introduction leads to smaller CCPs in
terms of membership base, the resulting reduction in CCP uncollateralised losses more
than offsets cross-CCP losses that can occur even under extreme market conditions, while
the netting benefits result in lower CM liquidity encumberment and further reduction of
CCP losses. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel finding in the small literature
on CCP interoperability arrangements. While it is not intended to guide policy due to
the stylised nature of the model, it indicates that further research should be conducted to
assess how interoperability can affect systemic risk.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a network model incorporating the largest dealer banks in
the OTC derivatives markets as well a fictitious CCP that is the dominant counterparty.
We consider two system configurations, one in which the banks post collateral between
themselves in bilateral transactions and one in which they don’t in order to assess the
effects of non-central clearing on counterparty, liquidity and systemic risks.
We report the effectiveness of non-central clearing at reducing counterparty and sys-
temic risks under mild and severe market conditions. Even though a higher number of
market participants default on their obligations due to liquidity risk under extreme stress
following the introduction of non-central clearing, the collateral posted in bilateral trades
results in lower systemic losses and protects market participants from counterparty risk.
However, the implications for the relationship between central and non-central clearing
are less clear-cut. A higher number of defaulting banks due to increased liquidity risk leads
to higher losses for the CCP which in turn transmits them back to the surviving market
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participants. This effect is reduced as the CCP becomes more dominant in the market but
the knock-on losses originating from the CCP may surpass those due to the initial market
shock as a result. Hence, our analysis suggests that the proliferation of derivatives clearing
necessitates the adoption of a holistic view by the regulatory authorities on how different
market participants, including banks and CCPs, can propagate shocks during times of
stress.
To conclude, our paper provides a quantitative assessment of the potential sources of
stress in the cleared OTC derivatives markets. We highlight the importance of liquidity risk
during times of stress and its potential to destabilise the CCP, leading to significant feedback
effects. We have used the framework to empirically assess various recommendations
regarding the optimal CCP design that will maximise the welfare of itself and its members




A.1 CCP auction optimal bidding function
In this section we derive the optimal bidding function of our auction setup which
coincides with the one from the independent private value model.
Consider M risk-neutral bidders (the participating CMs), each assigning a private
and independent value ui on the auction item, in this case the defaulting CMs’ portfolio.
Each bidder knows its valuation and the fact that the opponents’ valuations are drawn
independently from the same distribution F with density f and support [u, u]. Note that it
may be that u < 0 and u > 0 since the CMs may assign both positive and negative values
to the portfolio depending on their existing positions as explained in the main text.
Let the payoff of each bidder be:
πi =
ui − bi − qi if bi > maxj 6=i bj−qi otherwise (A.1.1)
where ui is the private valuation, bi is the bid and qi is a loss function that depends on the
bidder’s DF contribution, the uncollateralised losses faced by the CCP and the resources
used by the CCP prior to the bidder’s Powers of Assessment contribution which include
the defaulted CMs’ IM, the entire DF, the skin-in-the-game equity and any other bidders’
Powers of Assessment contributions used according to the bidding behavior. Except for
its own DF contribution, the equity contribution of the CCP and the total DF amount, all
other quantities are unknown to the bidder.
The total VM owed to the CCP by defaulted CMs belonging in the set H is ∑h∈H VM0hi.
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Note that CMs that defaulted due to missed VM receipts violating condition (2.15) have
successfully repaid their VM obligations since they satisfy condition (2.14) hence they do
not owe VM to the CCP. As such we only consider here the subset H that includes the
CMs that violated (2.14) and not D that also includes those that failed condition (2.15). The















for j = n + 1
(A.1.2)
where T is the equity tranche used by the CCP and K is the set of bidders having posted
lower bids than bidder i and have responded to the Powers of Assessment in full by
contributing twice their original DF amounts Fk. The number of bidders belonging in
this set increases as the bid posted by bidder i increases in ranks. Hence, if the losses are
sufficiently covered by the Powers of Assessment the function decreases to zero as the
ranking of the bid increases. However, the only known variables to CM i are Fi, T and DF.
Since the function is capped at 2Fi, the worst-case scenario is the one where the expected
payoff is minimised, i.e. the one where the loss function is maximised in every state of
nature irrespectively of the bidding order. Formally, each bidder chooses a value xi ∈ [u, u]
to assign to the bid bi = b(xi) to maximise the expected payoff πi = π(xi) given the least



























where P[·] denotes the probability, Q denotes the set of all possible values of qi and








































since the loss 2Fi occurs in all states of nature, i.e. with probability 1.
The probability that a bid is the k-th highest among M bids is given by order statistics:
P[b(x1), ...,> b(xk−1) > b(xk) > b(xk+1), ...,> b(xM)]







Note that the second line uses the assumption of b being strictly increasing in x.












[ui − bi]F(xi)M−1 − 2Fi
}
(A.1.7)
First order condition (FOC) yields:
ϑπ(xi)
ϑxi
= π′(xi) = 0⇔ (M− 1)F(xi)M−2 f (xi)(ui− b(xi))− b′(xi)F(xi)M−1 = 0 (A.1.8)
As can be seen, the Powers of Assessment contribution 2Fi disappears in the FOC. In
that case, this is the standard IPV model.
In a symmetric equilibrium the expected profit is maximised at xi = ui.
We solve for the optimal bid as follows. From (A.1.8):
b′(ui)F(ui)M−1 = (M− 1)F(ui)M−2 f (ui)(ui − b(ui))
⇔ [b(ui)F(ui)M−1]′ = ui(M− 1)F(ui)M−2 f (ui)
(A.1.9)
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xi(M− 1)F(xi)M−2 f (xi)dxi
⇔ b(ui)F(ui)M−1 − b(u)F(u)M−1 =
∫ ui
u
xi(M− 1)F(xi)M−2 f (xi)dxi








if u < ui ≤ u
−∞ if ui = u
(A.1.10)
i.e. equation (2.22).
To verify that xi = ui is indeed an equilibrium it suffices to show from (A.1.8) that:
(M− 1)F(xi)M−2 f (xi)(ui − b(xi))− b′(xi)F(xi)M−1 = 0
⇔ (M− 1)F(xi)M−2 f (xi)(ui − xi) = 0
(A.1.11)
Hence from (A.1.11) if xi < ui then π′(xi) > 0 and if xi > ui then π′(xi) < 0 so xi = ui
maximises the expected payoff and the optimal solution is an equilibrium.
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A.2 Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A.1: List of banks
Core-16 Periphery-23
Bank of America Merrill Lynch ANZ Banking Group
Barclays Banca IMI SpA
BNP Paribas Banco Santander
Citigroup Bank of China
Crédit Agricole Bank of New York Mellon
Credit Suisse BBVA
Deutsche Bank Commerzbank
Goldman Sachs Commonwealth Bank
HSBC Danske Bank
JP Morgan Chase Dexia
Morgan Stanley DZ Bank
Nomura Group Intesa
Royal Bank of Scotland LBBW









































































































































Figure A.1: Increased CCP resources configuration results (first day)























































































































Figure A.2: Increased CCP resources configuration results (second day)
Table A.2: Increased CCP resources configuration results
This table reports results assuming that the CCP has double the resources it collects in the baseline con-
figuration. The CCP is assumed to clear 75% of all derivatives transactions, and the banks default
due to liquidity risk if their LCR drops to less than 100% and due to counterparty risk if their CAR
drops to less than 8%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Day 1 results
Shock With NCC Without NCC % Change
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 1.36 0.53 156.60∗∗∗
3σ0 1.77 0.62 185.48∗∗∗
10σ0 5.76 4.00 44.00∗∗∗
20σ0 12.87 9.79 31.46∗∗∗
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.85 −100.00∗∗∗
3σ0 0.00 1.41 −100.00∗∗∗
10σ0 19.34 68.95 −71.95∗∗∗
20σ0 205.86 273.46 −24.72∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.01 −100.00
20σ0 0.17 0.80 −78.75∗∗∗
CCP uncollateralised losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 141.36 127.24 11.10∗∗∗
Panel B: Day 2 results
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 0.74 0.55 34.55∗∗
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 54.96 44.29 24.09∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 0.65 0.80 −18.75
Panel C: Days 1&2 results
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.85 −100.00∗∗∗
3σ0 0.00 1.41 −100.00∗∗∗
10σ0 19.34 68.95 −71.95∗∗∗
20σ0 260.82 317.74 −17.92∗∗∗
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Figure A.3: Alternative LCR threshold configuration results (first day)
Round 2 number of defaults due to liquidity risk
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.010.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%















































































































Figure A.4: Alternative LCR threshold configuration results (second day)
Table A.3: Alternative LCR threshold configuration results
This table reports results assuming a lower LCR threshold. The CCP is assumed to clear 75% of all derivatives
transactions, and the banks default due to liquidity risk if their LCR drops to less than 70% and due to counterparty
risk if their CAR drops to less than 8%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Day 1 results
Shock With NCC Without NCC % Change
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.07 0.01 600.00∗∗
3σ0 0.06 0.02 200.00
10σ0 0.30 0.12 150.00∗∗
20σ0 2.98 1.92 55.21∗∗∗
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.01 −100.00
10σ0 1.07 3.38 −68.42∗∗
20σ0 52.34 65.83 −20.50∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.01 −100.00
20σ0 0.03 0.19 −84.21∗∗∗
CCP uncollateralised losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 2.49 2.02 23.17
20σ0 58.55 50.25 16.52∗
Panel B: Day 2 results
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 0.01 0.01 0.00
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 23.53 16.61 41.64∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 0.09 0.19 −52.63∗
Panel C: Days 1&2 results
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.01 −100.00
10σ0 1.07 3.38 −68.42∗∗
20σ0 75.87 82.44 −7.98
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Figure A.5: Static configuration results (first day)




























































































































Figure A.6: Static configuration results (second day)
Table A.4: Static configuration results
This table reports results assuming that the banks do not rebalance their portfolios following the mar-
ket shock. The CCP is assumed to clear 75% of all derivatives transactions, and the banks default
due to liquidity risk if their LCR drops to less than 100% and due to counterparty risk if their CAR
drops to less than 8%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Day 1 results
Shock With NCC Without NCC % Change
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 3.34 1.21 176.03∗∗∗
3σ0 3.58 1.37 161.31∗∗∗
10σ0 6.42 3.78 69.84∗∗∗
20σ0 10.85 8.14 33.29∗∗∗
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 3.05 −100.00∗∗∗
3σ0 0.00 5.36 −100.00∗∗∗
10σ0 24.49 66.70 −63.28∗∗∗
20σ0 198.15 249.63 −20.62∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.02 −100.00
20σ0 0.13 0.66 −80.30∗∗∗
CCP uncollateralised losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 49.48 31.84 55.42∗∗∗
20σ0 220.49 192.94 14.28∗∗∗
Panel B: Day 2 results
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.25 0.01 2400.00∗∗∗
20σ0 0.56 0.03 1766.67∗∗∗
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 15.57 3.73 317.17∗∗∗
20σ0 120.98 104.31 15.98∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 1.62 1.45 11.72
Panel C: Days 1&2 results
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 3.05 −100.00∗∗∗
3σ0 0.00 5.36 −100.00∗∗∗
10σ0 40.06 70.43 −43.12∗∗∗
20σ0 319.13 353.94 −9.84∗∗∗
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Figure A.7: Interoperability configuration results 1 (first day)

































































Figure A.8: Interoperability configuration results 2 (first day)































































































































Figure A.9: Interoperability configuration results (second day)
Table A.5: Interoperability configuration results
This table reports results assuming that two CCPs clearing 75% of all derivatives transac-
tions may or may not form interoperability arrangements. The banks default due to liquid-
ity risk if their LCR drops to less than 100% and due to counterparty risk if their CAR drops
to less than 8%. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A: Day 1 results
Shock With Interop. Without
Interop.
% Change
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.71 0.73 −2.74
3σ0 0.72 1.00 −28.00∗∗
10σ0 4.71 5.78 −18.51∗∗∗
20σ0 11.63 13.17 −11.69∗∗∗
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 16.38 20.09 −18.45∗∗∗
20σ0 189.78 220.51 −13.93∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 0.11 0.16 −31.25
CCP 1 uncollateralised losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 30.95 35.23 −12.15∗∗
20σ0 183.98 185.88 −1.02
CCP 2 uncollateralised losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.65 9.95 −93.44∗∗∗
20σ0 31.37 93.01 −66.28∗∗∗
Panel B: Day 2 results
Defaults due to liquidity risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.10 0.11 −9.09
20σ0 0.43 0.28 53.57∗∗
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 4.10 7.52 −45.42∗∗∗
20σ0 101.59 122.99 −17.40∗∗∗
Defaults due to counterparty risk
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
20σ0 1.27 1.68 −24.41∗∗∗
Panel C: Days 1&2 results
Systemic losses (US$ billion)
2.33σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
3σ0 0.00 0.00 0.00
10σ0 20.49 27.61 −25.79∗∗∗
20σ0 291.37 343.49 −15.17∗∗∗
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Chapter 3
Information and liquidity linkages in
ETFs and underlying markets1
Abstract
We find that exchange-traded funds (ETFs) have differential effects on the underlying
equities and corporate debt securities. First, ETFs propagate liquidity shocks to equities but
not to debt securities. Second, ETF flows affect the underlying equities’ returns to a much
higher degree than debt securities’ returns. Third, higher ETF ownership increases equities’
volatility but decreases debt securities’ volatility. The results are consistent with the view
that the higher accessibility of equities facilitates the formation of strong information links
with ETFs and encourages arbitrage activity, which makes equities’ prices sensitive to
ETF demand shocks and creates the potential for illiquidity contagion when this link is
disrupted. In contrast, the hard-to-access nature of corporate debt securities results in weak
information links with ETFs and inhibits arbitrage activity which reduces commonalities
between the two markets.
1This essay is based on the working paper titled “Information and liquidity linkages in ETFs and
underlying markets” co-authored with Paweł Fiedor (Central Bank of Ireland), available as a Research
Technical Paper of the Central Bank of Ireland. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Central Bank of Ireland.
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3.1 Introduction
Turmoil in one market can affect other markets when assets are linked through infor-
mation channels, creating comovements in liquidity, prices and volatility. Information
links between assets exist when investors use information from one asset to infer the price
of another. However, these links can trigger contagion effects when investors mistakenly
believe that idiosyncratic shocks in one asset reveal information about the other asset,
increasing volatility (King and Wadhwani, 1990), or when a liquidity dry-up in one asset
makes investors unable to reliably price the other, propagating liquidity shocks (Cespa
and Foucault, 2014).
In this paper, we provide novel evidence for this transmission mechanism by looking
at the Irish exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and their underlying equities and corporate debt
securities using a proprietary dataset from the Central Bank of Ireland. ETF shares can
be traded intradaily on an exchange, which attracts high-frequency trading. In addition,
ETF shares and the underlying securities are subject to arbitrage activity that exploits
price differences, which creates a link between the two markets. Finally, ETFs as index
products emphasize the systematic factor of the underlying assets, so they can become
the key mover of the index as well as the underlying assets if they dominate the markets
(Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2020), Glosten et al. (2020)). As a result, ETFs provide a natural
testing ground to assess the effects of information links between markets.
We investigate the effects of ETFs on the underlying equities’ and corporate debt
securities’ liquidity, returns and volatility. By looking at both equities and debt securities,
we are able to assess how the ETF effects differ according to the unique characteristics
of each market. Specifically, we argue that the strength of the information link and
the resulting degree of liquidity, returns and volatility comovement depends on the
accessibility of the underlying markets, i.e. the ease with which investors can trade in
them. This is because a higher accessibility facilitates the incorporation of information
from the linked asset, and incentivises market participants to actively trade the underlying
assets in order to exploit arbitrage opportunities with ETF shares which increases the
transmission of shocks between markets.
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We expect ETFs to form stronger information links with the underlying exchange-
traded equities than with the underlying over-the-counter-traded (OTC) corporate debt
securities due to the lower accessibility of the latter arising from the significant search and
transaction costs of OTC markets (Vayanos and Wang, 2007). The difference in accessibility
between equities and corporate debt securities has been further amplified by the post-crisis
banking regulations which have caused a deterioration of corporate debt markets’ liquidity
due to the dealers’ contraction of market-making activities (Bessembinder et al. (2018), Bao
et al. (2018)), while equity markets’ liquidity has recovered from the crisis period (Anand
et al., 2013). Even though there certainly exist individual equities that are less liquid than
corporate debt securities, the findings of these papers suggest that there is a significant
overall divergence in the liquidity of these two markets which affects their accessibility.
While the literature on ETFs and underlying equities has found strong effects on price
and liquidity comovements due to arbitrage (Da and Shive (2015), Agarwal et al. (2017),
Ben-David et al. (2018)), the literature on ETFs and underlying corporate debt securities
has shown theoretically and empirically that the illiquid and hard-to-access nature of
these securities imposes limits to arbitrage and can lead to persistent price distortions
(Pan and Zeng (2017), Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2018), Todorov (2021)). This weakens
the information link, leading liquidity traders to migrate from the underlying corporate
debt securities to the ETFs which offer lower transaction and adverse selection costs
(Dannhauser, 2017). As a result, we hypothesize that the ETFs will have stronger effects
on the underlying equities than on the corporate debt securities.
We start our empirical analysis by testing whether ETFs propagate liquidity shocks to
the underlying securities based on the theoretical framework of Cespa and Foucault (2014).
The authors argue that the presence of information links can lead to illiquidity contagion
when investors are unable to price one asset due to the illiquidity of the other, citing the
dry-up of liquidity of ETFs during the 2010 flash crash as an example. Arbitrageurs can
dampen this effect by providing capital to both assets but their absence can exacerbate the
liquidity dry-up. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase in ETF bid-ask spreads
is associated with a next-day increase in equities’ bid-ask spreads of 1.3 basis points
(bps). However, debt securities’ bid-ask spreads are not affected by a change of ETF bid-
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ask spreads. Furthermore, we find that arbitrage activity plays an active role in reducing
illiquidity contagion between ETFs and equities by 0.7 bps due to the provision of arbitrage
capital in both assets, but not so between ETFs and debt securities where arbitrageurs are
less active.
The results are consistent with the two market setups outlined in the theoretical frame-
work of Cespa and Foucault (2014): in a fully interconnected market the liquidity of the
two assets is interrelated through the information channel, while in a fully segmented
market there are no liquidity spillovers. These two theoretical setups represent the op-
posite ends of a spectrum, and our empirical results suggest that ETFs lie within these
two extremes. On the one hand, ETFs and the underlying equities are closer to the fully
interconnected market where investors use information from each asset to price the other
(strong information link). On the other hand, ETFs and the underlying corporate debt
securities are closer to the fully segmented market where investors largely ignore the
information present in asset prices because it can be noisy, so a deterioration of liquidity in
one asset does not have cross-asset effects (weak information link).
In the second part of our analysis, we investigate the effect of ETF demand shocks on
the underlying securities’ returns. If the assets are closely linked, the theoretical framework
of Cespa and Foucault (2014) predicts that demand shocks in one asset can have an impact
on the price of the other asset. This can occur through the information channel when
investors revise their views on the price of one asset after observing a change in the price
of the other asset, or through the arbitrage channel when arbitrageurs propagate the price
shock by trading both assets. However, when the markets are fully segmented such an
effect does not exist. We estimate regressions of daily security returns on security-level
ETF flows, which proxy the expected demand for each security caused by aggregate
additional ETF demand, in order to establish whether changes in ETF demand affect the
underlying returns. We find that a one-standard-deviation increase of lagged ETF flows
is associated with a 14.9 bps increase of daily stock returns but only 0.4 bps increase of
daily debt securities’ returns. Furthermore, we find that this effect is almost exclusively
driven by arbitrageurs, which highlights their important role in ETF markets. The results
show that ETF demand affects equities’ prices more strongly than debt securities’ prices,
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consistent with our argument of an interconnected market between ETFs and equities but
a segmented one between ETFs and corporate debt securities.
Finally, we look at the effect of ETF ownership, i.e. the fraction of the underlying
securities’ market capitalisation owned by ETFs, on the volatility of the securities. If
ETF ownership facilitates arbitrage between ETFs and the underlying securities, the
two markets become more interconnected and the activity on the underlying securities
increases, with a subsequent increase in their volatility (Ben-David et al., 2018). In contrast,
if the underlying assets are hard-to-trade, a higher ETF ownership is associated with a
migration of liquidity traders from the underlying assets to the ETFs due to the latter’s
higher accessibility (Dannhauser, 2017). This segments the markets and lowers activity
in the underlying assets and hence their volatility (Grossman, 1989). We thus expect that
higher ETF ownership is associated with an increase of equities’ volatility but a decrease
of debt securities’ volatility. Consistent with this prediction, we find that a one-standard-
deviation increase in ETF ownership is associated with an increase of equities’ volatility by
1% of a standard deviation but a decrease of debt securities’ volatility by 1% of a standard
deviation.
Against the backdrop of a significant growth of ETFs over the past decade, our results
have important policy implications. First, the accessibility of the underlying markets and
by extension the formation of information links and ease with which investors can exploit
arbitrage opportunities is an important factor in determining whether ETFs can propagate
shocks to them. Second, ETFs can affect the securities they invest in via various channels
including their liquidity, prices as well as volatility, and understanding the underlying
mechanism that drives the effects on these channels is crucial in providing a holistic view
of how ETFs can transmit shocks. For example, the regulatory report on the events of
the flash crash of 2010 describes the propagation of liquidity shocks from ETFs to the
underlying equities due to a deterioration of information available in the former to price
the latter (CFTC-SEC, 2010). More recently in the market turmoil of March 2020 due to
Covid-19, ETFs acted as price discovery mechanisms for the underlying corporate debt
securities and traded at large discounts as the demand shocks hitting ETF shares were
not being transmitted to the illiquid underlying securities (BoE (2020b), Aramonte and
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Avalos (2020)). These events are consistent with our results and our proposed mechanism
of information links and arbitrage activity driving ETF behaviour.
Our paper contributes to the literature on links between assets. King and Wadhwani
(1990) argue that asset prices are linked via information channels, which partly explains
their simultaneous drop during the market crash of 1987. Duffie et al. (2014) show theoreti-
cally the existence of strategic complementarities in information acquisition in segmented
markets. They also show cross-class externalities, including pure learning externalities
between linked markets. Rahi and Zigrand (2009) show theoretically how arbitrageurs
integrate markets by exploiting asset mispricings. We examine the effects of such links in
the context of ETFs and the underlying markets.
We also contribute to the literature on illiquidity contagion. When arbitrage capital
becomes scarce, prices can deviate significantly from their fundamental values (Hu et al.,
2013). We empirically test the theoretical predictions of Cespa and Foucault (2014) by in-
vestigating whether liquidity shocks can propagate from ETFs to the underlying securities,
and the role of arbitrageurs in mitigating this effect.
Finally, our paper is related to the growing literature on ETFs and how they affect asset
prices. Da and Shive (2015) document the positive association between ETF ownership
and return comovement of underlying stocks due to arbitrage while Agarwal et al. (2017)
document a similar pattern with the liquidity of the underlying stocks. Evans et al. (2017)
find a positive relationship between ETF ownership and bid-ask spreads of the underlying
stocks. Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2018) show theoretically that ETFs investing in hard-to-
access markets such as corporate bonds can transmit noise and form weak information
links while Pan and Zeng (2017) show theoretically and empirically that the illiquidity of
corporate bond markets limits arbitrage opportunities with ETFs. Glosten et al. (2020) show
that ETFs increase the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks by incorporating
systematic information faster and transmitting it to the underlying securities. Bae and
Kim (2020) find that ETF tracking errors are positively correlated with the illiquidity of the
underlying securities. Ben-David et al. (2018) argue that ETF ownership increases the non-
fundamental volatility of underlying stocks, adding an undiversifiable risk which increases
their risk premia. In contrast, Agapova and Volkov (2018) find that ETF ownership reduces
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the volatility of the underling bond securities. We propose the presence of information
links and accessibility of the securities as an explanation behind the different effects of
ETFs to the underlying equities and corporate debt securities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides the ETF institutional
details, section 3.3 describes the data used in this study, section 3.4 presents the empirical
results and section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Details
ETFs are investment companies that track the performance of a securities index, sim-
ilarly to index mutual funds. The main difference is that ETFs allow their shares to be
traded continuously intradaily on an exchange. ETFs can replicate an index either by
holding all or a representative sample of the securities comprising the index (physical
ETFs) or by entering into derivatives contracts, usually total return swaps, where the
return on the index is swapped with the return on another benchmark (synthetic ETFs).
Other types of ETFs also exist, such as leveraged ETFs that attempt to deliver a multiple of
the index return, and inverse ETFs that seek to deliver the inverse of the index return.
ETF shares can be created and redeemed like other open-ended funds. However, this
can only be done by a select group of market participants called authorised participants
(APs), who have a legal agreement with the ETFs to trade directly with them. The APs
do this because they can profit from bid-ask spreads on the secondary market and by
creating and redeeming ETF shares when their value deviates from the net asset value
(NAV) of the underlying securities. The trading of shares between the APs and the ETF
in exchange for the underlying securities or cash constitutes the primary market. Other
market participants trade ETF shares on an exchange or over-the-counter through market
makers (which can also be APs), which constitutes the secondary market. The secondary
market trading allows the ETF share price to move even in the absence of fund flows.
The continuous trading of ETF shares ensures that their price does not deviate signifi-
cantly from the underlying NAV. If there is a positive demand shock on the ETF shares
such that they trade at a premium relative to the NAV, the APs can buy the underlying
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securities at the NAV, submit them to the ETF in order to create new ETF shares on the
primary market and sell them for a profit on the secondary market. This creates an upward
pressure on the underlying securities and a downward pressure on the ETF shares until
prices converge. Conversely, when a negative demand shock causes the ETF shares to
trade at a discount relative to the NAV, the APs can buy the shares on the secondary market
and redeem them on the primary market in exchange for the underlying securities, which
can be subsequently sold at the NAV for a profit. This creates a downward pressure on the
underlying securities and positive pressure on the ETF shares. ETF arbitrage can also be
achieved by other market participants on the secondary market by buying the inexpensive
asset and short selling the expensive one until prices converge for a profit. Of course, this
mechanism is not a pure arbitrage opportunity as prices may not converge fast enough.
Through this arbitrage mechanism, demand shocks on ETF shares can propagate to the
underlying securities.
While there also exist other products such as index mutual funds that contain systematic
information regarding the underlying assets, and could also create information links with
them, ETFs are unique in allowing continuous trading of their shares rather than only once
per day. Hence, they are more suitable for speculative and hedging purposes which fosters
the creation of information links.
3.3 Data
We use a proprietary dataset on Irish-domiciled ETFs and their holdings from the
Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) database.2 All funds report their holdings to the CBI on a
quarterly basis and are categorised internally into the following types according to their
investment strategy: equity, bond, hedge, mixed, money market (MM), real estate (RE) and
other funds. An ETF can belong to any of these types, although in practice the vast majority
are either equity or bond funds. As of September 2018, there were 694 Irish-domiciled





held by euro area ETFs. The prominence of Ireland as an ETF hub in the euro area is mainly
attributed to its robust regulatory framework for investment funds and business-friendly
environment. The majority of these assets was invested in physical ETFs (EUR 374 billion),
and EUR 271 billion was invested in equities while EUR 116 billion was invested in bonds.
Together, equities and bonds comprised more than 90% of total assets held by Irish ETFs.
Our equities sample covers the period from March 2014, the earliest available date for
which reliable data exist, up to December 2018. We have a total of 16,937 equities held by
Irish ETFs at various points during the sample period. We use Bloomberg to download
data for each stock. We obtain daily data on price, shares outstanding, volume, percentage
bid-ask spread, total assets, book value of debt, revenue, cost of goods sold, as well as
bid and ask percentage volumes to identify the direction of trades. We use this data to
construct the main variables as well as controls.
Moving to corporate debt securities, we obtain daily data on their individual charac-
teristics from IHS Markit including mid price, bid-asks-spread, maturity date, number of
trades and volume. Credit ratings data is obtained from the CBI database and is mapped
to a scale from 1 (highest rating) to 22 (lowest rating) following Dimitrov et al. (2015).
The sample covers the period from January 2016, the earliest available date in the Markit
database, up to December 2018. We have a total of 22,534 corporate debt securities held by
the Irish ETFs during this period. We provide details on the construction of the variables
in Appendix B.1.
Table 3.1 reports the amounts invested in equities and debt securities by Irish ETFs
per country of security as of September 2018. Only the five largest countries according to
amount invested are shown. The table also reports the amount held in each country as
a percentage of total assets and the amount invested as a percentage of the total market
capitalisation (equities) or amount outstanding (debt securities) of the country. Amounts
are in EUR million.
As can be seen, 50% of total assets held in equities or EUR 136 billion are invested in
US equities, followed by UK, Japan, Germany and France with smaller fractions. Irish
ETFs hold on average 0.5% of the total market capitalisation of each country. For corporate
debt securities, 35% of total assets or EUR 23 billion are invested in US debt, followed by
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Table 3.1: Amounts invested by Irish ETFs in equities and debt securities per country of
security in EUR million
Country Amount % of total assets % of country market cap
Panel A: Equities
US 136,150 50.16 0.49
UK 18,324 6.75 0.59
Japan 18,020 6.64 0.34
Germany 15,438 5.69 0.82
France 12,501 4.06 0.55
Panel B: Corporate debt securities
US 23,006 34.96 0.11
UK 6,923 10.52 0.25
France 6,474 9.84 0.32
Netherlands 6,393 9.72 0.41
Germany 3,572 5.43 0.23
UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany. On average, Irish ETFs hold 0.3% of the total
amount outstanding of debt issued by entities in each country.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the variables that we use in the analysis.
Panels A and B present summary statistics for the monthly equities and debt securities
samples while panels C and D present the statistics for the daily equities and debt securities
samples.
Looking at Panel A, we observe that the daily stock volatility, calculated as the standard
deviation of daily stock returns over the period of a month, has a maximum value in
our sample of 94.914%. Such high values reflect the fact that we include all the equities
holdings and do not confine our analysis to US equities which are not as volatile.3 ETF
ownership of equities ranges from −0.170% (a negative value indicates short positions) to
23.200%, almost a quarter of a stock’s market capitalisation. Hedge funds have the largest
short position (−21.097%) while equity funds have the largest long position (38.580%).
In Panel B, daily volatility of corporate debt securities can similarly take high values
up to 99.410%, although the highest ETF ownership is lower compared to equities at
14.649%. In addition, there are no short ETF positions on debt securities as observed by
3We have repeated our analysis by removing the outliers of the variables of interest to ensure that our
analysis is robust.
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the minimum value of ETF ownership of 0%. Hedge funds again have the largest short
position (−4.504%) while bond funds have the largest long position (27.383%), both smaller
than the corresponding positions for equities.
Moving to Panel C, the stock-level ETF flows, a weighted average of the daily flows
occurring in all ETFs investing in each security, take values from EUR −42.522 million to
EUR 45.851 million. Stock-level ETF bid-ask spreads range from −0.003% to 2.789%. ETF
mispricing, the difference between ETFs’ share price and the underlying portfolio’s NAV,
ranges from EUR −0.001 million to EUR 1246.021 million.
In Panel D, corporate debt ETF flows range from EUR −5.928 million to EUR 5.737
million, lower than for equities which reflects the reduced arbitrage activity. ETF bid-ask
spreads range from 0% to 0.842% while ETF mispricing ranges from EUR 0 to EUR 138.017
million.
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 ETFs and illiquidity contagion
We begin our analysis by investigating the potential of ETFs to transmit liquidity shocks
to the underlying securities. We test our hypothesis that the magnitude of illiquidity
spillover will be stronger from ETFs to the underlying equities than to the underlying
debt securities using the theoretical framework of Cespa and Foucault (2014). The authors
argue that the magnitude of illiquidity spillover is determined by the strength of the
information link, the presence of arbitrage capital and the dealers’ risk tolerance. While the
framework allows for the possibility that the underlying securities could also affect ETFs,
we focus on one side of the relationship because ETFs attract high-frequency trading and
thus can incorporate information faster than the underlying securities, especially when the
latter are hard-to-trade (Aramonte and Avalos, 2020). This can result in ETFs affecting the
underlying securities rather than the other way around (Bhattacharya and O’Hara, 2018).
Our measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spreads as provided by















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We define the security-level ETF bid-ask spread as follows:




wi,j,tbid− ask spreadj,t (3.4.1)
where J is the set of ETFs that hold the security i, wi,j,t is the weight of security i in the
portfolio of ETF j in day t, and bid− ask spreadj,t is the bid-ask spread of ETF j in day
t. The weights do not sum to 1 for each security but they represent the “information
proportionality” of each ETF. As an example, a hypothetical ETF that invests 99% of its
assets on a specific security should have a price that closely mirrors that of the security, and
investors would assign a large weight on its informativeness. As a result, the ETF’s bid-ask
spread is weighted accordingly to capture the impact of a decrease of its liquidity on the
underlying security’s liquidity due to the breakdown of the information link, depending
on how informative the ETF’s price is.
We proxy the degree of arbitrage activity by constructing the security-level ETF mis-
pricing variable following Ben-David et al. (2018).
ETF mispricingi,t =
∑Jj=1 wi,j,t AUMj,t | Mispricingj,t |
MktCapi,t
(3.4.2)
where J is the set of ETFs that hold the security i, wi,j,t is the weight of security i in the
portfolio of ETF j in day t, AUMj,t are the total assets of ETF j in day t, and MktCapi,t is the
market capitalisation of security i in day t. | Mispricingj,t | denotes the difference between
the ETF j’s share price and NAV divided by its share price in day t. Larger mispricing
indicates the absence of arbitrageurs in the market that exploit the price differences. We
create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for values of ETF mispricing higher than
the 90th percentile and interact it with the ETF bid-ask spread in order to estimate the
effect of high mispricing (absence of arbitrageurs) on illiquidity contagion.
In addition, we measure dealers’ risk tolerance by using the VIX index for equities
and the MOVE index for debt securities as a proxy of market stress. As Cespa and
Foucault (2014) argue, higher market stress implies a lower risk tolerance of dealers, which
strengthens illiquidity contagion. Similarly to mispricing, we create dummy variables that
take the value of 1 for values of the corresponding variables higher than the 90th percentile
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and interact them with the ETF bid-ask spread.
In our regressions we include security and day fixed effects, and standard errors are
clustered at the country and day levels. Furthermore, we include a number of lagged
control variables. For equities we include, following Ben-David et al. (2018), market
capitalisation, the inverse of the stock price as a measure of size, the Amihud (2002)
measure and the bid-ask-spread to account for persistence in illiquidity. In addition, we
include a number of control variables that are standard predictors of returns, including
the book-to-market ratio, the cumulative past 12-month returns and gross profitability.
Finally, we include order imbalance which is calculated as the euro value of buy minus sell
trades divided by market capitalisation. For debt securities we include as control variables
the credit rating, time to maturity, the percentage of days in a month that the security
didn’t trade (Bond zero), the bid-ask spread and the security’s turnover defined as the
average daily volume over a month as a percentage of its amount outstanding. We omit
the amount outstanding because it remains constant for each security and is collinear with
the security fixed effects.4
The results for equities and debt securities are presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 respec-
tively. We use lagged ETF bid-ask spread in order to avoid simultaneity bias as both assets
could influence each other. In column (1) we present results without including the stress
index (VIX or MOVE) or mispricing interactions, in column (2) we include the stress index
interaction, in column (3) we include the mispricing interaction while in column (4) we
include all interactions.
Looking at column (3) of Table 3.3, the effect of the information channel on illiquidity
contagion is given by the sum of the coefficients of ETF bid-ask spread and its interaction
with ETF mispricing, which rules out the effect of the arbitrage channel as it controls for
the absence of arbitrageurs. We thus document an increase of 1.3 (= 0.6 + 0.7) bps of bid-ask
spreads for a one-standard-deviation increase of ETF bid-ask spreads, which provides
4In unreported results we also included as control variables the Amihud measure of illiquidity, the
logarithm of the number of trades per month and the average trade size over a month. However, the
inclusion of these controls greatly reduces our sample size due to limited observations of these variables. We
ran the regressions in the reduced sample with and without these controls and the results for our variables
of interest did not change. As such, we do not include them in the final regressions in order to preserve our
sample size.
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evidence for illiquidity contagion. The positive coefficient of ETF mispricing shows that
the absence of arbitrageurs exacerbates the liquidity dry-up of both assets, and is consistent
with the arguments of Cespa and Foucault (2014) since arbitrageurs dampen illiquidity
contagion by providing capital to both assets. When looking at the full model specification
in column (4) this relationship is further dampened during times of high market stress
as indicated by the negative VIX interaction coefficient of −0.4 bps. This is in contrast to
the theoretical predictions of Cespa and Foucault (2014), who argue that low dealer risk
tolerance (as proxied by high values of the VIX index) exacerbates illiquidity contagion.
A potential driver behind this result could be that the dealers who specialise in one asset
and propagate liquidity shocks when the informativeness of the other asset evaporates
coexist with dealers who trade both assets for hedging purposes.5 These dealers could
then shift their capital to the underlying securities when ETFs become illiquid, dampening
illiquidity contagion.
Moving to debt securities, we do not observe a significant relationship between ETF
bid-ask spreads and debt securities’ bid-ask spreads.6 Furthermore, ETF mispricing is not
significant, indicating that arbitrage activity does not affect illiquidity contagion between
ETFs and debt securities. The MOVE interaction coefficient is similarly insignificant.
Overall, the findings indicate the presence of a strong information link between ETFs
and equities which increases the interconnectedness of the market and the potential for
illiquidity contagion, but a weaker link between ETFs and debt securities which segments
the market and reduces contagion effects.
In Appendix B.2 we provide results using alternative thresholds of 70th and 80th
percentiles for the stress indices and ETF mispricing. While the results for debt securities
remain insignificant (Tables B.4 - B.5), we observe that for equities ETF mispricing is 0.1 bps
insignificant when we use the 70th percentile (Table B.2 column (3)) and 0.4 bps significant
5In their model, Cespa and Foucault (2014) assume that dealers specialise in one asset, so they infer its
price using information from the other asset (cross-asset learning). This enables illiquidity contagion when
the informativeness of the other asset evaporates and excludes cross-market hedging effects when dealers
diversify their risk by trading both assets. The cross-market hedgers are distinct from the arbitrageurs as
defined in our paper who trade assets to exploit mispricing opportunities rather than hedge their positions
that result from market intermediation.
6All our results hold if we also include government debt securities which represent only a small fraction
of total debt securities that Irish ETFs invest in.
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when we use the 80th percentile (Table B.3 column (3)), so its magnitude increases as the
threshold becomes higher. The overall effect of illiquidity contagion also increases, from
1.1 bps to 1.3 bps. This result shows that illiquidity contagion between ETFs and equities
is directly linked to the level of arbitrage activity: as arbitrageurs increasingly exit the
market, the dampening effect is reduced and illiquidity contagion increases.
Finally, looking at the VIX interaction coefficients in column (4), we observe that they
become smaller in absolute magnitude as the threshold becomes higher, from −0.9 bps
and −0.6 bps to −0.4 bps for the 70th, 80th and 90th percentiles respectively. This indicates
that the ability of dealers to dampen illiquidity contagion through cross-asset trading
becomes increasingly impaired due to their decreasing risk tolerance and withdrawal from
the market as it becomes more volatile.
3.4.2 ETF flows and returns
The previous results indicate that ETFs and equities form strong information links while
ETFs and debt securities form weak ones, with implications for liquidity commonality. In
this section we assess the effects of ETFs on the underlying securities’ returns in order to
further analyse the implications of the information and arbitrage channels. Cespa and
Foucault (2014) predict that in a fully interconnected market demand shocks on one asset
can affect the price of the other while in a fully segmented market they do not. Hence, we
expect a stronger effect of ETF demand shocks on equities’ returns than on debt securities’
returns. This can occur through cross-asset learning as investors revise their beliefs about
one asset by observing shocks in the other asset, as well as through arbitrage trading
of both assets. As explained in section 3.2, the APs can transmit demand shocks to the
underlying securities through the creation and redemption of ETF shares. Following
Ben-David et al. (2018), we construct the security-level ETF flows variable which acts as a
proxy for ETF demand shocks:




where J is the set of ETFs that hold the security i, wi,j,t is the weight of security i in the
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Table 3.3: ETF bid-ask spreads and stock bid-ask spreads
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily stock bid-ask spreads on ETF bid-ask
spreads and control variables. ETF bid-ask spreads are divided by market capitalisation and
standardised. VIX and ETF mispricing are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values higher
than their corresponding 90th percentile. Standard errors are double-clustered at the country and
day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period from March 2014 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Bid-ask spread (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF bid-ask spread (t− 1) (%) 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.008***
(3.072) (3.383) (2.864) (3.078)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * VIX (t− 1) −0.004*** −0.004***
(−4.994) (−4.032)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) 0.007*** 0.007***
(5.774) (5.720)
log(MktCap (t− 1)) −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(−3.389) (−3.388) (−3.384) (−3.384)
1/Price (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.834) (0.849) (0.836) (0.849)
Amihud ratio (t− 1) 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111***
(2.796) (2.797) (2.797) (2.797)
Bid−ask spread (t− 1) 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.576***
(15.478) (15.477) (15.481) (15.481)
Book-to-market (t− 1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(10.348) (9.330) (10.348) (9.508)
Past 12-month returns (t− 1) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(1.830) (1.807) (1.819) (1.770)
Gross profitability (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.418) (−0.345) (−0.385) (−0.235)
Order imbalance (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.655) (−0.620) (−0.656) (−0.642)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.352) (0.353) (0.353) (0.354)
Intercept 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(3.712) (3.712) (3.707) (3.707)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,411,458 11,411,458 11,411,458 11,411,458
R2 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566
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Table 3.4: ETF bid-ask spreads and debt securities bid-ask spreads
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily debt securities bid-ask spreads on ETF
bid-ask spreads and control variables. ETF bid-ask spreads are divided by market capitalisation
and standardised. MOVE and ETF mispricing are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values
higher than their corresponding 90th percentile. Standard errors are double-clustered at the country
and day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period from January 2016 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Bid-ask spread (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF bid-ask spread (t− 1) (%) −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(−1.482) (−1.523) (−1.348) (−1.376)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * MOVE (t− 1) 0.000 0.000
(0.259) (0.254)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) 0.000 0.000
(1.063) (1.058)
Credit rating (t− 1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(3.674) (3.674) (3.675) (3.675)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954***
(57.249) (57.249) (57.249) (57.249)
Time to maturity (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.067) (1.067) (1.067) (1.067)
Bond zero (t− 1) −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(−3.044) (−3.045) (−3.045) (−3.045)
Turnover (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.664) (−0.668) (−0.562) (−0.566)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] −0.057** −0.057** −0.057** −0.057**
(−2.416) (−2.416) (−2.416) (−2.416)
Intercept −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.984) (−0.984) (−0.984) (−0.984)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,698,589
R2 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
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portfolio of ETF j in day t, Flowsj,t is the percentage change in shares outstanding of ETF
j in day t and Volumei,t is the volume of security i in day t. Flowsj,t and Volumei,t are
multiplied by their corresponding prices in order to obtain euro security-level ETF flows.
First, we regress stock returns in day t on the lagged flows and the same control
variables as before. The results are presented in Table 3.5. In order to disentangle the
information from the arbitrage channel, we include the ETF mispricing interaction in
column (3). We observe a statistically significant effect of lagged ETF flows on stock
returns, with a one-standard-deviation change in ETF flows being associated with a 14.9
bps change in stock returns. Interestingly, the effect is almost entirely driven by arbitrage
activity as the absence of arbitrageurs as proxied by ETF mispricing almost entirely negates
the effect with a coefficient of −14.7 bps. As before, the sum of the coefficients isolates the
effect of the information channel which is only 0.2 bps.
Next, we interact ETF flows with the VIX index, which proxies dealers’ risk tolerance.
We expect a negative relationship because during times of stress when the risk tolerance of
the dealers weakens, the information link breaks down lowering the effect of ETF demand
shocks. Consistent with this prediction, as seen in column (5) we find a negative interaction
coefficient of −30.3 bps.7
Finally, we consider how the different levels of financial development of each country
in our sample affect the relationship between ETF flows and underlying securities’ returns.
Specifically, we use data from the IMF Financial Development Index8 in order to assess
whether the unique market characteristics of each country have an effect on our results.
The data measure various aspects of development of financial institutions and financial
markets and are reported in annual frequency, ranging from 0 (lowest development) to 1
(highest development). We have experimented with all the variables in the dataset and our
results are broadly consistent. Hence, we report results for the overall country financial
development, including financial markets and institutions. We create the dummy variable
FD that takes the value of 1 if financial development is higher than the median value of
7In order to exclude the possibility that the results are driven by indexing effects, i.e. the exclusion and
inclusion of stocks in the major indices, we have repeated the analysis by removing all observations in the
months when all major index rebalances occur. The results remain the same.
8https://data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C-43B1-AC26-493C5B1CD33B
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development of all countries in our sample and 0 otherwise and interact it with ETF flows.9
The latest available year available for the IMF data is 2016, so we assume constant FD
values as of 2016 since there is little variation across time.10 As can be seen in column (5),
the interaction is negative and significant (−53.3 bps) implying that equities in countries
with high financial development are less affected by ETF demand shocks. This is intuitive
as such markets are more efficient so the equities’ prices better reflect their fundamental
values from other sources of information and do not rely on ETFs as much.
In Table B.6 provided in Appendix B.3 we repeat the analysis for the five largest
countries individually in order to assess whether the effects are consistent across different
countries. Irish ETFs do not have a significant effect on US equities, which is intuitive
given the size of the US stock market and the relatively small size of Irish ETFs. The only
country with significant effects is France (4 bps).
Next, we repeat the analysis for corporate debt securities and present the results in
Table 3.6. As can be seen in column (3), we document a small increase in securities’ returns
of 0.4 bps for a one-standard-deviation increase of lagged ETF flows. However, this is
completely negated by the absence of arbitrageurs as indicated by the coefficient of −0.4
bps of ETF mispricing, implying that the information channel has no effect on price shock
propagation between ETFs and corporate debt securities and providing further evidence
for the weak information link between them. Looking at column (5) the interaction of ETF
flows with the MOVE index is insignificant, indicating that the relationship is not affected
by a change in the dealers’ risk tolerance, which is intuitive given the segmented nature of
the market. Finally, the FD interaction is insignificant, which is likely due to the fact that
corporate debt securities are OTC traded and are not tied to specific geographical markets,
irrespectively of their issuing country. Looking at the five largest individual countries in
Table B.7 in Appendix B.3, we don’t observe any significant effect of Irish ETF flows on
them.
Overall, the results in both the full sample and the individual countries suggest that
ETF demand shocks have a much larger effect on equities’ than debt securities’ returns,
9We have also performed the analysis by considering the mean development. The results are robust.
10Repeating the analysis for equities from 2014 to 2016 with time-varying FD values yields similar results.
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which is mainly driven by the activity of arbitrageurs. The results provide further evidence
towards the importance of accessibility for the propagation of shocks between markets.
3.4.3 ETF ownership and volatility
In this section we investigate whether ETF ownership affects the underlying securities’
volatility. The introduction of a correlated asset in the market such as ETFs can increase
trading activity in both assets due to arbitrage opportunities, hence increasing their volatil-
ity (Ben-David et al., 2018) and making the two markets more interconnected. On the other
hand, if the new asset is more liquid and accessible, it may cause a migration of liquidity
traders to the new asset which reduces activity in the illiquid asset and hence its volatility
(Grossman, 1989), segmenting the two markets.
We follow Ben-David et al. (2018) and define ETF ownership of security i in month t
as the sum of the value of holdings by all ETFs investing in the security, divided by the





where J is the set of ETFs that hold the security i, wi,j,t is the weight of security i in the
portfolio of ETF j in month t, AUMj,t are the total assets of ETF j in month t, and MktCapi,t
is the market capitalisation of security i in month t. In other words, this variable is the
fraction of the total market capitalisation of the security held by Irish ETFs.
Our dependent variable is the daily volatility of security i, calculated by estimating the
standard deviation of daily security returns for each month. We include the usual control
variables, as well as the percentage of the total stock market capitalisation held by each
fund type except for money market funds which have no equity holdings. Finally, we
include three lags of volatility to account for volatility clustering.
The results of the OLS regressions of daily stock volatility on ETF ownership are
presented in Table 3.7. We report results for the entire sample as well as for the largest
countries individually. We use fixed effects at the security and month levels as before.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the country and month levels when the entire
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Table 3.5: ETF flows and stock returns
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily stock returns on ETF flows and control
variables. ETF flows are divided by market capitalisation and standardised. VIX and ETF mispricing
are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values higher than their corresponding 90th percentile.
FD is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for values higher than its median. Standard errors
are double-clustered at the country and day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗
and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period
from March 2014 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Ret[t, t− 1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ETF flows (t− 1) (%) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.149*** 0.479*** 0.690***
(3.393) (3.799) (12.877) (3.199) (3.853)
ETF flows (%) * VIX (t− 1) −0.224*** −0.303***
(−3.383) (−11.393)
ETF flows (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) −0.147*** −0.156***
(−12.255) (−10.142)
ETF flows (%) * FD (t− 1) −0.477*** −0.533***
(−3.186) (−3.083)
log(MktCap (t− 1)) −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003***
(−18.480) (−18.451) (−18.481) (−18.481) (−18.436)
1/Price (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.461) (1.462) (1.460) (1.460) (1.071)
Amihud ratio (t− 1) 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.291***
(2.997) (2.996) (2.997) (2.996) (2.997)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.171) (−0.169) (−0.178) (−0.169) (−0.172)
Book-to-market (t− 1) −0.000* −0.000* −0.000* −0.000* −0.000*
(−1.828) (−1.823) (−1.828) (−1.827) (−1.793)
Past 12-month returns (t− 1) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(2.255) (2.244) (2.255) (2.254) (2.220)
Gross profitability (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.163) (1.160) (1.163) (1.162) (1.163)
Order imbalance (t− 1) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(1.759) (1.758) (1.758) (1.762) (1.762)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] −0.016* −0.016* −0.016* −0.016* −0.016*
(−1.845) (−1.845) (−1.845) (−1.846) (−1.847)
Intercept 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(18.730) (18.701) (18.738) (18.730) (18.710)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,415,066 11,415,066 11,415,066 11,415,066 11,415,066
R2 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.093
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Table 3.6: ETF flows and debt securities returns
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily debt securities returns on ETF flows and
control variables. ETF flows are divided by market capitalisation and standardised. MOVE and ETF
mispricing are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values higher than their corresponding
90th percentile. FD is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for values higher than its median.
Standard errors are double-clustered at the country and day levels. t-statistics are presented in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The
sample covers the period from January 2016 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Ret[t, t− 1]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ETF flows (t− 1) (%) 0.001 0.000 0.004*** 0.004* 0.004**
(0.835) (0.706) (9.539) (1.915) (2.566)
ETF flows (%) * MOVE (t− 1) 0.001 0.000
(1.648) (0.269)
ETF flows (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) −0.004*** −0.004***
(−9.846) (−9.692)
ETF flows (%) * FD (t− 1) −0.003 0.001
(−1.413) (0.349)
Credit rating (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.302) (0.301) (0.302) (0.473) (0.478)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.731) (0.731) (0.730) (0.729) (0.728)
Time to maturity (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.089) (1.084) (1.089) (0.811) (0.944)
Bond zero (t− 1) −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(−5.159) (−5.159) (−5.159) (−5.076) (−5.367)
Turnover (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.391) (0.318) (0.026) (0.231) (0.033)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] −0.045*** −0.045*** −0.045*** −0.045*** −0.045***
(−3.013) (−3.013) (−3.013) (−3.002) (−3.002)
Intercept −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.479) (−0.479) (−0.479) (−0.555) (−0.510)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,161,001 11,161,001
R2 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
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sample is used, and at the security and month levels when individual countries are
examined.
Looking at the results for the entire sample in column (All), we establish a positive
relationship between ETF ownership and stock volatility. Specifically, for a one-standard-
deviation increase of ETF ownership, stock volatility increases by 1% of a standard devia-
tion. Examining individual countries, we infer that Irish ETFs do not affect the volatility of
US stocks, but have a significant effect for UK (3.4%), Japanese (3.2%), German (5.3%) and
French (7.0%) stocks.
In Table 3.8 we present the results of the same analysis using debt securities. In contrast
to equities, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase of ETF ownership corresponds
to a decrease of debt securities’ volatility by 1% of a standard deviation. However, looking
at individual countries, none of the five largest markets have a significant reduction of
volatility although all coefficients are negative.
Our contrasting results for equities and debt securities corroborate the findings of
the literature (Agapova and Volkov (2018), Ben-David et al. (2018)) and provide further
evidence for the links between ETFs and the underlying securities. Increased arbitrage
activity between ETFs and equities increases demand for the equities and their volatility
and makes the two markets more interconnected. However, increased ETF ownership of
debt securities incentivises liquidity traders to migrate from the debt securities to the ETFs
(Dannhauser, 2017), which segments the two markets and lowers the underlying securities’
volatility.
3.5 Conclusion
Our paper provides novel empirical evidence for the effects of information links and
arbitrage activity between ETFs and their underlying securities. We investigate two under-
lying asset classes, equities and corporate debt securities, and document the heterogeneous
effects of ETFs on their liquidity, returns and volatility.
First, we find that Irish ETFs propagate liquidity shocks to the underlying equities
but not to the debt securities. Second, we document a stronger effect of ETF flows on the
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Table 3.7: ETF ownership and stock volatility
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily stock volatility on ETF ownership and
control variables. In the (All) column estimates using the entire sample are presented, and in
subsequent columns estimates are presented for the largest countries individually. The dependent
variable and ETF ownership are standardised. Standard errors are double-clustered at the country
and month levels for column (All), and security and month levels for subsequent columns. t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels respectively. The sample covers the period from March 2014 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Daily volatility (t)
(All) (US) (UK) (Japan) (Germany) (France)
ETF ownership (t− 1) 0.010** 0.005 0.034*** 0.032** 0.053*** 0.070***
(2.091) (0.885) (3.290) (2.111) (2.973) (3.239)
log(MktCap (t− 1)) −0.206** −0.338*** −0.231*** −0.025 −0.067 −0.207**
(−2.553) (−12.097) (−3.369) (−0.537) (−1.097) (−2.145)
1/Price (t− 1) 0.000 0.017*** −0.003 −0.159*** 1.398** 1.804***
(1.154) (3.706) (−0.703) (−4.180) (2.265) (3.584)
Amihud ratio (t− 1) 34.677** 151.919 −4.369* −518200.397*** 297.454 −14395.311
(2.158) (0.638) (−1.859) (−6.058) (0.168) (−0.814)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.033*** 0.011*** 0.064* 0.269*** −0.038 0.060
(3.674) (2.980) (1.716) (3.234) (−1.343) (1.068)
Book-to-market (t− 1) 0.007 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.003 0.000
(1.105) (0.205) (0.841) (0.554) (0.189) (0.011)
Past 12-month returns (t− 1) 0.081** 0.002 −0.026 0.128*** 0.152*** 0.071
(2.556) (0.254) (−1.043) (7.142) (2.708) (1.115)
Gross profitability (t− 1) 0.008 0.057 −0.163* 0.097 0.040 −0.234
(0.616) (1.602) (−1.937) (0.892) (0.281) (−0.776)
Equity fund ownership (t− 1) 0.471 2.156* 1.376 0.806 0.135 2.721
(0.723) (1.803) (1.518) (1.488) (0.079) (1.324)
Hedge fund ownership (t− 1) −5.933* −10.963*** 3.559 0.476 5.183 −23.706**
(−1.865) (−4.351) (0.899) (0.232) (1.447) (−2.303)
Mixed fund ownership (t− 1) −0.013 −11.345*** 10.333*** 0.510 0.183 6.730
(−0.011) (−3.110) (2.745) (0.271) (0.041) (0.728)
Bond fund ownership (t− 1) −4.326 −10.642** 105.404** 114.190* −77.760 −1330.493***
(−0.633) (−2.482) (2.347) (1.924) (−0.459) (−3.298)
Other fund ownership (t− 1) 2.937 0.422 −0.029 14.249 1.777** 122.218
(1.169) (0.230) (−0.007) (0.931) (2.183) (1.371)
RE fund ownership (t− 1) −0.641 5.163 −24.177 54.889** 11.004 −16.749
(−1.050) (1.036) (−1.472) (2.183) (0.516) (−0.367)
Daily volatility (t− 1) 0.212*** 0.105*** 0.185*** 0.188*** 0.177*** 0.052
(6.218) (7.821) (3.266) (8.033) (5.684) (1.453)
Daily volatility (t− 2) 0.101*** 0.055*** 0.065* 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.063**
(11.100) (3.509) (1.678) (7.424) (4.057) (2.165)
Daily volatility (t− 3) 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.014 0.154*** 0.093*** 0.077*
(7.463) (4.803) (0.473) (10.901) (5.813) (1.989)
Intercept 1.367** 2.165*** 1.587*** 0.077 0.373 1.541*
(2.446) (11.491) (3.158) (0.245) (0.812) (1.900)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 601,694 127,019 27,357 84,924 9,071 6,440
R2 0.476 0.482 0.459 0.514 0.496 0.411
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Table 3.8: ETF ownership and debt securities volatility
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily debt securities volatility on ETF own-
ership and control variables. In the (All) column estimates using the entire sample are presented,
and in subsequent columns estimates are presented for the largest countries individually. The
dependent variable and ETF ownership are standardised. Standard errors are double-clustered
at the country and month levels for column (All), and security and month levels for subsequent
columns. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period from January 2016 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Daily volatility (t)
(All) (US) (UK) (France) (Netherlands) (Germany)
ETF ownership (t− 1) −0.010** −0.008* −0.010 −0.019* −0.004 −0.044
(−2.411) (−1.857) (−0.697) (−1.758) (−0.377) (−1.464)
Credit rating (t− 1) 0.009 0.023* −0.006 0.066 −0.020 −0.019
(0.729) (1.962) (−0.180) (1.269) (−0.767) (−0.792)
Time to maturity (t− 1) 0.002 −0.000 0.129*** 0.004*** −0.001*** 0.000
(0.113) (−0.085) (5.745) (3.066) (−3.218) (0.000)
Bond zero (t− 1) −0.030 −0.040 −0.183* −0.075 −0.041 1.642
(−1.303) (−1.006) (−1.717) (−0.511) (−0.359) (1.481)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 3.224* 10.322** 29.906*** 53.877*** 3.891 89.145***
(2.018) (2.557) (2.949) (4.556) (0.669) (3.439)
Turnover (t− 1) 0.005 −0.082 3.962 4.131 0.378 34.298***
(0.358) (−1.196) (0.990) (0.479) (0.076) (3.005)
Equity fund ownership (t− 1) −6.153** −9.953 41.955*** −77.322*** 16.056 −5.792
(−2.106) (−1.470) (4.549) (−3.338) (0.863) (−0.324)
Hedge fund ownership (t− 1) 0.454 −3.802* −0.578 84.710*** −8.056 5.060
(0.195) (−1.951) (−0.108) (3.183) (−0.690) (0.785)
MM fund ownership (t− 1) 0.744* 1.050 0.677 0.668 0.509 6.528**
(1.759) (1.096) (0.498) (0.494) (1.212) (2.534)
Mixed fund ownership (t− 1) 0.262 −0.082 −3.355* −1.400 1.331 −2.892
(0.576) (−0.114) (−1.734) (−0.733) (1.310) (−0.356)
Bond fund ownership (t− 1) −0.116 −0.223 0.358 0.109 −0.113 0.035
(−0.593) (−0.729) (0.630) (0.097) (−0.251) (0.038)
Other fund ownership (t− 1) 0.018 0.579 −1.262 −1.174 0.089 −3.108
(0.016) (0.372) (−0.493) (−0.384) (0.028) (−0.402)
Daily volatility (t− 1) 0.214*** 0.262*** 0.075 0.219*** 0.060 0.181
(8.738) (5.751) (1.550) (4.766) (1.084) (0.830)
Daily volatility (t− 2) 0.073 0.144*** 0.052 0.023 0.029 0.017
(1.645) (3.546) (1.395) (1.033) (0.897) (0.730)
Daily volatility (t− 3) 0.065 0.129*** 0.040 0.024 0.025 0.016
(1.073) (3.674) (1.301) (0.951) (0.435) (1.051)
Intercept −0.100 −0.241** −1.343*** −0.665 0.174 −1.832
(−0.640) (−2.330) (−4.410) (−1.669) (0.660) (−1.686)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 513,292 244,729 41,948 33,161 29,464 14,549
R2 0.501 0.590 0.466 0.633 0.301 0.655
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underlying equities’ returns than on the underlying debt securities’ returns. Third, while
higher ETF ownership increases equities’ volatility, it decreases debt securities’ volatility.
We argue that these effects are due to a strong information link formed between
ETFs and equities but a much weaker one between ETFs and debt securities as well as
due to different levels of arbitrage activity. The accessibility of equity markets fosters
the formation of a strong information link and facilitates the exploitation of arbitrage
opportunities. However, the hard-to-trade nature of the debt securities results in a weaker
information link and inhibits arbitrage.
As a result, we document illiquidity contagion occurring between ETFs and equities
but not between ETFs and debt securities, since a breakdown of the information link when
ETFs become illiquid would affect equities more severely than debt securities. Similarly,
the effect of ETF flows on equities’ returns is much stronger than the one on debt securities’
returns as equities are strongly affected by ETF demand shocks through arbitrage but
debt securities are less so. Finally, equities’ volatility increases due to increased arbitrage
activity as ETF ownership increases, but debt securities’ volatility decreases as investors
satisfy their liquidity demand through the (more liquid) ETFs.
Our results indicate that ETFs can affect the underlying markets in different ways
depending on their accessibility. From a policy perspective, this has important implications
in understanding the extent to which ETFs can propagate shocks as well as their effects
on different aspects of the underlying assets including their liquidity, prices and volatility.
Future research should investigate more directly the role of market accessibility and
arbitrageurs in driving the results presented in this paper, and examine the effects during






Table B.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Description Source
Panel A: Equities
Daily stock volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns within amonth. Bloomberg
ETF ownership
The sum of positions held by ETFs in the stock at each
quarter, divided by the stock’s daily market capitalisa-







The sum of positions held by ETFs of each fund type
in the stock at each quarter, divided by the stock’s daily
market capitalisation. We assume that positions remain
constant throughout the quarter.
CBI data and
Bloomberg
Log(Market Cap) The natural logarithm of the product of the stock’s sharesoutstanding and daily price. Bloomberg
1/Price The inverse of the daily stock price. Bloomberg
Amihud ratio The average of the absolute stock daily return divided bythe euro volume within a month. Bloomberg
Bid-ask spread The midpoint bid-ask spread. Bloomberg
Book-to-market
Book value of assets / Market value of assets, where Mar-
ket value of assets = Market capitalisation + Book value
of debt.
Bloomberg
Past 12-month returns The cumulative daily stock returns of the past 12 months. Bloomberg
Gross profitability (Revenue - Cost of goods sold) / Book value of assets,following Novy-Marx (2013). Bloomberg




spread The stock-level weighted ETF bid-ask spreads.
CBI data and
Bloomberg
Security-level ETF mispricing The stock-level weighted ETF mispricing. CBI data andBloomberg
Ret[y, x] The cumulative stock return from date x to y. Bloomberg
Order imbalance (Ask % volume - Bid % volume) × Volume / Shares out-standing. Bloomberg
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Table B.1: Variable Definitions (continued)
Variable Description Source
Panel B: Debt securities
Daily debt volatility Standard deviation of daily debt security returns withina month. Markit
ETF ownership
The sum of positions held by ETFs in the debt security at
each quarter, divided by the security’s amount outstand-






The sum of positions held by ETFs of each fund type
in the debt security at each quarter, divided by the se-
curity’s amount outstanding. We assume that positions
remain constant throughout the quarter.
CBI data
Credit rating
The debt security’s credit rating in a scale of 1 (high-
est rating) to 22 (lowest rating) following Dimitrov et al.
(2015).
CBI data
Time to maturity The debt security’s time to maturity in years. Markit
Age The debt security’s age in years. CBI data
Log(Amount outstanding) The natural logarithm of the debt security’s amount out-standing. CBI data
Bond zero The fraction of days in a month that the debt security didnot trade. Markit
Log(Trades) The natural logarithm of the debt security’s number oftrades per month. Markit
Amihud ratio The average of the absolute debt security’s daily returndivided by the euro volume within a month. Markit
Bid-ask spread The midpoint bid-ask spread. Markit
Turnover The debt security’s average daily volume over a monthdivided by the amount outstanding. CBI data and Markit
Log(Average trade size)
The natural logarithm of the debt security’s average
daily volume over a month divided by the average num-
ber of trades over a month.
Markit




spread The debt security-level weighted ETF bid-ask spreads.
CBI data, Bloomberg
and Markit
Security-level ETF mispricing The debt security-level weighted ETF mispricing. CBI data, Bloombergand Markit
Ret[y, x] The cumulative debt security’s return from date x to y. Markit
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B.2 Illiquidity contagion alternative thresholds
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Table B.2: ETF bid-ask spreads and stock bid-ask spreads (70th percentile)
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily stock bid-ask spreads on ETF bid-ask
spreads and control variables. ETF bid-ask spreads are divided by market capitalisation and
standardised. VIX and ETF mispricing are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values higher
than their corresponding 70th percentile. Standard errors are double-clustered at the country and
day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period from March 2014 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Bid-ask spread (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF bid-ask spread (t− 1) (%) 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.011** 0.017**
(3.072) (3.226) (2.268) (2.592)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * VIX (t− 1) −0.009*** −0.009***
(−3.049) (−3.014)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) 0.001 0.001
(0.654) (0.351)
log(MktCap (t− 1)) −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(−3.389) (−3.393) (−3.388) (−3.392)
1/Price (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.834) (0.842) (0.839) (0.844)
Amihud ratio (t− 1) 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111***
(2.796) (2.797) (2.797) (2.797)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.576***
(15.478) (15.466) (15.478) (15.466)
Book-to-market (t− 1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(10.348) (10.057) (10.351) (10.106)
Past 12-month returns (t− 1) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(1.830) (1.833) (1.827) (1.829)
Gross profitability (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.418) (−0.441) (−0.416) (−0.440)
Order imbalance (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.655) (−0.656) (−0.655) (−0.657)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.352) (0.355) (0.352) (0.355)
Intercept 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(3.712) (3.717) (3.711) (3.716)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,411,458 11,411,458 11,411,458 11,411,458
R2 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566
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Table B.3: ETF bid-ask spreads and stock bid-ask spreads (80th percentile)
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily stock bid-ask spreads on ETF bid-ask
spreads and control variables. ETF bid-ask spreads are divided by market capitalisation and
standardised. VIX and ETF mispricing are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values higher
than their corresponding 80th percentile. Standard errors are double-clustered at the country and
day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period from March 2014 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Bid-ask spread (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF bid-ask spread (t− 1) (%) 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.012***
(3.072) (3.438) (2.659) (3.007)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * VIX (t− 1) −0.006*** −0.006***
(−3.991) (−3.792)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) 0.004*** 0.003***
(3.321) (2.873)
log(MktCap (t− 1)) −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002*** −0.002***
(−3.389) (−3.390) (−3.387) (−3.388)
1/Price (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.834) (0.842) (0.839) (0.846)
Amihud ratio (t− 1) 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111***
(2.796) (2.797) (2.797) (2.797)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.576*** 0.576***
(15.478) (15.473) (15.478) (15.474)
Book-to-market (t− 1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(10.348) (9.777) (10.351) (8.801)
Past 12-month returns (t− 1) 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(1.830) (1.832) (1.825) (1.827)
Gross profitability (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.418) (−0.434) (−0.408) (−0.425)
Order imbalance (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.655) (−0.655) (−0.656) (−0.656)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.352) (0.354) (0.352) (0.354)
Intercept 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(3.712) (3.714) (3.710) (3.712)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,411,458 11,411,458 11,411,458 11,411,458
R2 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566
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Table B.4: ETF bid-ask spreads and debt securities bid-ask spreads (70th percentile)
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily debt securities bid-ask spreads on ETF
bid-ask spreads and control variables. ETF bid-ask spreads are divided by market capitalisation
and standardised. MOVE and ETF mispricing are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values
higher than their corresponding 70th percentile. Standard errors are double-clustered at the country
and day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period from January 2016 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Bid-ask spread (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF bid-ask spread (t− 1) (%) −0.000 −0.000 −0.002 −0.002
(−1.482) (−1.594) (−1.385) (−1.409)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * MOVE (t− 1) 0.000 0.000
(1.081) (1.066)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) 0.001 0.001
(1.224) (1.219)
Credit rating (t− 1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(3.674) (3.674) (3.675) (3.675)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954***
(57.249) (57.249) (57.249) (57.249)
Time to maturity (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.067) (1.067) (1.067) (1.067)
Bond zero (t− 1) −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(−3.044) (−3.044) (−3.045) (−3.044)
Turnover (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.664) (−0.714) (−0.530) (−0.580)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] −0.057** −0.057** −0.057** −0.057**
(−2.416) (−2.416) (−2.416) (−2.416)
Intercept −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.984) (−0.984) (−0.984) (−0.984)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,698,589
R2 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
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Table B.5: ETF bid-ask spreads and debt securities bid-ask spreads (80th percentile)
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily debt securities bid-ask spreads on ETF
bid-ask spreads and control variables. ETF bid-ask spreads are divided by market capitalisation
and standardised. MOVE and ETF mispricing are dummy variables taking the value of 1 for values
higher than their corresponding 80th percentile. Standard errors are double-clustered at the country
and day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period from January 2016 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Bid-ask spread (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ETF bid-ask spread (t− 1) (%) −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(−1.482) (−1.562) (−1.392) (−1.424)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * MOVE (t− 1) 0.000 0.000
(0.808) (0.797)
ETF bid-ask spread (%) * ETF mispricing (t− 1) 0.001 0.001
(1.254) (1.237)
Credit rating (t− 1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(3.674) (3.674) (3.675) (3.675)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954*** 0.954***
(57.249) (57.249) (57.249) (57.249)
Time to maturity (t− 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.067) (1.067) (1.067) (1.067)
Bond zero (t− 1) −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(−3.044) (−3.044) (−3.045) (−3.045)
Turnover (t− 1) −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.664) (−0.694) (−0.551) (−0.581)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] −0.057** −0.057** −0.057** −0.057**
(−2.416) (−2.416) (−2.416) (−2.416)
Intercept −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.984) (−0.984) (−0.984) (−0.984)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,698,589 11,698,589
R2 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961
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B.3 Country-level ETF flows and security returns
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Table B.6: ETF flows and country stock returns
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily stock returns on ETF flows and control
variables. ETF flows are divided by market capitalisation and standardised. Standard errors are
double-clustered at the security and day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the period
from March 2014 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Ret[t, t− 1]
(US) (UK) (Japan) (Germany) (France)
ETF flows (t− 1) (%) 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.040**
(0.154) (0.199) (0.982) (0.095) (2.437)
log(MktCap (t− 1)) −0.002*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.002*** −0.001***
(−5.316) (−9.027) (−11.414) (−6.904) (−2.748)
1/Price (t− 1) 0.000*** 0.000** −0.000 0.003 0.005***
(3.226) (2.020) (−0.677) (0.799) (3.528)
Amihud ratio (t− 1) 13.600 0.022 −917.714*** −9.423 −131.042
(0.606) (0.259) (−2.721) (−1.212) (−0.690)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) −0.005 −0.025** 0.030 −0.078*** −0.005
(−0.975) (−2.107) (1.127) (−4.174) (−0.359)
Book-to-market (t− 1) −0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
(−1.426) (0.797) (2.588) (3.664) (0.798)
Past 12-month returns (t− 1) −0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000
(−1.488) (0.975) (2.931) (2.293) (1.188)
Gross profitability (t− 1) 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.004**
(2.805) (2.909) (6.162) (0.581) (2.394)
Order imbalance (t− 1) 0.000 −0.001*** −0.000 0.005*** −0.001
(1.107) (−4.950) (−0.605) (6.472) (−1.361)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] −0.020*** −0.012* −0.006 −0.065*** 0.013*
(−3.186) (−1.931) (−1.475) (−9.301) (1.912)
Intercept 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.009**
(5.372) (8.699) (10.999) (6.470) (2.278)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,463,258 518,077 1,598,692 183,816 132,885
R2 0.132 0.174 0.263 0.203 0.181
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Table B.7: ETF flows and country debt securities returns
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of daily debt securities returns on ETF flows
and control variables. ETF flows are divided by market capitalisation and standardised. Standard
errors are double-clustered at the security and day levels. t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The sample covers the
period from January 2016 to December 2018.
Dependent Variable: Ret[t, t− 1]
(US) (UK) (France) (Netherlands) (Germany)
ETF flows (t− 1) (%) 0.002* 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(1.896) (0.675) (−0.022) (0.647) (−1.078)
Credit rating (t− 1) 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.413) (−1.178) (0.500) (0.920) (1.542)
Bid-ask spread (t− 1) 0.008 0.127* −0.001 −0.013* −0.079*
(1.321) (1.799) (−0.086) (−1.708) (−1.685)
Time to maturity (t− 1) 0.000** 0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000
(2.493) (5.988) (−8.896) (−3.497) (0.000)
Bond zero (t− 1) −0.000*** −0.000** −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(−3.220) (−2.300) (−0.903) (0.154) (−0.258)
Turnover (t− 1) −0.000 −0.004 −0.015 −0.002 0.010
(−0.431) (−0.514) (−1.582) (−0.545) (0.699)
Ret[t− 1, t− 2] −0.085*** −0.041* 0.001 −0.006 0.000
(−6.538) (−1.930) (0.331) (−0.583) (0.041)
Intercept −0.000 −0.002*** 0.000 −0.001 0.000
(−0.430) (−4.973) (0.343) (−0.823) (0.448)
Day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,493,436 957,172 752,837 663,507 357,513
R2 0.067 0.124 0.080 0.044 0.097
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Chapter 4
Systemic Liquidity Risk and Money
Market Funds
Abstract
This paper examines the ability of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) to protect the banks
against systemic liquidity risk arising from their interconnectedness with money market
funds (MMFs). I develop a network model of banks (sellers) and MMFs (buyers) of
money market securities and simulate MMF redemptions which can trigger asset sales
and a disruption to the funding of the banks. The model is calibrated to the full holdings
data of the US prime MMFs as of the end of 2017 following the introduction of the post-
crisis regulations aimed at mitigating runs on MMFs and the adoption of LCR. I find
that the banks can withstand the MMF funding withdrawal without breaching their LCR
regulatory requirements even in the face of extreme MMF redemption shocks. The post-
crisis reforms have similarly made MMFs more capable to withstand large redemptions,
although they can still face severe losses if their cash is depleted and the banks are
unwilling to accommodate asset sales. The results indicate that LCR can be effective from
a macroprudential perspective at mitigating systemic liquidity risk.
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4.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis highlighted the importance of addressing systemic liquidity
risk, defined as the simultaneous liquidity stress of multiple financial institutions (IMF,
2011). As the crisis deepened, many banks were unable to rollover or issue new short-term
debt, which resulted in a reduction of credit provision to the real economy (Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010), Acharya and Mora (2015)). The systemic nature of liquidity risk
manifested through the direct interconnectedness between borrowing banks and creditors
who were prone to withdraw their funding under stress (e.g. money market funds -
MMFs), as well as indirect interconnectedness through common asset holdings and fire
sales externalities.
In response to these events, the post-crisis regulatory framework of Basel III mandated
that banks need to hold enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to withstand a funding
shock for a stress period of 30 days through their liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). How-
ever, LCR is inherently microprudential in nature as it does not take into account the
interconnectedness that exists between financial sectors (Bonner et al., 2018). As such,
the question of whether it helps in mitigating systemic liquidity risk, a macroprudential
concern, remains open and is the focus of this paper.
In this paper, I focus on a specific aspect of systemic liquidity risk, the direct intercon-
nectedness that exists between banks and MMFs, which facilitate the short-term liquidity
needs of financial institutions by investing in commercial paper, certificates of deposit
and repurchase agreements (repos). At the peak of the financial crisis, the default of
Lehman Brothers led US prime MMFs investing in corporate debt to experience investor
redemption requests totalling $400 billion due to their liquidity mismatch as well as their
perceived inability to maintain a constant share price of $1, forcing them to cut down
lending in order to meet these requests and exacerbating the funding problems of the
financial sector (IMF, 2010). While regulations were introduced to reduce MMFs’ fragility
following the financial crisis, they again experienced runs during the recent Covid-19 crisis
due to investors’ flight-to-quality and search for cash. Without regulatory intervention,
the run could have triggered widespread contagion, propagating systemic liquidity risk
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(Cunliffe (2020), BoE (2020a)).
To answer my research question, I develop a network model of MMFs and banks and
assess whether redemptions incurred by the former can significantly impair the available
liquidity of the latter. The redemptions can be modelled either exogenously (liquidity
risk) or endogenously as a result of losses due to a bank default (i.e. a Lehman scenario -
counterparty risk). To satisfy the redemptions, the MMFs stop reinvesting the proceeds
from maturing securities which creates a funding shortfall for the banks. The banks then
attempt to cover this shortfall in the overnight interbank market, which can create upward
pressure on interbank rates, propagating liquidity stress. In extreme cases where MMFs
have insufficient cash to satisfy redemptions, they resort to asset sales. Due to the absence
of an active secondary market of money market securities, they ask the issuing banks to
buy back the assets, and the latter can impose haircuts if they have insufficient liquidity,
creating fire sales losses for MMFs and a new round of redemptions.
The network model by its nature facilitates the study of interactions between market
participants due to direct interconnectedness and is ideal for assessing their resilience
under stress. Importantly, the model incorporates the post-crisis US MMF regulations
designed to strengthen their resilience and mitigate first-mover advantages to accurately
capture the dynamics that can unfold during stress. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first attempt to model the liquidity stress propagation from MMFs to banks
in the current regulatory environment and assess whether MMFs contribute to systemic
liquidity risk. Furthermore, in order to test the effectiveness of the LCR regulation in
isolation of the post-crisis MMF regulations, I run a counterfactual analysis assuming
the latter have not been implemented. This allows me to assess whether the banks could
withstand a funding shock originating from MMFs of similar magnitude as in the financial
crisis assuming the LCR regulation was in place.
The model is calibrated to the security-level US prime MMF holdings data as of De-
cember 2017 which provide a detailed picture of the network of exposures between MMFs
and the largest issuer banks of money market securities. This enables the identification of
the important nodes in the network in spreading contagion and an accurate assessment of
whether MMFs can propagate systemic liquidity risk to the banking sector. The holdings
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data are complemented by data on the banks’ LCR and available HQLA as well as their
positions in the overnight interbank market to measure their ability to withstand liquidity
shocks.
My main finding is that LCR is effective at protecting the banking sector against
systemic liquidity risk arising from the interconnectedness with the MMF sector as the
banks are able to retain their regulatory LCR requirement of 100% even in the presence
of very large MMF redemption shocks not observed historically. The liquidity buffers
held by both banks and MMFs have increased their resilience, although when banks are
unwilling to accommodate asset sales the resulting fire sales can create significant losses
for the MMFs.
More specifically, when looking at the model results due to counterparty risk, i.e. due
to bank defaults, I find that the MMF asset losses arising from their exposures to the
defaulting banks reach up to $13.607 billion or 2.9% of total MMF assets. In most cases the
MMFs are able to accommodate the redemptions that are generated as a result of the losses
due to the banks’ defaults using their available cash without resorting to asset sales, which
only reach $24 million in the worst-case scenario. Because of this, the MMFs do not suffer
fire sales losses and the secondary redemptions are negligible. The limited disruption to
MMFs makes the banks suffer HQLA losses of up to $1.213 billion, or 1 basis point (bp) of
total available HQLA, which they can comfortably accommodate without breaching the
regulatory threshold of 100%.
Next, I impose large exogenous redemption shocks on the MMFs to test their resilience
against redemptions exceeding historical patterns (liquidity risk). In the most extreme
scenario MMFs suffer asset losses of $164.579 billion or 34.9% of total MMF assets due to
redemptions, which forces them to sell large amounts of assets of up to $69.626 billion to
generate enough cash to satisfy them. The banks, faced with a large funding shortfall as
MMFs stop reinvesting in them and the magnitude of assets they are asked to buy back,
hoard liquidity and impose steep haircuts of 85% on average on these purchases while at
the same time restricting lending in the interbank market. Interestingly, the results suggest
that while MMFs’ losses are not significantly negatively correlated with their liquidity
buffers, they are strongly positively correlated with banks’ haircuts and the absence of
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market liquidity. The negative returns create further losses for MMFs of up to $4.271 billion
due to secondary redemptions which forces the banks to utilise their HQLA reserves to
cover the funding shortfall. Nonetheless, the total HQLA losses in this stress scenario
reach up to $64.964 billion, or 0.5% of total HQLA, which are still not sufficient to make
any bank breach its regulatory threshold.
Finally, when considering the configuration without the post-crisis MMF regulations
and a prime MMF sector similar in size before their implementation, the model results
indicate that bank defaults can have a severe effect on MMFs due to their structural
vulnerabilities that make investors prone to run. Specifically, the asset losses reach $450.447
billion in the most extreme case or 27.8% of total MMF assets, which is similar to what
was observed during the financial crisis. The resulting asset sales reach $160.449 billion,
which makes the banks impose haircuts averaging 52%, creating further losses for the
MMFs. The total HQLA losses in this stress scenario reach $169.493 billion or 1.4% of
total HQLA, which while significant are still not sufficient to make any bank breach its
regulatory threshold. This suggests that the introduction of LCR has made the banks
resilient to liquidity shocks originating from MMFs similar in magnitude as was observed
during the financial crisis.
Against the backdrop of the ongoing Covid-19 crisis, my paper has several policy
implications. First, the LCR requirement helps banks to mitigate systemic liquidity risk
arising from the interconnectedness with the MMF sector, independently of the post-crisis
MMF reforms. As such, they are able to withstand severe liquidity shocks in money
markets without significantly impairing their ability to function during times of stress.
Second, while the MMF reforms have increased their capacity to satisfy redemptions, my
results indicate that in the absence of a buyer of last resort the MMFs can still incur severe
losses when large redemption shocks occur and the banks are unwilling to accommodate
asset sales. Hence, future reforms should focus on improving the market liquidity of
money market instruments rather than further increasing MMFs’ liquidity buffers.
My paper contributes to several strands of literature. On systemic liquidity risk, Farhi
and Tirole (2012) show theoretically that without macroprudential regulation, banks
choose to hold sub-optimal liquidity buffers and rely on government bailouts during a
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crisis. Several empirical papers have focused on the events of the financial crisis. Gorton
and Metrick (2012) describe the propagation of systemic liquidity risk through indirect
interconnectedness that occurred during the financial crisis as a result of the run on the
repo market. Ashcraft et al. (2011) find that US banks that acted as sponsors to asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and were subject to liquidity shocks in the summer
of 2007 hoarded liquidity, increasing rates in the interbank market. Similarly, Acharya
and Merrouche (2013) document liquidity hoarding in the UK interbank market in the
summer of 2007 and find an increase in the borrowing rates of all UK banks irrespectively
of their counterparty risk. Finally, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Cornett et al. (2011) and
Acharya and Mora (2015) show that banks reduced credit provision to the real economy as
a result of the liquidity crunch.
Fewer papers have focused on the effects of the post-crisis LCR regulation on the
mitigation of systemic liquidity risk. Among them, Aldasoro and Faia (2016) and Ferrara
et al. (2019) document that skewing the distribution of liquid assets towards systemic
banks in the interbank network minimises systemic liquidity risk. My paper contributes
by looking at the propagation of systemic liquidity risk across multiple financial sectors,
MMFs and banks, in order to provide a more holistic view of the contagion mechanism
and assess whether stress similar to the crisis period can have equally detrimental effects
to the banks post-crisis.
My paper also contributes to the literature on MMFs. The empirical strand has exten-
sively analysed the crisis period. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) find that MMF managers
had strong incentives to increase the riskiness of their portfolios before the crisis in order to
attract inflows, but once the shocks materialised the riskier MMFs also experienced larger
outflows. Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) investigate the European debt crisis in 2011
and find that MMFs that had large exposures to European banks suffered large outflows,
which negatively affected corporates that relied on them for financing. Strahan and Tanyeri
(2015) find that the MMFs that suffered large outflows following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers sold their most liquid assets first to satisfy the redemptions due to the absence of
an active secondary market for commercial paper. Schmidt et al. (2016) construct a simple
model of strategic complementarities and find that institutional investors were more prone
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to run than retail investors because of information asymmetries. Gallagher et al. (2020)
document the aversion of MMFs to hold assets that were exposed to negative news during
the Eurozone crisis to avoid redemptions from sophisticated investors. Importantly, there
has been scant empirical work looking at the post-crisis period and the stability of the
MMF sector following the introduction of the new regulations. This paper contributes to
fill this gap.1
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the institutional
details of MMFs, section 4.3 presents the model, section 4.4 describes the data used in this
study, section 4.5 analyses the results and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Institutional details
MMFs are open-ended investment vehicles that invest in high-quality short-term debt
securities, both sovereign and corporate. As a result, they are considered low-risk vehicles
that offer yields slightly higher than bank deposits since they are not covered by deposit
insurance. US MMFs are categorised according to their clientele (retail vs. institutional
funds) and their portfolio composition (government vs. prime funds). Retail MMFs cater
to small investors while institutional MMFs serve large corporations and governments.
Government MMFs invest in safe liquid government debt while prime MMFs invest
mainly in riskier and higher-yield short-term corporate debt.
Prior to the financial crisis, most MMFs offered a constant net asset value (CNAV) of $1
(called the market NAV) as long as the true (“shadow”) NAV did not deviate more than
50 bps, i.e. did not move below $0.995 or above $1.005. This fact, along with most MMFs
having implicit support from their sponsors should they break the buck (i.e. lower their
1The theoretical strand of the MMF literature has focused on the efficiency of the new regulations in
preventing runs. Cipriani et al. (2014) show that by introducing the possibility of a liquidity fee investors
may be incentivised to run pre-emptively before it is actually implemented, a distortion that would not be
present in the absence of such a measure. There is empirical evidence to support this prediction in the recent
run on MMFs during the Covid-19 crisis (Li et al., 2020). In contrast, Lenkey and Song (2016) argue that
the liquidity fee may increase or decrease the incentives of investors to run pre-emptively; on the one hand
first-movers may avoid the fee but on the other any investors who stay benefit from a wealth transfer due to
the fees imposed on the redeemers. Parlatore (2016) tests the efficiency of the new regulations in a general
equilibrium setting and finds that the MMF industry is more stable without allowing sponsor support as
mandated by EU regulation.
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market NAV below $1), made MMFs appear as safe investments with capital losses almost
impossible. However, when a large MMF, Reserve Primary Fund (RPF), broke the buck
due to the default of Lehman Brothers, this perception abruptly changed. The result was
a run on prime MMFs resulting in outflows totalling $400 billion (Schmidt et al., 2016),
which abated only after the intervention of the US Treasury.
The run was a result of the opacity of the MMFs’ holdings which increased the uncer-
tainty of the investors about the true value of their investments. In addition, there were
two important reasons why, once instigated, the run extended to multiple MMFs. First,
CNAV MMFs are prone to runs due to first-mover advantage. The RPF investors who were
quick enough to redeem their shares first were paid back the full price of $1 per share even
though the shadow NAV had already dropped below that value. All remaining investors
were forced to face losses which were exacerbated by the early redeemers withdrawing
their funds at par. Second, even though most prime MMF securities are short-term in
nature, most are inherently illiquid, making MMFs vulnerable to runs in a similar manner
as the one described by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for banks and Chen et al. (2010) more
generally for mutual funds due to liquidity mismatch. Hence, an MMF is forced to use
its most liquid assets first in order to repay early redeemers at full price, while remaining
investors are left with highly illiquid securities which can only be sold at fire sales prices.
In both cases, redeeming investors impose a negative externality on investors who do not
redeem, which incentivises everyone to front-run others.
Because of these facts, the post-crisis regulations in the US mandate that prime institu-
tional MMFs, which suffered the largest redemptions due to investor sophistication, adopt
a variable net asset value (VNAV) that is marked-to-market. This conversion removes the
incentive to redeem early since capital losses are automatically incorporated into the share
price. Prime retail MMFs retain a constant NAV of $1 since the run risk is deemed to be
small. Furthermore, in order to address the second cause of runs, securities illiquidity,
both prime retail and prime institutional MMFs can impose a liquidity fee capped at 2% of
redemption value if the weekly liquid assets (WLA)2 fall below 30% of total assets. Further,
2The new regulations categorise MMF assets according to their liquidity into the following types. Daily
liquid assets (DLA) include cash, US government debt and securities that mature within one business
day. Weekly liquid assets (WLA) include cash, US government debt and securities that mature within five
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if WLA fall below 10% of total assets, the fund managers would be obligated to impose a
liquidity fee of 1% unless this is deemed to be against the best interest of the fund (SEC,
2014). This creates a transfer of value from the redeeming investors to the ones that stay in
the fund, which compensates them for any potential losses due to fire sales, reducing the
incentive to run. Sponsor support in the form of asset purchases above market value or
direct cash injections remains, but the MMF must disclose it when this happens. Most US
MMF sponsors are either banks or investment fund families. However, this support is not
guaranteed and is at the discretion of the sponsor.
In Figure 4.1 I plot the evolution of US prime and government MMFs’ total net assets
(TNA) from 2000 to May 2020. As can be seen, while historically prime MMFs attracted
more investment than government MMFs, the introduction of the new regulations in 2016
was preceded by a shift of $1 trillion from the former to the latter. This shows the strong
preference of MMF investors for a stable NAV and capital preservation against small
market fluctuations. The gap between prime and government MMFs widened further
during the Covid-19 crisis as investors withdrew cash from the former and deposited it to
the latter. As a result, prime MMFs had TNA of $715 billion while government MMFs had
TNA of $3.9 trillion as of May 2020.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Model overview
Consider a universe of banks and MMFs connected via funding linkages. In line with
the current regulations, prime institutional MMFs are VNAV while prime retail MMFs are
CNAV but both may impose a liquidity fee of up to 2% of redemptions should their WLA
fall below 30% of total assets.
MMFs are linked to banks via ownership of debt securities (funding channel) and if
they are bank-sponsored CNAV they are also beneficiaries of discretionary support in case
of stress (sponsor channel). Both channels pose a risk to the banks which may see their

































































Figure 4.1: US prime and government MMFs’ total net assets (TNA)
Source: iMoneyNet data and Investment Company Institute (ICI) statistics
funding dry up (rollover risk) while at the same time be forced to provide liquidity to
their stressed funds. Furthermore, the banks are connected to each other via the unsecured
overnight interbank market.
My model takes place over a period of a week, i.e. five business days to coincide with
the available data on DLA and WLA and the typical timeframe before the introduction
of regulatory support. On day 1, the MMFs experience a redemption shock that can be
exogenous or a result of another shock (i.e. a bank default). Every day, the MMFs have an
amount of liquidity available to meet redemptions. This amount comprises of cash, US
Treasury debt which I assume to be perfectly liquid, and the securities which mature on
that day and are converted to cash.
In line with the findings of Strahan and Tanyeri (2015), I assume that MMFs attempt to
meet redemptions by first using their available cash instead of selling assets in a pro-rata
fashion. This assumption is based on the fact that short-term corporate debt, with the
exception of certificates of deposit (CDs), is not actively traded on a secondary market.
Instead, if MMFs are forced to liquidate securities like commercial paper, they can only do
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so by asking the issuer to buy them back (Van Horne and Wachowicz, 2008). In order to be
compliant with regulations, MMFs are assumed to use available cash only to the extent
that their WLA do not drop below 30% and their DLA do not become lower than 10%. If
this cash is not enough to cover redemptions, I assume that they further sell securities that
are not DLA, WLA or illiquid and are issued by the banks in my sample. The banks can
then decide to impose a haircut on the value of the securities they are asked to buy back,
which creates further losses for the MMFs due to fire sales.3 If the haircut is large enough
such that the MMFs cannot satisfy the redemptions after the asset sale, they are forced to
use their remaining cash reserves. However, since this can reduce their WLA below 30%,
they can impose a liquidity fee of up to 2% of redemptions in order to protect their liquidity
reserves. Throughout this exercise, I assume that MMFs experiencing redemptions stop
buying new bank debt and keep cash reserves instead.
As a reaction to the drop in the supply of liquidity from MMFs, the banks attempt
to cover the shortfall in the interbank market and at the same time decide the haircut
to be imposed on the securities they are asked to buy back.4 Banks that are sponsors
also provide liquidity to the CNAV MMFs in danger of breaking the buck. The interbank
market is modelled as a collection of risk-averse banks that act as profit maximisers and are
constrained by their LCR requirements. The equilibrium interbank rate is a function of the
banks’ willingness to lend and the increase in interbank borrowing due to the withdrawal
of MMF funding.
Finally, the MMFs calculate daily losses as a result of the redemptions. If there are no
fire sales, VNAV MMFs suffer no losses since their NAV is marked-to-market. However,
CNAV MMFs suffer losses if their shadow NAV is less than $1 since investors can redeem
at par. If there are fire sales, both VNAV and CNAV MMFs experience losses, creating
3In reality, there exists an active secondary market for CDs so MMFs would not be constrained in selling
them only to the issuer. However, since the identity of the specialised dealers that trade them is not publicly
known, I treat them like all other securities and assume that only the issuer can buy them back.
4The haircut imposed is a function of the banks’ available liquidity. Duygan-Bump et al. (2013) describe
how market liquidity for commercial paper evaporated after Lehman’s default due to pressure on the dealers’
own capital and liquidity, which impaired the MMFs’ ability to satisfy redemptions. Essentially, the dealers
imposed large haircuts on the securities they were asked to buy back so the MMFs faced further losses.
Several euro area MMFs were forced to ask issuing banks to buy back assets during the recent Covid-19
crisis as well according to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (ESRB, 2020).
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further redemptions the next day according to a flow-performance relationship and the
cycle repeats. The simulation ends after five days/rounds.
4.3.2 Model breakdown
4.3.2.1 Preliminary step: Initial shock
Consider a population of nB banks and nF MMFs belonging in the sets NB = {1, 2, ..., nB}
and NF = {1, 2, ..., nF} respectively. Each day, the MMFs have available liquidity Ci,t which
is equal to their cash, US Treasury debt and the value of the securities maturing on the
day. I start the stress testing exercise by imposing a redemption shock Si,0, i ∈ NF on the
MMFs. This redemption shock can arise from two distinct sources and I present results for
each one.
In the first stress scenario, I model a credit event akin to the default of Lehman Brothers
by letting each bank default on its debt, which creates losses for the MMFs and subsequent
redemptions. In this way I can measure the systemicness of each bank on the network by
calculating the total losses originating due to its default, as well as the vulnerability of
each MMF to each bank due to counterparty risk. I assume that the recovery rate of all
uncollateralised bank debt is 40% so MMFs are faced with a loss-given-default of λ = 0.6
for each dollar of defaulted debt held. Collateralised securities such as ABCP and repos
are assumed to preserve 100% of their value.5 At this stage, non-defaulted banks that
are sponsors must consider extending liquidity to MMFs under stress. It is assumed that
banks always do so in order to avoid the reputational risk associated with not providing
support as was observed during the financial crisis (BCBS, 2015). The banks will only
support a prime retail MMF that has broken the buck and will supply enough liquidity
to make its shadow NAV equal to $0.995 (such that its market NAV is $1). As a result,
initial redemptions for supported funds will be zero. The initial return is calculated as the
5The results are qualitatively similar assuming 0% recovery rate of uncollateralised debt and 80% recovery
rate of collateralised debt.
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∀ i ∈ NF (4.3.1)
where MNAVi,0 is the market NAV of MMF i at time 0 while MNAVi,1 is the market NAV
following the assets’ devaluation due to the bank’s default and any support received, if
any.
The negative return is assumed to cause investors to withdraw their capital according
to a flow-performance relationship that is estimated as follows:
Flowi,t+1 = α + (β + ui)Returni,t + γXi,t + εi,t+1 (4.3.2)
where Flowi,t+1 is the percentage change in TNA of MMF i from month t to month
t + 1, Returni,t is the gross return of MMF i from month t− 1 to month t, and, following
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), Xi,t is a matrix of control variables including the logarithm
of MMF size, the MMF’s expense ratio, the MMF’s age and the logarithm of the fund family
size. In this study I use gross returns instead of yields because they take into account
capital gains and losses, similarly to Witmer (2016). Since I use fund-level data, I aggregate
the share class-level variables by using weighted averages according to each class’s TNA.
For the purposes of the analysis, we are more interested in the individual MMF flow-
performance relationships rather than an aggregate estimate which would allow us to
capture the heterogeneity that exists among MMFs. For these reasons, and in order to
preserve the panel nature of the data, I estimate the regression using a mixed effects model
which incorporates a fixed effect common across all MMFs β as well as random effects
unique for each MMF ui. Finally, since institutional investors are more sensitive to past
returns than retail ones, I estimate the regression separately for retail and institutional
MMFs.
The endogenous MMF redemptions are thus:
Si,0 = (β + ui)returni,0 (4.3.3)
In the second stress scenario, I impose exogenous redemption shocks of various mag-
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nitudes to measure liquidity risk and assess the ability of MMFs to honour redemptions
using available resources. This scenario reflects the events of the recent Covid-19 crisis
where investors redeemed their capital due to flight-to-quality and search for cash rather
than due to capital losses arising from a bank’s default. By imposing arbitrary redemption
shocks I can assess whether there exist plausible levels of stress not observed historically
which could make MMFs propagate systemic liquidity risk.6
The redemptions from the two stress scenarios are used to update the MMFs’ NAV as
discussed next.
4.3.2.2 First step: Initial MMF losses
As a result of the redemptions, the MMFs’ TNA, number of shares and shadow net
asset value (SNAV) are updated as follows:
TNAi,t =
TNAi,t−1 ∗ (1− Si,t−1) if i ∈ NF is institutional or retail that broke the buckTNAi,t−1 − sharesi,t−1 ∗ Si,t−1 if i ∈ NF is retail that didn’t breat the buck
(4.3.4)





Prime institutional MMFs suffer no losses to their shadow NAV since the numerator
and the denominator are reduced by the same amount. This follows from the fact that they
mark-to-market their NAV. On the other hand, prime retail MMFs that haven’t broken the
buck can have a reduction of TNA that is greater than the reduction of their shares since
they are obligated to pay $1 for each redeeming share. As a result, their shadow NAV will
be reduced if it was less than $1 prior to the shock. However, if they have broken the buck
6In unreported results, I also considered redemptions as a result of losses due to an increase of interest
rates. The findings suggest that MMFs can withstand losses arising from extreme rate shocks of 300 bps
without facing significant redemptions due to the short maturity profile of their investments.
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I assume that they pay redeemers at market values. In reality, a retail MMF that cannot
preserve a share price of $1 is likely to face large redemption requests and as a result
suspend redemptions in order to manage an orderly liquidation of its assets as happened
with RPF. I abstract from such complexities in the baseline model by assuming that in
such cases MMFs move to a VNAV format which limits their subsequent redemptions (as
would happen if they were suspended).7
MMFs use their liquidity Ci,t in order to satisfy the redemptions as long as their WLA
remain above 30% and their DLA above 10% of TNAi,t. If they do not have enough
liquidity to do so without breaching those limits, they sell securities in order to generate
enough cash to pay back investors. I randomise the sale procedure by letting MMFs sell
securities that are not DLA, WLA or illiquid and are issued by the banks belonging in NB.
In the credit stress scenario, it is assumed that the defaulted bank does not accept asset
sales and its securities become illiquid. Each MMF randomly selects securities until their
total value is at least as high as the residual amount needed to satisfy all redemptions, after
taking into account the available liquidity used first. Implicitly, by only considering the
issuers in the subset NB, I make the assumption that non-financial companies are not able
to accommodate asset sales. This is reasonable to assume as most non-financial companies
sell debt through dealers, who can buy it back when requested to do so.
4.3.2.3 Second step: Bank reaction
I assume that MMFs experiencing redemptions stop reinvesting the proceeds from the
maturing securities. As a result, the banks are faced with rollover risk and need to cover




maturing securityi,j,z,t ∀ i ∈ NB and j ∈ J (4.3.7)
where FSi,t is the funding shortfall of bank i on day t, and maturing securityi,j,z,t is the
value of security z belonging in the set Z of securities maturing on day t, issued by bank i,
7In section 4.5.3 I consider results from an alternative model configuration where institutional investors
withdraw all their capital from CNAV MMFs that broke the buck.
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and held by MMF j belonging in the set J of MMFs experiencing redemptions on that day.
The updated interbank liabilities are:
ILi,t = ILi,t−1 + FSi,t (4.3.8)
where ILi,t are the interbank liabilities of bank i on day t.
If the bank is a sponsor, it also provides support to its funds as discussed in the previous
section. The total support provided by a sponsor bank, if any, is:
Supporti,t = ∑
j∈D
(0.995− SNAVj,t) ∗ sharesj,t if i ∈ NB is sponsor (4.3.9)
where Supporti,t is the total support in liquidity provided by bank i if it is a sponsor bank
to the MMF j belonging in the set D of prime retail MMFs that have broken the buck (i.e.
SNAVj,t lower than $0.995). VNAV MMFs are not entitled to sponsor support since by
definition they cannot break the buck.
Finally, the banks must consider the amount of securities they are willing to buy back
from distressed MMFs. They can impose a haircut fi,t ∈ [0, 1] which is applied uniformly
on the value of the assets they are asked to buy, Assetsi,t, and is determined in equilibrium
depending on their available liquidity.8 Since the banks are the issuers of the debt they
are asked to buy back, the repurchased securities expire and the banks are not required
to hold capital for these positions. This is a key distinction with other dealer models
where broker-dealers typically finance asset purchases with repo transactions and take into
account the capital costs associated with warehousing assets (e.g. Baranova et al. (2017)).
I model the interbank market by using a modified version of the framework developed
by Hałaj and Kok (2015). Each bank has a default probability which is simply estimated





where pi,t is the default probability of bank i, si,t is the CDS spread of i at time t and λ is
8I do not observe MMFs that own sponsor bank securities, hence a haircut does not negatively affect a
bank’s sponsored MMFs.
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the loss-given-default parameter equal to 0.6.
Each bank is charged a risk premium rpi,t over the risk-free rate r
f
t . This premium is
calculated using the fact that, in expectation, the rate of return of lending to bank i must be
equal to the risk-free rate:

















I model the demand (liabilities) and supply (assets) channels separately. The overnight
interbank market under consideration is assumed to be an over-the-counter market where
banks allocate funds to each other according to a probability map P. This is a nB × nB
matrix where the element Pij denotes the probability of bank i having a lending relationship
with bank j. I calibrate this matrix by using country-level data of interbank fund flows
using the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) locational statistics.9 Specifically, the
probability of bank i residing in country A lending to bank j residing in country B is
estimated as the fraction of funds lent by banks in country A to banks in country B to
the total funds lent by banks in country A. Banks residing within the same country are
assumed to lend to each other with probability 1.
After updating their interbank liabilities, the banks need to decide how to allocate them
across the other banks. They do so by minimising their rollover risk, i.e. the risk that the
lending bank will default and will not be able to rollover the loan. This risk is calculated by
estimating the covariance matrix of the default probabilities pi,t’s C, following Hałaj and
Kok (2015). Let Lt denote the nB × nB matrix of interbank liabilities, where the element Ltji
denotes the amount borrowed by bank i from bank j on day t. Each bank asks for funding






























Each bank chooses the vector of Ltij’s that minimises its rollover risk, subject to the
following conditions: first, the sum of the vector elements is equal to the total interbank
liabilities; second, the bank asks for funding from bank j with probability Pij; and third,
the interest payment of the liabilities must not lower the bank’s LCR below 100%, where
HQLAi,t are the bank’s available HQLA on day t and stressi are the bank’s projected
stress outflows over a 30-day period as provided in the annual report. The LCR in this
optimisation is only a forecast based on the current market conditions as the market hasn’t
cleared. The final LCR is calculated when I model the supply side.
Once the banks have stated their requested amounts from their counterparts, the latter
must decide whether they will extend the funding. The lending banks10 act as risk-averse
profit maximisers by considering the trade-off between the return on the amount lent and
the riskiness of these returns. The riskiness is computed by estimating the volatility of
the individual risk premia rpi,t, σ = [σ1, ..., σnB ], and their associated correlation matrix Q,
which measures the correlation of the banks’ default risk and comovement of reference
rates that determine the cost of interbank funding. Let At denote the nB × nB matrix of
interbank assets, where the element Atij denotes the amount lent by bank i to bank j on
















10Note that most banks act as borrowers and lenders simultaneously.
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subject to:
0 ≤ Atij ≤ Ltij
LCRi,t =








i,t)− Supporti,t − (1− fi,t)Assetsi,t
stressi
≥ Λ
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard product of element-by-element multiplication of the
vectors σ and Ati·.
The first condition states that the banks cannot lend more than what the borrowers
requested. They can, however, lend less if they deem that the return is not adequate for
the risk taken.
The second condition is the bank’s LCR which must be higher than a lower threshold Λ.
Each day, the banks’ HQLA increase by the interest received on the interbank assets and
decrease by the interest paid on the interbank liabilities. The HQLA are further reduced if a
bank has to support an MMF, and if it decides to buy back the assets sold by the distressed
MMFs. The bank has the option of applying a haircut fi,t to the value of the assets bought
up to a maximum of 100% whereby it refuses to buy back entirely. The closer the bank
is to breaching the lower LCR threshold Λ, the higher the haircut that it applies. In the
simulations, I vary the value of Λ in order to capture liquidity hoarding. A high value
indicates that banks prefer to hoard liquidity instead of lending it out and accommodating
asset sales, which has negative repercussions for the other market participants.
If the banks do not lend the full amounts requested, the market does not clear at the
current equilibrium rate r ft . I solve for the competitive equilibrium using a tâtonnement
process by employing the exponential search algorithm described by Meisser and Kreuser
(2017). The competitive equilibrium is defined as the interest rate r ft for which demand
equals supply (market clears) and banks maximise their risk-adjusted return subject to
the conditions stated in (4.3.14). As in all numerical solutions, I can only achieve an
approximate solution within a tolerance level. In the simulations, equilibrium is achieved
with a maximum deviation of 0.0001% between total interbank assets and liabilities.
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In summary, as MMF redemptions get higher and liquidity to the banks is disrupted,
their interbank liabilities increase and the equilibrium rate gets higher in order for supply
to satisfy the increased demand.
4.3.2.4 Third step: MMF reaction
After the banks have imposed their haircuts fi,t, the MMFs use the cash raised from the
asset sales to satisfy residual redemptions. If the haircuts are such that the MMFs breach
their WLA lower bound of 30% of TNAi,t, they impose a liquidity fee on redemptions









if WLAi,t < 30%
0 otherwise
(4.3.15)
where WLAi,t are the updated WLA as a percentage of TNAi,t after taking into account
the haircuts.
Finally, the MMFs calculate their final TNAi,t after taking into account haircuts and liq-
uidity fees. They also update their NAVi,t and calculate their daily return as the percentage




∀ i ∈ NF (4.3.16)
Following that, I calculate the new MMF redemptions:
Si,t = (β + ui)returni,t (4.3.17)
The new redemptions start the next round/day of the model since they force MMFs to
use their new cash and sell assets in order to satisfy them.
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4.3.3 Model implications
The model has several implications for the determinants of the propagation of systemic
liquidity risk. First, it is a function of MMFs’ TNA because as they increase in size and the
banks rely more on them, the resulting funding shortfall can also become higher, depleting
their available liquidity. Second, it is a function of the MMFs’ DLA and WLA since higher
cash reserves make them more able to satisfy redemptions without resorting to asset
sales and potential losses. Third, it is a function of banks’ available HQLA buffers which
they can utilise to cover the funding shortfall and lend in the interbank market without
impairing the provision of liquidity. Fourth, it is a function of banks’ propensity to hoard
liquidity because if they are unwilling to lower their LCR ratios below a target level, they
can impose losses on MMFs that sell assets and refuse to lend in the interbank market,
leading to a market freeze in extreme cases.
In what follows, I will utilise the model to assess whether there exist circumstances




The main data source for my analysis is iMoneyNet, a database that contains infor-
mation at the share class and fund levels for the universe of US MMFs. I conduct most
of my analysis at the fund level, which may include multiple share classes. The focus of
this paper is on prime MMFs, both retail and institutional, that lend to banks. As such I
exclude government MMFs from the sample.
First, I download the full portfolio holdings of all US prime MMFs as of the 31st
December 2017, after the introduction of the new regulations, in order to coincide with
the accounting reporting date of the banks. The holdings contain information at the
security level for the issuer, the type (e.g. commercial paper), the maturity date, the MMF
that holds it, as well as the market value. I complement this dataset with data extracted
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from the forms N-MFP which are filed by MMFs monthly in the SEC EDGAR database.11
Specifically, for each security I identify whether it is DLA, WLA or illiquid. I use this
data to calculate the DLA and WLA values of each MMF as a fraction of TNA. Next, I
download from iMoneyNet descriptive data for each MMF: whether it is institutional or
retail, the identity of its sponsor, and its market and shadow NAVs as of the 31st December
2017. Finally, I download from iMoneyNet monthly data from May 2008 to December 2017
for MMF gross returns and total net assets, which I use to estimate the flow-performance
relationship as explained in the previous section.
In Table C.1 in Appendix C.1 the complete list of US prime MMFs is presented along
with their TNA and type. There were 66 prime MMFs, 30 institutional and 33 retail, with
total net assets of almost $472 billion as of the end of December 2017. A total of 31 MMFs
were sponsored by banks, with the rest being sponsored by fund families. Vanguard Prime
MMF, a retail fund, was the largest MMF with TNA of $95.794 billion or a fifth of the total
TNA.
The breakdown per security type is presented in Table C.2. Certificates of Deposit
(CDs) comprised 31% of total value, followed by unsecured commercial paper (CP) issued
by financial companies at 21%, non-negotiable time deposits (TDs) at 10% and ABCP at
9%. All these securities are issued by banks or conduits mostly sponsored by banks, which
shows the dominance of the financial sector in the issuance of money market instruments.
I identify a total of 616 issuers. Table C.3 presents the top 10 issuers by market value
of securities issued. As can be seen, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the US
Treasury were the largest issuers, comprising 11.29% of total value, followed by various
banks. In Figure 4.2 I illustrate the US prime MMF network where the nodes represent
the sellers (banks) and buyers (MMFs) of securities. The nodes are connected by total
exposures and are weighted by the number of incoming edges, so the issuer nodes with
the most MMFs investing in them are the largest ones. The network shows a strong core-
periphery structure, with the largest issuers concentrated in the core. This is especially
helpful as we don’t have to extend the modelling framework far. I identify the largest
issuing banks, 66 in number (coincidentally the same as the number of MMFs), which
11https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html
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together with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the US Treasury, as well as their
sponsored ABCP conduits, account for 95.62% of total market value of securities issued.
Hence, in this study I focus on this small subset of issuers which nonetheless captures
almost the entirety of the market. They are reported in Table C.4 with the total market
value of the debt securities issued (excluding those of their sponsored conduits).
4.4.2 Bank data
For each bank, I download data on overnight (on-demand) interbank assets and lia-
bilities as well as their LCR and HQLA from their annual reports, Orbis Bank Focus and
SNL Financial as of 31st December 2017. The total interbank assets have a value of $809
billion, while the total interbank liabilities are worth $921 billion. The average LCR across
the 66 banks is 148%, while the total HQLA are worth $12.3 trillion. I also download from
Bloomberg daily CDS spreads for each bank covering one year, from 31st December 2016
to 31st December 2017. This data is used to calibrate the interbank market in the model.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Flow-performance relationship
Before I illustrate the simulation results, I briefly discuss the estimation results of the
flow-performance relationship (4.3.2) which are presented in Table 4.1. I estimate the
regression for the full sample of MMFs as well as splitting into institutional and retail ones.
The fixed effect parameter β is statistically significant in all sample configurations,
estimated as 0.692 for the entire sample, 0.937 for institutional MMFs and 0.440 for retail
MMFs. As can be seen, institutional MMFs are more than twice as sensitive to past
returns than retail ones, with a 1% negative return leading to redemptions of 0.937% and
0.440% respectively. Goldstein et al. (2017) estimate the flow-performance relationship for
corporate bond funds equal to 0.859, which lies between my estimates. The conditional R2,
which measures the proportion of flows variability captured by both the fixed and random
components, is quite high for the entire sample and the institutional subsample, at 51.3%
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Figure 4.2: The US prime MMF network as of end-December 2017
Nodes represent buyers (MMFs) and sellers (bank issuers) of money market securities and
are weighted by the number of incoming edges.
Source: iMoneyNet data and own calculations
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Table 4.1: Flow-performance relationship
This table presents the estimates of the flow-performance relationship of the MMF sam-
ple with a mixed effects regression using monthly data from May 2008 to December
2017. Column (All) provides results using the entire sample of MMFs while columns
(Institutional) and (Retail) split the sample into institutional and retail MMFs only re-
spectively. Flowi,t+1 is winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. t-statistics are provided in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ signify significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Flowi,t+1
(All) (Institutional) (Retail)
Returni,t 0.692∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗
(3.463) (2.648) (2.149)
Log(Fund sizei,t) −0.000 −0.002 0.001
(−0.225) (−1.249) (1.088)
Expense ratioi,t 0.005 −0.006 0.550∗∗
(0.112) (−0.112) (2.453)
Fund agei,t −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000
(−4.487) (−4.352) (−1.545)
Log(Fund f amily sizei,t) −0.000 0.003 −0.001
(−0.156) (1.199) (−0.697)
Intercept 0.009 0.005 −0.010
(1.036) (0.240) (−1.135)
N 6,552 2,798 3,754
Conditional R2 0.513 0.686 0.014
Marginal R2 0.188 0.325 0.005
and 68.6% respectively, but lower for the retail subsample at 1.4%. This could be attributed
to the fact that the returns of institutional MMFs have a much stronger predictive power
on the subsequent flows than the returns of retail MMFs due to the sophistication of
their clientele. Comparing the conditional R2 with the marginal R2, which measures the
proportion of flows variability captured by only the fixed component, we can deduce that
the inclusion of random effects substantially increases the explanatory power of the model.
It is interesting to note that a few MMFs in my sample have significant negative random
effects ui’s which lower their overall sensitivity to returns. Hence, the model captures the
heterogeneity of the flow-performance relationship between MMFs.
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4.5.2 Baseline simulation results
In this section I analyse the results of the baseline model presented in section 4.3 for
different stress scenarios. Each set of results is an average over 100 simulations due to the
randomised asset sale procedure. I set the initial risk-free rate r f0 equal to the US Libor rate
as of end-December 2017 which stood at 1.429%. For ease of presentation, I illustrate the
full sets of results in figures provided in Appendix C.2 while a summary of specific results
is presented in tables in the main body.
4.5.2.1 Counterparty risk
In this subsection I present the model’s results by simulating the default of each bank. I
set the lower LCR bound Λ equal to 110% which represents normal market conditions as
banks have ample available liquidity to accommodate asset sales.
In Figure C.1 I plot the heatmap of the first-round (negative) percentage NAV returns
incurred by the MMFs due to the default of the banks. The banks are sorted according to
the value of their issued securities, from the largest issuer (Wells Fargo) to the smallest
(US Bancorp). We observe that the larger losses are concentrated in the larger banks,
although the largest return of 6.3% is incurred by Meeder MMF due to the default of a
relatively small in terms of securities issued bank, Morgan Stanley. This occurs due to a
large exposure to the specific bank relative to total assets. In Panel A of Table 4.2, I report
the ten largest negative returns, separated by first and subsequent rounds and sorted by
total returns. As can be seen, apart from the two largest first-round returns due to the
default of Morgan Stanley, the rest are closer to 3%, similar to the losses incurred by RPF
due to the default of Lehman Brothers.
The losses due to the banks’ default cause some CNAV retail MMFs to break the buck,
forcing sponsor banks to provide support. The total support offered by the banks to MMFs
for the default of each bank is presented in Figure C.2 (a), separated by first-round and
subsequent-rounds support. As can be seen, CNAV MMFs only break the buck due to the
initial losses as there is no support offered in subsequent rounds. The default of Bank of
Montreal triggers the largest total sponsor support of almost $400 million, which represents
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less than 0.1% of total MMF TNA.
The negative returns incurred by MMFs not subject to sponsor support generate re-
demptions from MMFs. In Figure C.2 (b) I present the total TNA losses that are incurred
by all MMFs as a result of each bank’s default, separated by first-round and subsequent-
rounds losses. The former are due to asset devaluations resulting from the banks’ default,
while the latter are due to redemptions on the second day as by the third day there are no
more redemptions in the system. As can be seen, there is a strong association between the
magnitude of first-round and subsequent-rounds losses as the former largely dictate the
size of the latter. In addition, the amount of total redemptions tends to increase with the
size of the bank but it is not the only factor that determines them. Looking at the ten banks
whose default creates the largest TNA losses due to redemptions in Panel B of Table 4.2,
the largest losses across all MMFs of $13.607 billion occur due to the default of Toronto-
Dominion. Wells Fargo, the largest bank by value of assets issued, causes the seventh
largest redemptions ($10.112 billion) because a larger fraction of its assets are collateralised.
On the other hand, Canadian banks are the dominant issuers of commercial paper which
is uncollateralised so they pose the largest counterparty risk to the MMFs. However, even
the largest redemption losses originating from the default of Toronto-Dominion represent
less than 3% of aggregate TNA across all MMFs, substantially less than the 10% losses
observed following Lehman’s default.
The redemptions cause MMFs to stop reinvesting the proceeds from maturing securities
which creates a funding shortfall for the banks. The total funding shortfall faced by the
banks as a result of MMF redemptions is shown in Figure C.2 (c). Since I assume that any
MMF that faces redemptions does not reinvest the proceeds from maturing assets on a
specific day, the first-round shortfall is a function of the number of MMFs affected due
to the default of each bank, rather than its size in the money markets. As a result, we
can deduce that Bank of Montreal is the most interconnected bank affecting the greatest
number of MMFs and creating a funding shortfall for the remaining banks of $76.408
billion in the first round, and reaching $80.968 billion overall, or 0.659% of total bank
HQLA. Once again, Wells Fargo is not in the top five contributors which highlights the fact
that, although related, the amount of assets issued is not a perfect indicator of the potential
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of a bank to create stress in the system.
Next, I assess the MMFs’ ability to honour redemption using liquid resources and the
extent to which they resort to asset sales. Figure C.3 (a) shows the value of assets sold from
MMFs to banks in case of default of each bank. In most cases, these remain zero as MMFs
have enough liquidity to accommodate redemptions without breaking their regulatory
limit of 30% WLA. The default of Toronto-Dominion causes the largest asset sales but they
are limited to $24 million, around half a basis point of total MMF assets. These results
showcase the high liquidity reserves that MMFs hold as a result of post-crisis regulations.
Given the small amount of assets sold, and the fact that banks do not hoard liquidity in
this stress scenario, the average haircut that is applied in all cases is 0% as seen in Figure
C.3 (b). As a result the banks buy back the assets at market value and no MMF breaches
the 30% WLA bound, so none of them imposes a liquidity fee on redemptions.
In Figure C.4 I illustrate the cumulative returns occurring from days 2 to 5, i.e. excluding
the initial losses due to the banks’ default in order to assess the effect of fire sales on total
returns. As can be seen, returns are practically zero for subsequent days since the banks
do not impose haircuts and there are no fire sales losses. Nonetheless, the zero returns do
not imply that no redemptions occur in subsequent days, rather that these do not cause
further reduction to NAV because they only occur in VNAV MMFs at market prices, either
institutionals or retails that broke the buck and became VNAV. Sponsored CNAV MMFs in
danger of breaking the buck in the first round receive enough support so that they retain
their $1 valuation and so experience no further redemptions.
Finally, banks’ HQLA reserves are reduced by the support offered to stressed MMFs and
the funding shortfall. However, these losses are balanced by the additional gains realised
through increased interbank lending. In Figure C.3 (c) I present the aggregate HQLA losses
due to the default of each bank. The first-round losses are due to the initial support offered
to CNAV MMFs in danger of breaking the buck while the subsequent losses are due to
the interest payments on higher interbank liabilities resulting from the funding shortfall
as well as any subsequent support and purchases of MMF assets. Looking at Panel C of
Table 4.2, the largest losses occur once again due to the default of Bank of Montreal ($1.213
billion) but they represent only 1 basis point of the overall HQLA reserves. As a result,
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none of the banks breaches the lower LCR threshold of 110% and the equilibrium rate r ft
remains constant throughout the five days in all simulations.
To summarise, the initial losses incurred by MMFs due to an issuer’s default do not
have significant subsequent-rounds effects when banks facilitate market liquidity and
support CNAV MMFs. The ample liquidity held by the MMFs makes them capable to
honour the majority of redemption requests without resorting to significant asset sales.
4.5.2.2 Liquidity risk
The previous analysis assumes that investors act according to a pre-determined flow-
performance relationship. However, as was evidenced during the financial crisis, what
drove the mass redemption requests were the strategic complementarities arising due to
the structural characteristics of the MMFs rather than any realised losses (Schmidt et al.,
2016). In addition, investors may decide to redeem their capital in search for cash as was
evidenced during the recent Covid-19 crisis. In order to simulate such scenarios, in this
subsection I impose large exogenous outflows on the MMFs while remaining agnostic
about the reason behind them. In addition, due to the large resulting funding shortfalls I
assume that banks decide to hoard liquidity by setting the lower LCR bound Λ equal to
116%.12
I consider a range of redemption shock scenarios, starting from uniform outflows of
10% of TNA from institutional MMFs and 2% of TNA from retail MMFs, increasing the
former by 2% and the latter by 1% up to an extreme scenario of 50% of TNA redemptions
for institutional MMFs and 22% of TNA redemptions for retail MMFs. Such extreme
scenarios are beyond any historical precedence. Nonetheless, this analysis is useful in
determining the capacity of the banks to withstand severe funding shortfalls as well as
their ability to accommodate asset sales during a wider run on prime MMFs.
12Beyond that point the equilibrium rate becomes unstable indicating a complete market freeze.
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Table 4.2: Summary of results for counterparty risk
This table presents the summary results for counterparty risk including the largest neg-
ative MMFs’ returns in the first and subsequent rounds, the largest total MMFs’ TNA
losses and the largest total banks’ HQLA losses for the corresponding defaulting bank.
Panel A: Largest negative MMF returns
Defaulting bank MMF Return (First/Subsequent) (%)
Morgan Stanley Meeder MMF 6.341/0.000
Morgan Stanley Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 4.615/0.000
Toronto-Dominion Invesco Liquid Assets Portfolio 3.593/0.000
Bank of Montreal Dreyfus Inst Preferred MMF 3.437/0.000
Toronto-Dominion Dreyfus Cash Management 3.299/0.000
Barclays BlackRock MMP 3.293/0.000
National Bank of Canada Morgan Stanley Instit Liquidity/Prime 3.121/0.000
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Federated Capital Reserves Fund 3.114/0.000
JPMorgan Goldman Sachs FS MMF 3.101/0.000
Toronto-Dominion Northern Instit Prime Obligs Port 3.079/0.000
Panel B: Largest TNA losses
Defaulting bank TNA losses ($bn) % of total TNA
Toronto-Dominion 13.607 2.885
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 13.606 2.884
RBC 12.951 2.746
Bank of Nova Scotia 12.327 2.613
ANZ Banking Group 11.171 2.368
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 10.670 2.262
Wells Fargo 10.112 2.144
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp 9.562 2.027
Bank of Montreal 9.426 1.998
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 7.908 1.677
Panel C: Largest HQLA losses
Defaulting bank HQLA losses ($bn) % of total HQLA
Bank of Montreal 1.213 0.010
Toronto-Dominion 1.042 0.009
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 1.018 0.008
Wells Fargo 0.998 0.008
Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank 0.827 0.007
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp 0.756 0.006
Mizuho 0.710 0.006
Bank of Nova Scotia 0.668 0.005
Northern Trust 0.665 0.005
ANZ Banking Group 0.645 0.005
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As before, I start with the first-round negative MMF returns in Figure C.5, which occur
due to the initial redemption shocks and losses from the subsequent asset sales. The
heatmap provides an interesting overview of the vulnerability of MMFs to fire sales due
to liquidity constraints. As can be seen, while most MMFs are resilient even when faced
with very large redemptions, certain MMFs like Meeder Institutional Prime MMF and
JPMorgan Prime MMF incur large negative returns of 12.7% and 9.4% respectively. In
fact, these two MMFs comprise the ten largest total negative returns as seen in Table 4.3
Panel A. Interestingly, Meeder’s losses do not seem to stem from a lack of excess WLA
(48.8% as of December 2017) but rather due to its exposure to banks that impose steep
haircuts. A simple correlation analysis reveals that the average correlation across all shock
scenarios and MMFs of the negative first-round returns with the respective baseline WLAs
is −8.85% while the correlation with the average haircut imposed across all asset sales is
70.03%. This suggests that banks’ unwillingness to accommodate asset sales following a
large redemption shock can cause MMFs to incur severe losses even when they have large
liquidity buffers in the absence of a regulatory authority acting as buyer of last resort.
The sponsor support offered to retail MMFs in danger of breaking the buck as a result
of the first-round losses is presented in Figure C.6 (a). It reaches $13 million in the most
severe shock scenario, significantly lower than the amount of $400 million observed when
considering counterparty risk in the previous subsection. This is because of the retail
MMFs’ ample liquidity which allows them to satisfy the majority of redemptions without
resorting to asset sales and facing losses.
Figure C.6 (b) shows the total TNA losses of MMFs due to the different redemption
shocks. The first-round losses are a function of the severity of the exogenous shock,
ranging from $26 billion to $165 billion. The subsequent-rounds losses are zero for the
mild redemption shocks but gradually increase with the severity of the shock reaching $4
billion in the most severe case. This reflects the difficulty of the banks to accommodate
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increasing asset sales and the subsequent increase in haircuts that they impose, leading to
higher fire sales losses and redemptions. The ten largest TNA losses are presented in Table
4.3 Panel B. The most extreme redemption shock wipes out $168.849 billion or more than a
third of total TNA (35.797%), around three times more severe than the shock of September
17 2008.
The funding shortfall generated by the decision of MMFs under stress to stop rein-
vesting the proceeds from maturing securities is presented in Figure C.6 (c). As can be
seen, it is the same for all shock scenarios in the first round at $82 billion because it is a
function of the number of MMFs affected by redemptions rather than the magnitude of the
redemption shock. The subsequent-rounds shortfall gradually increases with the shock
magnitude from $1 billion to $14 billion as more MMFs are affected by fire sales and suffer
further redemptions.
As a result of the redemptions, MMFs are forced to sell large amounts of assets to the
banks to raise cash and not breach the 30% WLA threshold. These increase quickly from
negligible to $64 billion or 13.5% of total MMF TNA in the first round as seen in Figure
C.7 (a). Subsequent-rounds sales similarly rise up to $6 billion. The combination of a
large funding shortfall and asset sales together with banks’ liquidity hoarding behaviour
makes them impose steep haircuts as seen in Figure C.7 (b), averaging 85% in the first
round and 58% in subsequent rounds across all shock scenarios. As a result, several
MMFs are forced to impose liquidity fees to prevent their WLA dropping below 30%, with
the average fee imposed being 1.04% in the first round and 0.34% in subsequent rounds.
The subsequent-rounds returns are presented in Figure C.8 and remain subdued as the
subsequent redemptions are determined according to the flow-performance relationship
(4.3.2) so the fire sales losses from asset sales are lower. However, the two most affected
MMFs in the first round, Meeder Institutional Prime MMF and JPMorgan Prime MMF,
continue to incur significant negative returns of 4.5% and 2.1% respectively as they suffer
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higher subsequent redemptions due to their high initial losses.
Finally, the banks’ HQLA losses are presented in Figure C.7 (c) which follow a similar
increasing pattern as the shock magnitude increases. Looking at Table 4.3 Panel C, the
largest losses reach $64.964 billion, or 0.529% of total HQLA. While significant, these losses
still do not force any bank to breach the regulatory LCR threshold of 100%, although
several drop below 116%. This is despite an increase to the cost of funding in the interbank
market as the equilibrium rate r ft rises to 3.1% due to liquidity hoarding, which is similar
to the level of US Libor in early 2008 bur lower than its peak in September 2008 of 6.8%.
Overall, the results indicate that large MMF redemption shocks can have a significant
but not systemically destabilising effect for banks even if they hoard liquidity. There are
various reasons for this. First, the prime MMF sector has reduced significantly in size
following the adoption of the new regulations as seen in Figure 4.1. Second, both MMFs
and banks have considerably increased their available liquidity which helps mitigate
the negative effects of redemptions. And third, the new MMF regulations help reduce
subsequent-rounds redemptions.
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Table 4.3: Summary of results for liquidity risk
This table presents the summary results for liquidity risk including the largest negative
MMFs’ returns in the first and subsequent rounds, the largest total MMFs’ TNA losses and
the largest total banks’ HQLA losses for the corresponding exogenous redemption shock.
Panel A: Largest negative MMF returns
Redemption (% of MMF TNA) MMF Return (First/Subsequent) (%)
50 Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 12.730/4.548
48 Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 11.289/4.050
46 Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 9.610/3.734
44 Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 9.138/2.828
50 JPMorgan Prime MMF 9.396/2.055
48 JPMorgan Prime MMF 8.575/2.079
42 Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 7.866/2.151
46 JPMorgan Prime MMF 7.943/1.597
40 Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 7.083/1.897
44 JPMorgan Prime MMF 7.039/1.547
Panel B: Largest TNA losses











Panel C: Largest HQLA losses












4.5.3 No MMF regulations
A question that naturally arises from the previous analysis is what is the key driver
behind the results. To what extent is the ability of the banking sector to withstand liquidity
shocks driven by the high HQLA reserves irrespectively of the MMF regulations? In order
to answer this question, I run a counterfactual analysis. Using the same dataset, I run the
model assuming that the MMF regulations have not been implemented, i.e. all MMFs
are CNAV and there are no rules for liquidity fees, as was the case during the financial
crisis. In addition, in order to take into account the endogenous reaction of the MMF
investors to the new regulations, i.e. the massive outflows that occurred in the run-up
to their introduction, I scale the prime MMF sector’s TNA to their 2010 level of $1.62
trillion (ICI, 2018). By scaling the 2017 MMF holdings, I thus assume that in the absence
of the new regulations the MMFs would have similar portfolio compositions but roughly
3.5 times more capital to invest. This is reasonable to assume as by 2010 the SEC had
already imposed minimum liquidity requirements to the MMFs which forced them to
diversify their holdings to US Treasuries and repos instead of exclusively corporate debt
(ICI, 2016). I do not calibrate the model to 2010 data for two reasons: first, because detailed
MMF holdings data from this period are not available; and second, because the aim of
this analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the post-crisis LCR regulation in isolation of
the MMF regulations. I assume that banks do not hoard liquidity in this simulation, i.e.
setting the lower LCR bound Λ to 110%, although the results are qualitatively similar if it
is set to 116%.
Without the MMF regulations, the investors have the incentive to front-run others
if the MMF faces losses as explained in section 4.2. I modify my model to capture the
emerging dynamics of MMF runs theoretically described and empirically verified by
Schmidt et al. (2016). The authors look at the individual share classes of each MMF which
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can be institutional or retail and find that institutional investors were more prone to
withdraw their capital than retail investors within the same fund during the crisis. They
also find that as the fraction of total assets held by institutional investors within each MMF
increased, the total outflows also increased because of the strategic complementarities
arising due to their sophistication.
I perform this analysis at the share class level. Each MMF can have multiple share
classes, classified either as institutional or retail. The former typically require large min-
imum deposits (≥ $100,000) but enjoy smaller expense ratios (fund fees) compared to
the retail ones. If an MMF breaks the buck following a bank’s default, I assume that
institutional investors will attempt to redeem at par and immediately withdraw all of their
funds (similar to the RPF case). Retail investors will instead only redeem according to the
flow-performance relationship as before as they do not monitor market conditions to the
same extent. In order to scale the total TNA to the 2010 levels, I multiply each holding’s
market value by the fraction of 2010 TNA to 2017 TNA, i.e. a scaling factor equal to 3.435.
Starting with the first-round negative returns in Figure C.9, which include the redemp-
tions as a result of the asset losses from the banks’ default, it can be observed that the MMFs
that do not receive sponsor support and break the buck experience a complete withdrawal
of institutional capital. This leads them to post very large negative returns, reaching
100% if they are entirely comprised of institutional capital. MMFs that are predominantly
institutional but also contain retail capital in multiple share classes (e.g. BlackRock Liquid-
ity:TempFund and Federated Instit Money Market Mgmt) post lower but still significant
first-round negative returns because of the flight of institutional capital.
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Table 4.4: Summary of results for no MMF regulations
This table presents the summary results assuming there are no
MMF post-crisis regulations including the largest negative MMFs’
returns in the first and subsequent rounds and the largest to-
tal banks’ HQLA losses for the corresponding defaulting bank.
Panel A: Largest TNA losses
Defaulting bank TNA losses ($bn) % of total TNA
Toronto-Dominion 450.447 27.803
Wells Fargo 444.444 27.431
Bank of Nova Scotia 440.130 27.164
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 433.685 26.767
ANZ Banking Group 418.895 25.854
RBC 401.557 24.784
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 390.618 24.109
Bank of Montreal 388.574 23.983
Mizuho 377.800 23.318
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp 370.948 22.895
Panel B: Largest HQLA losses
Defaulting bank HQLA losses ($bn) % of total HQLA
Toronto-Dominion 169.493 1.380
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 165.687 1.349
ANZ Banking Group 159.911 1.302
Wells Fargo 154.426 1.257
Bank of Nova Scotia 153.306 1.248
Mizuho 153.059 1.246
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp 151.601 1.234
RBC 142.275 1.159
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 138.125 1.125
Bank of Montreal 134.175 1.093
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The sponsor support offered to MMFs is presented in Figure C.10 (a), which is higher
than in the previous simulations due to the larger size of the MMF sector and the fact
that all MMFs are CNAV. Specifically, it reaches $7 billion if Toronto-Dominion defaults,
considerably higher than the $4.4 billion of support provided in total from 2007 to 2011 to
US MMFs (Brady et al., 2012).
Figure C.10 (b) presents the total TNA losses. The first-round losses due to each bank’s
default are completely dominated by the subsequent-rounds losses due to the run of
institutional investors. This is similar to what occurred during the financial crisis when a
3% capital loss incurred by RPF investors due to the default of Lehman Brothers led to
massive redemption requests. As seen in Table 4.4 Panel A, the total losses reach $450.447
billion when Toronto-Dominion defaults, or 27.803% of total TNA, similar in magnitude as
during the financial crisis.
The funding shortfall in the first round reaches $190 billion with the default of Bank of
Nova Scotia as seen in Figure C.10 (c), identifying it as the most interconnected bank in
this simulation.13 When considering the total funding shortfall, it reaches $238 billion with
the default of the same bank, or 1.94% of total HQLA.
MMFs retain their high liquidity in this stress scenario but have to resort to significant
asset sales to satisfy redemptions as seen in Figure C.11 (a). The default of Toronto-
Dominion causes the largest asset sales of $160 billion, or 10% of total MMF TNA. The
pressure on the banks’ liquidity forces them to impose large haircuts on the asset sales
even in the absence of liquidity hoarding, averaging 52% in the first round but subduing in
subsequent rounds (Figure C.11 (b)). The subsequent-rounds returns, presented in Figure
C.12, shows that the MMFs that suffered a significant but not total flight of capital (e.g.
BlackRock Liquidity:TempFund and Federated Instit Money Market Mgmt) also post large
13This is different from Bank of Montreal in subsection 4.5.2.1 because the subset of MMFs receiving
support is different, which affects which ones stop reinvesting and the resulting funding shortfall.
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negative returns in subsequent rounds. This is exactly because of the negative externality
imposed on the remaining investors due to the run as the NAV is further reduced and the
MMFs are forced to resort to fire sales to satisfy redemptions.
Finally, the overall HQLA losses for the banks reach $169.493 billion when Toronto-
Dominion defaults, which represents 1.380% of total available HQLA as seen in Table 4.4
Panel B and Figure C.11 (c). While this amount is significant, it still does not force any bank
to post an LCR lower than 100%. In addition, the equilibrium rate of the interbank market
remains constant throughout the stress scenario. As a result, this analysis shows that the
introduction of the LCR has enhanced the capacity of the banking sector to withstand
liquidity shocks of similar magnitude as the one originating from MMFs during the crisis.
4.5.4 Robustness tests
In order to test the sensitivity of the results to different model specifications, I have
run a number of robustness tests. First, I have repeated the analysis by also including
the capital and leverage constraints outlined in the Basel III framework.14 The results
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar as none of the banks breach the minimum
regulatory thresholds of 8% and 3% for the capital and leverage ratios respectively as a
result of the increased interbank activity.
Second, I have run the model assuming there is no interbank market, so the banks
deduct the entire funding shortfall from their HQLA and do not offset these losses via
gains from interbank lending. While this more than doubles the total HQLA losses, none
of the banks post an LCR less than 100% (even under the scenario of no MMF regulations
and increased size of the MMF sector).
Third, I have also run the model assuming that the MMF regulations are imposed but
14https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm
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the sector’s size is the same as in 2010 in order to determine whether the reduction of the
size was an important factor in reducing its systemicness. The results remain qualitatively
similar as in subsection 4.5.2.1 which indicates that this is not the case.
Overall, the tests indicate that my main results are not driven by model assumptions
but reflect the increased resilience of the banking system to liquidity shocks.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed a framework to assess the resilience of the US prime
MMFs faced with counterparty and liquidity risks as well as their potential to transmit
stress to the banking sector by cutting wholesale funding. Using end-2017 data, I document
the resilience of the MMF sector in all but the most extreme redemption shocks as well
as the ability of the banks to retain enough liquidity to satisfy their LCR regulatory
requirements.
The results indicate that the LCR requirement introduced in Basel III makes the banks
able to withstand the funding shocks originating from the MMF sector. Hence, from a
macroprudential perspective, systemic liquidity risk originating from the interconnected-
ness of banks with US prime MMFs has decreased. In addition, the post-crisis regulations
have made US prime MMFs more resilient to shocks by adhering to strict minimum liquid-
ity and diversification criteria. However, they can still face severe losses if the banks are
unwilling to accommodate asset sales and in the absence of a buyer of last resort, which
can amplify the propagation of liquidity stress.
These findings contrast with what was observed during the run on US prime MMFs
at the height of the financial crisis when there were severe repercussions for the banks
and the real economy. While the increased liquidity reserves of the banks have enhanced
their resilience, my analysis remains partial in nature as it does not consider other funding
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markets that were also stressed during the crisis. In addition, the new MMF regulations
have reduced the incentive for investors to front-run others when mass redemptions occur
but as seen in the recent Covid-19 crisis such an event cannot be ruled out, especially given
their strong preference for capital preservation and aversion for liquidity fees. As such,
future research should focus on more detailed modelling of amplification mechanisms





Table C.1: List of US prime MMFs
This table lists all US prime MMFs as of December 2017, with their total net assets, the %
share of total TNA across all MMFs, their type and whether they are sponsored by banks.
Money Market Fund TNA ($bn) Share of total (%) Type Bank sponsored
Vanguard Prime MMF 95.794 20.309 Retail No
BlackRock Money Market Master Portfolio 56.101 11.894 Institutional No
JPMorgan Prime MMF 37.206 7.888 Institutional Yes
Schwab Cash Reserves 35.875 7.606 Retail No
Schwab Value Advantage MF 27.485 5.827 Retail No
Fidelity Inv Money Market Portfolio 25.798 5.469 Retail No
Western Asset Liquid Reserves 19.374 4.107 Institutional Yes
Fidelity MMF 14.672 3.111 Retail No
Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves 14.413 3.056 Retail No
Fidelity Inv Prime MMP 13.602 2.879 Institutional No
BlackRock Liquidity:TempFund 13.581 2.879 Institutional No
State Street Money Market Portfolio 9.936 2.106 Institutional Yes
General MMF 9.149 1.940 Retail Yes
Schwab Money Market Fund 7.997 1.695 Retail No
Federated Prime Cash Obligs 7.091 1.503 Retail No
Federated Instit Prime Oblig 6.841 1.450 Institutional No
Wells Fargo Heritage MMF 6.710 1.422 Institutional Yes
UBS Prime Master Fund 6.458 1.369 Institutional Yes
Dreyfus Cash Management 5.902 1.251 Institutional Yes
Federated Capital Reserves Fund 5.278 1.119 Retail No
Morgan Stanley Instit Liquidity/Prime 5.017 1.064 Institutional Yes
USAA Money Market Fund 4.395 0.932 Retail No
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Table C.1: List of US prime MMFs (continued)
Money Market Fund TNA ($bn) Share of total (%) Type Bank sponsored
Fidelity Inv Prime Reserves 3.697 0.784 Institutional No
First Amer Retail Prime Obligs Fund 2.952 0.626 Retail Yes
Dreyfus Inst Preferred MMF 3.055 0.648 Institutional Yes
Invesco Liquid Assets Portfolio 2.831 0.600 Institutional No
Goldman Sachs FS MMF 2.424 0.514 Institutional Yes
T Rowe Price Cash Reserves Fund 2.263 0.480 Retail No
Northern Instit Prime Obligs Port 2.220 0.471 Institutional Yes
JPMorgan Liquid Assets MMF 1.950 0.413 Retail Yes
BlackRock Liquidity:TempCash 1.823 0.386 Institutional No
UBS Prime CNAV Master Fund 1.849 0.392 Retail Yes
Wells Fargo Cash Invmt MMF 1.499 0.318 Institutional Yes
Ivy Cash Mgmt Fund 1.465 0.311 Retail No
Goldman Sachs FS Prime Obligs Fund 1.394 0.296 Institutional Yes
Schwab Variable Share Price MF 1.295 0.275 Institutional No
American Century Prime MMF 1.269 0.269 Retail No
TD Money Market Portfolio 1.131 0.240 Retail No
Putnam MMF 0.822 0.174 Retail No
First Amer Instit Prime Obligations 0.784 0.166 Institutional Yes
Morgan Stanley Instit Liq/MMP 0.786 0.167 Institutional Yes
DWS Money Market Prime Series 0.774 0.164 Retail Yes
Invesco Premier Portfolio 0.740 0.157 Retail No
Dreyfus Liquid Assets 0.618 0.131 Retail Yes
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Table C.1: List of US prime MMFs (continued)
Money Market Fund TNA ($bn) Share of total (%) Type Bank sponsored
Schwab Investor Money Fund 0.568 0.120 Retail No
Principal Funds MMF 0.484 0.103 Retail No
Wells Fargo Money Market Fund 0.474 0.100 Retail Yes
BlackRock MMP 0.473 0.100 Retail No
BMO Prime MMF 0.451 0.096 Retail Yes
BMO Institutional Prime MMF 0.419 0.089 Institutional Yes
Invesco Prime Portfolio 0.378 0.080 Institutional No
Goldman Sachs Inv MMF 0.333 0.071 Retail Yes
MainStay Money Market Fund 0.330 0.070 Retail No
Meeder Institutional Prime MMF 0.297 0.063 Institutional No
Northern MMF 0.211 0.045 Retail Yes
Schwab Retirement Advantage MF 0.201 0.043 Retail No
Dreyfus Prime MMF 0.155 0.033 Retail Yes
Dreyfus BASIC MMF 0.129 0.027 Retail Yes
Western Asset Prime Oblig MMF 0.128 0.027 Retail Yes
DWS Variable NAV MF 0.122 0.026 Institutional Yes
Federated Instit Money Market Mgmt 0.085 0.018 Institutional No
Plan Inv Fund/MMP 0.065 0.014 Institutional No
Meeder MMF 0.035 0.007 Retail No
T Rowe Price Instit Cash Reserves 0.021 0.004 Institutional No
Federated Inst Prime 60 Day Fund/Pm 0.008 0.002 Institutional No
Morgan Stanley Active Assets Prime Trust 0.003 0.001 Retail Yes
Total 471.687 100
Source: iMoneyNet data and own calculations
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Table C.2: Security type breakdown
This table lists the security types US prime MMFs invested to as of
December 2017, the total value invested and the % share of total.
Security type Market value ($bn) Share of total (%)
CD 144.894 30.718
Financial Co CP 97.998 20.776
Non-Negotiable TD 47.658 10.104
ABCP 40.714 8.632
Other Repo 36.329 7.702
Treasury Repo 32.810 6.956
Treasury Debt 26.271 5.570
Other CP 13.211 2.801
VRDN 8.897 1.886
Govt Agency Repo 8.569 1.817
Other Instrument 7.288 1.545
Govt Agency Debt 3.083 0.654
Cash 1.596 0.338
Tender Option Bond 1.311 0.278
Non-US SUPRA 0.526 0.112
Other Muni Debt 0.200 0.042
Investment Co 0.166 0.035
Other ABS 0.148 0.031
Ins Co Funding Agrmnt 0.017 0.004
Total 471.687 100
Source: iMoneyNet data and own calculations
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Table C.3: Top 10 issuers by market value of securities issued
This table lists the ten largest issuers of money market securities bought by US
prime MMFs as of December 2017, the total value issued and the % share of total.
Issuer Market value ($bn) Share of total (%)
Federal Reserve Bank of NY 26.965 5.717
US Dept of the Treasury 26.271 5.570
Wells Fargo 19.647 4.165
RBC 16.496 3.497
Toronto-Dominion 14.936 3.166
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 14.077 2.984
Bank of Nova Scotia 13.605 2.884
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 12.059 2.557
ANZ Banking Group 11.616 2.463
Bank of Montreal 10.951 2.322
Total 166.623 35.325
Source: iMoneyNet data and own calculations
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Table C.4: List of banks
This table lists the 66 largest issuer banks of money market securities bought by US prime MMFs
as of December 2017, the total value issued, the % share of total and whether they sponsor MMFs.
Issuer Market value ($bn) Share of total (%) Sponsor bank
Wells Fargo 19.647 4.165 Yes
RBC 16.496 3.497 No
Toronto-Dominion 14.936 3.166 Yes
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 14.077 2.984 No
Bank of Nova Scotia 13.605 2.884 No
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 12.059 2.557 No
ANZ Banking Group 11.616 2.463 No
Bank of Montreal 10.951 2.322 Yes
Citigroup 10.036 2.128 Yes
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp 9.643 2.044 No
Mizuho 9.264 1.964 No
Barclays 9.223 1.955 No
HSBC 8.112 1.720 No
Bank of America 8.071 1.711 No
JPMorgan 7.911 1.677 Yes
Nordea Bank 7.800 1.654 No
Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank 7.731 1.639 No
Credit Agricole 7.495 1.589 No
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 7.432 1.576 No
BNP Paribas 7.305 1.549 No
Westpac 7.260 1.539 No
UBS 6.944 1.472 Yes
167
Table C.4: List of banks (continued)
Issuer Market value ($bn) Share of total (%) Sponsor bank
National Australia Bank 6.835 1.449 No
Credit Suisse 6.730 1.427 No
DnB NOR Bank 6.095 1.292 No
Svenska Handelsbanken 5.246 1.112 No
Swedbank 5.149 1.092 No
ABN AMRO 4.828 1.024 No
KBC Bank 4.529 0.960 No
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp 4.399 0.933 No
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 4.299 0.897 No
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 3.952 0.838 No
Societe Generale 3.612 0.766 No
BPCE 3.492 0.740 No
Norinchukin Bank 3.287 0.697 No
ING 3.101 0.658 No
Standard Chartered Bank 2.967 0.629 No
DBS Bank 2.940 0.623 No
Rabobank 2.833 0.601 No
Natixis 2.505 0.531 No
Bayerische Landesbank 2.289 0.485 No
State Street 2.262 0.479 Yes
NRW.Bank 2.128 0.451 No
National Bank of Canada 2.063 0.437 No
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Table C.4: List of banks (continued)
Issuer Market value ($bn) Share of total (%) Sponsor bank
Deutsche Bank 1.952 0.414 Yes
Danske Corp 1.779 0.377 No
Helaba 1.769 0.375 No
Dexia 1.530 0.324 No
Credit Industriel et Commercial 1.459 0.309 No
China Construction Bank 1.409 0.299 No
United Overseas Bank 1.395 0.296 No
Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 1.279 0.271 No
Santander UK 1.165 0.247 No
Northern Trust 1.137 0.241 Yes
Lloyds Banking Group 1.094 0.232 No
Macquarie Group 1.082 0.229 No
Morgan Stanley 1.048 0.222 Yes
First Abu Dhabi Bank 0.940 0.199 No
DZ Bank 0.918 0.195 No
Bank of China 0.880 0.186 No
Goldman Sachs 0.646 0.137 Yes
Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 0.413 0.088 No
RBS 0.392 0.083 No
Chiba Bank 0.376 0.080 No
BNY Mellon 0.067 0.014 Yes
US Bancorp 0.031 0.007 Yes
Total 335.846 71.201
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The introduction of regulations aimed at mitigating systemic risk following the financial
crisis has transformed the financial system. Many of the vulnerabilities that manifested
have been addressed by enhancing the resilience of the banking and shadow banking
sectors. Yet, as the recent market turbulence in March 2020 due to Covid-19 demonstrated,
new vulnerabilities have arisen which have showcased the need for an understanding of
the new channels of stress in the financial system in order to mitigate them.
This thesis has contributed to this understanding by examining various sectors of
the financial system that have received academic and regulatory focus over the past
decade. The first essay examined the effects of the mandatory collateralisation of OTC
derivatives contracts that are not centrally cleared through CCPs on counterparty, liquidity
and systemic risks. Using a stress-testing network model calibrated to balance sheet data
of the largest dealer banks in the OTC derivatives markets, the findings indicate that the
regulation is successful in reducing counterparty and systemic risks, at the expense of
higher liquidity risk and increased fragility of CCPs. When the financial system is hit
by large shocks, this can give rise to a dash-for-cash as market participants try to raise
183
cash to pay their obligations. Hence, our results contribute to the academic literature on
derivatives clearing by showcasing the trade-offs between the various forms of risk and
their systemic implications, as well as to the current policy debate on the role of margining
practices in amplifying funding strains.
The second essay examined the mechanism through which ETFs can affect the prices,
liquidity and volatility of the underlying equities and corporate debt securities. Using
a proprietary dataset of the Central Bank of Ireland containing all Irish ETFs and their
holdings, the findings suggest that ETFs have a strong effect on equities’ liquidity and
prices and increase their volatility, but only have a weak or insignificant effect on corporate
debt securities’ liquidity and prices and decrease their volatility. By examining both
underlying asset classes jointly we are able to propose a mechanism that explains these
differential effects by relying on the theoretical framework that looks at information links
between assets. Our results thus contribute to the academic literature that has examined
such effects separately on each underlying asset class, as well as to the policy debate on
whether ETFs can propagate shocks to the underlying securities.
The third essay examined the potential of MMFs to act as a source of systemic liquidity
risk and the resilience of the banking sector against this risk. Using a stress-testing network
model calibrated to the US MMF holdings data, the findings suggest that the banks
can withstand liquidity shocks arising from a withdrawal of short-term funding from
MMFs due to their high liquidity reserves. However, the MMFs, while more resilient
to redemption shocks following the post-crisis regulations, can still face severe fire sales
losses if the banks are unwilling to buy back commercial paper and market liquidity
evaporates. The results thus highlight the continual vulnerability of MMFs and contribute
to the academic literature on MMFs which has mainly focused on the financial crisis period.
The results are also consistent with the MMF stress observed in the recent market turmoil
in March 2020, and highlight the need for reform of the market structure of commercial
184
paper in order to ensure that it remains liquid even during times of stress.
The findings of the thesis provide multiple avenues for future research. On OTC
derivatives markets, it would be interesting to examine how different market participants
react to liquidity shocks and whether margin procyclicality causes excessive strain on
them. On ETFs, future research can examine the effects of information links further to
discover new ways of shock propagation to the underlying securities. Finally, on MMFs it
would be interesting to examine the optimal market structure of the securities they invest
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